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Chapter I 
Breaking down the chain of responsiveness. 
The rough path from voters’ preferences to policy outcomes 
 
 
Abstract. This dissertation investigates how well political parties, especially those holding 
executive positions, achieve policy congruence by translating voters’ redistributive 
preferences into consistent social policy outcomes. This first chapter aims at providing 
the general theoretical framework. In detail, it defines the meaning of the elusive concept 
of political representation drawing on Hanna Pitkin’s (1967) treatment of substantive 
political representation. Then, it discusses the expressive and the instrumental functions 
that political parties are expected to perform in representative democracies and recalls 
party government theories formulated from the 1970s. This literature review allows 
formulating a unified framework, which reorganizes the core stipulations for party 
government to emerge. Finally, this chapter introduces the general structure of this 
dissertation by revealing how the ideal chain of responsiveness from voters’ redistributive 
preferences to social policy outcomes will be broken down to measure how far actual 
representative processes are from the ideal model depicted by democratic theorists. 
 
 
Introduction 
This dissertation addresses the issue of representation in modern democracies focusing 
on social and labor market policies, a domain which is deeply rooted in the capital-labor 
conflict and which largely drew the attention of scholars concerned with the role of 
political parties in achieving policy congruence (Lipset & Rokkan, 1967; cfr. Section 1.4.1).  
Indeed, this study intends to assess how far actual representative processes are from the 
normatively informed vision of representative democracy, according to which individual 
or collective representatives (i.e., the agents) act on behalf of their voters (i.e., the 
principals) in adopting and implementing authoritative decisions, policies and laws 
(Thompson, 2001; Cfr. Section 1.1).  
In the social and labor market policy areas, it means investigating how well political 
parties, especially those holding executive positions, translate voters’ redistributive 
preferences into consistent social policy outcomes once the dust of the election is settled 
(Cfr. Section 1.4). Accordingly, this study belongs to the substantive representation 
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literature, that specifically analyses the degree of correspondence between voters’ and 
parties’ policy preferences and that understands the voting as the linking mechanism 
between the two (Lehmann & Schultze, 2012). 
Broadly speaking, to understand whether political parties act as representatives agencies 
or whether they disregard their voters’ wants, needs and preferences when they are 
charged with governmental responsibilities, two paths could be taken. On the one hand, 
it is possible to conduct a detailed examination of the sequence of events and 
circumstances that ultimately lead to the adoption or to the implementation of a particular 
policy program. This fine-grained investigation, however, may not cast much light on the 
larger picture. On the other hand, it is possible to conduct large-N studies with the aid of 
quantitative techniques. This second approach also has its costs, among those the 
difficulty to grasp complex interplays of actors and objectives.  
This dissertation largely follows this second path of research. Throughout its six chapters 
(Cfr. Section 1.4 for a detailed summary), the ideal chain of responsiveness between 
voters’ redistributive preferences and governmental social policy outcomes (Cfr. Figure 
1.2) will be broken down and each linkage will be theoretically and empirically analyzed, 
every time maximizing the number of observations according to the available data sources 
(Cfr. Chapter VI, Table 6.1). 
This first chapter aims at providing the general theoretical framework and it is composed 
of five sections. Section 1.1 focuses on the elusive concept of political representation and 
discusses the ways in which it uses to be employed by contemporary political theorists. It 
draws on Hanna Pitkin’s (1967) treatment of substantive political representation to 
specify the meaning of this normative concept in the present study. In particular, 
substantive political representation will be defined as the popular specification of public 
policies or, using Michael Saward’s words, as the “necessary correspondence between acts 
of governance and the equally weighted felt interests of citizens with respect to these acts” 
(1998: 51).  
Once established what does it mean “to represent” in the political arena, section 1.2 
elaborates on political parties, the political actors that have long been considered a 
necessary condition for representative democracy to exist. This section discusses the role 
that political parties are expected to play to allow voters’ preferences to translate into 
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consistent governmental outcomes. Specifically, it describes the expressive and the 
instrumental functions performed by those actors, namely their ability to give voice to 
citizenry through the formulation of policy promises in their electoral manifestoes and to 
concretely organize policy making process both in Parliament and government (Mair, 
2009). 
Section 1.3 recalls party government theories formulated from the 1970s to establish what 
are the conditions to be fulfilled so that political parties will be able to effectively serve as 
vehicles of delegation. In particular, it critically reviews the existing literature and 
reorganizes in a unified framework the core stipulations for party government to emerge. 
Finally, section 1.4 moves from the normative to the empirical ground to highlight the 
general structure of this dissertation. In particular, it reveals how the ideal chain of 
responsiveness from voters’ preferences to governmental outcomes discussed in sections 
1.1, 1.2 and 1.3 will be broken down to measure how far actual representative processes 
are from the ideal model depicted by democratic theorists. 
 
1.1 To represent in the political arena: the necessary correspondence between 
voters’ preferences and governmental outcomes 
The concept of political representation is elusive: everyone seems to know what it is, yet 
few can agree on any particular definition among the ones currently used in literature (For 
classic treatments, see, inter alia, Pitkin, 1967; Pennock & Chapman 1968; Schwartz, 1988). 
On almost any account, political representation implies the following four components: 
1. some party that is being represented (e.g., voters, constituents, clients, etc.); 2. some 
party that is representing (e.g., political parties, state bodies, interest groups, social 
movements, informal organizations, etc.); 3. something that is being represented (e.g., 
preferences, interests, opinions, discourses, etc.); and 4. a setting within which the activity 
of representation is taking place (i.e., the political context) (Dovi, 2014). In this 
dissertation, I will limit the types of political representation being discussed to those 
activities put in practice by formal representatives, holding elected offices, on the behalf 
of voters.  
One of the most comprehensive discussions of the concept of political representation is 
the one offered by Hanna Pitkin in her influential and oft-cited work The Concept of 
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Representation (1967). The author defines political representation as the activity of making 
citizens’ voices, opinions and preferences “present again” in the political arena. In this 
sense, political representation occurs when political actors speak, advocate and act on the 
behalf of others to orient public policy making processes. However, Pitkin maintains that 
it is necessary to know the ways in which the concept of political representation is used 
in contemporary politics in order to correctly determine its meaning. In particular, she 
distinguishes four ways in which political theorists use to employ this notion: namely, 
formalistic representation, descriptive representation, symbolic representation and 
substantive representation, each one implying different standards for assessing what 
representatives should do (Cfr. Table 1.1 for a brief description).   
I will draw on Pitkin’s theoretical discussion to specify the meaning in which the notion 
of political representation will be employed in this dissertation.  
The first view of political representation, called “Formalistic Representation”, focuses on 
the formal procedures allowing representatives to obtain their offices (Cfr. Table 1.1, 
Authorization) and citizens to punish the representatives if they do not implement public 
policies consistent with their preferences (Cfr. Table 1.1, Accountability).  
On the one hand, the notion of authorization refers to the minimal definition of 
representative democracy proposed by democratic theorists, according to which, in 
democratic settings, the congruence between citizens’ policy preferences and the actions 
undertaken by their representatives has to come about through an appropriate 
competitive mechanism among political parties. 
Joseph Schumpeter (1943: 269), for example, states that, although it is possible that 
policies and opinion converge in non-democratic settings or because of mechanisms that 
do not relate to the way parties compete, the presence of “a competitive struggle for the 
people’s vote” among political parties is a necessary and sufficient condition for 
representative democracy to emerge. As a democratic elitist, Schumpeter deems parties 
useful insofar they facilitate the necessary process of electoral competition and perform 
the implicit function of recruiting candidates for offices. William Riker essentially stands 
in the same tradition, arguing that “the function of voting is to control officials and no 
more” (1982: 9). In his model of democracy, “the liberal remedy is the next election. That 
is all is needed to protect liberty; so election and limited tenure are sufficient” (1982: 9). 
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Similarly, according to G. Bingham Powell, “the competitive electoral context, with 
several political parties organizing the alternatives that face the voters, is the identifying 
property of the contemporary democratic process” (1982: 3). Finally, Robert Dahl (1989: 
95) describes competitive elections as “an orderly and peaceful process by means of which 
a majority of citizens can induce the government to do what they most want it to do and 
to avoid doing what they most want it not to do”. Put it simply, voters liking a party give 
it a chance to govern; voters disliking it temporally send the same party to the opposition 
benches and, according to Dahl, this is a reasonable justification for representative 
democracy.  
On the other hand, the concept of accountability points to the mechanisms by which 
politicians and parties can be sanctioned, daily or at fixed intervals, by voters for the 
successes and failings of their actions (Pitkin, 1967; Schmitter, 2007; Mair, 2009; Bovens, 
2010; Bardi et. al., 2014).  
Usually, literature distinguishes between a “delegate type” and a “trustee type” of 
relationship between elected politicians and voters, which place competing and 
contradictory demands on the behavior of representatives (Dovi, 2014). If voters’ 
judgements reflect a “delegate type” of relationship, politicians are expected to behave 
according to their constituent’s preferences. Vice versa, if voters’ opinions reflect a 
“trustee type” of relationship, politicians are allow to follow their own judgements about 
the proper course of action and are subsequently evaluated on their performances. James 
Madison (1787-8) is one of the leading historical figures who articulated a delegate 
conception of political representation. Conversely, Edmund Burke (1790: 115) is famous 
for arguing that: “Parliament is not a congress of ambassadors from different and hostile 
interests, which interest each must maintain, as an agent and advocate, against other 
agents and advocates; but Parliament is a deliberative assembly of one nation, with one 
interest, that of the whole”. 
This dichotomy between a “delegate type” and a “trustee type” of political representation 
is increasingly quarreled. Famously, Pitkin (1967) argues that theorists should not try to 
reconcile these competing and contradictory demands on the behavior of representatives. 
Rather, representatives must act in ways that safeguard the capacity of the represented to 
hold them accountable and uphold the capacity of the representative to act independently 
of the wishes of the represented. Similarly, Nadia Urbinati (2000) identifies two main 
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features of political representation: the representative’s passionate link to the electors 
cause and the representative’s relative autonomy of judgment. Analogously, Andrew 
Rehfeld (2006) describes representatives as partial delegates and partial trustees. 
Even if there has been a lot of theoretical attention paid to the proper design of 
representative institutions (e.g. Amy, 1996; Barber, 2001; Christiano, 1996; Guinier, 1994), 
it is no longer satisfactory to consider only what Pitkin defines “Formalistic 
Representation” (1967). Of course, elections are the distinguishing institution of 
democracy, allowing citizens to select their representatives (Cfr. Table 1.1, Authorization) 
and to sanction those that do not act in accordance to their preferences (Cfr. Table 1.1, 
Accountability). However, it is essential to also consider whether the election result 
determines, in any way, public policies or whether it simply produces a Parliament and a 
government that then make policies themselves. Moreover, if a connection between 
election result and public policies exists, how accurately do transitions between citizens’ 
policy preferences and actual policy outcomes perform? 
These questions relates to Pitkin’s fourth view of political representation, namely to 
“Substantive Representation” (Cfr. Table 1.1), which will be the one employed in this 
dissertation. Normative theorists state that representative democracy should entail 
popular specification of public policies. According to David Held (1987: 4), representative 
democracy, is “a system of rule embracing elected officers who undertake to represent 
the interests and/or views of citizens within the framework of law”. What distinguishes 
representative democracy from benevolent despotism is precisely its institutional 
mechanism for ensuring “a necessary correspondence between acts of governance and 
the equally weighted felt interests of citizens with respect to these acts” (Saward, 1998: 
51; Weale, 1999: 14; see also Wessels, 1999: 137). In democratic settings, therefore, this 
“necessary correspondence” has not to depend on vagaries of culture, élite temperament 
or the goodwill of rulers (McDonald & Budge, 2005: 8-10). 
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Table 1.1: Pitkin’s meanings of political representation (1967) 
1. Formalistic Representation: 
Description: The institutional arrangements that precede and initiate 
representation. It has two dimensions: authorization and accountability.  
a. Authorization: 
Description: The means by which a representative obtains his or her 
position. 
Main Research Question: What is the process by which a representative 
gains power? 
Implicit Standards for Evaluating Representatives: Does the representative 
legitimately hold his or her position? 
b. Accountability: 
Description: The ability of constituents to punish their representative for 
failing to act in accordance with their wishes. 
Main Research Question: What are the sanctioning mechanisms available 
to constituents?  
Implicit Standards for Evaluating Representatives: Can a representative be 
sanctioned if he or she does not act in accordance with the wishes of 
his or her constituents?  
2. Symbolic Representation: 
Description: The meaning that a representative has for those being represented. 
Main Research Question: What kind of response is invoked by the representative 
in those being represented? 
Implicit Standards for Evaluating Representatives: The representative is assessed by 
the degree of acceptance that he or she has among the represented. 
3. Descriptive Representation: 
Description: The extent to which a representative resembles those being 
represented. 
Main Research Question: Does the representative look like, have common interests 
with or share certain experiences with the represented? 
Implicit Standards for Evaluating Representatives: Representatives are assessed by the 
accuracy of the resemblance between the representative and the represented. 
4. Substantive Representation: 
Description: The actions taken by the representative as an agent of the 
represented. 
Main Research Question: Does the representative advance the policy preferences 
that serve the interests of the represented? 
Implicit Standards for Evaluating Representatives: The representative is assessed by 
the extent to which the advanced policy outcomes serve the best interests of 
his or her constituents. 
Source: H. F. Pitkin (1967). The Concept of Representation. Berkeley: University of California. 
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Elmer Eric Schattschneider (1942), for example, argues that democracy is meaningful to 
the extent that it provides the opportunity for people to exercise a degree of choice and 
control over public affairs. In particular, he specifies that popular control can be exerted 
if and only if three is a connection between the competing programs offered by parties to 
the electorate and the policies a government implements. Similarly, Robert Dahl states: “I 
assume that a key characteristic of democracy is […] responsiveness of the government 
to the preferences of its citizens” (1971, cited in Morlino, 2011: 208).  
As suggested by Dahl’s last quotation, the keyword to describe this last substantive 
definition of political representation is “responsiveness”. It seems to be a simple concept, 
yet, as for political representation, scholars do not agree on any particular definition. 
According to the most straightforward definition, responsiveness is identified with the 
tendency, and indeed the normative claim, that political parties in office – for reasons that 
range anywhere from self-interest to re-election, organizational discipline and ideological 
commitment (Cfr. Section 1.2) – sympathetically respond to the short-term demands of 
voters, public opinion, interest groups and the media (Bardi et. al., 2014). In this sense, 
the notion of responsiveness clearly involves ex ante representation and builds on the 
expressive function of parties (Andeweg, 2003), that is on their ability to give voice to the 
citizenry, articulating and aggregating individual interests through the formulation of 
consistent policy promises in their electoral manifestoes (Mair, 2009; cfr. Section 1.2). 
However, what does it mean to “sympathetically respond”? The less demanding answer 
is the one provided by Gunnar Sjöblom (1988: 189), according to which responsive 
government simply requires decision makers to “take these [voters’] demands seriously 
and publicly argue why they accept, transform or reject them”. More intuitively, Dahl 
(1971) suggests that a government is responsive if it has “the capacity to satisfy the 
governed by executing its policies in a way that corresponds to their demands” (cited in 
Morlino, 2011: 208). Analogously, for Heinz Eulau and Paul Karps (1977), responsiveness 
is the “congruence” between citizens’ interests and political outcomes.  
Michel McDonald and Ian Budge (2005: 184) distinguish between “electoral 
responsiveness” and “policy responsiveness”. The first one measures whether party seat 
percentages respond to shifting vote percentages (Tufte, 1973; Edgeworth, 1898; Kendall 
& Stuart, 1950; March, 1957, 1958; Taagepera & Shugart, 1989; King & Gelman, 1991) 
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and could be considered as the empirical counterpart of Pitkin’s normative claim for 
formalistic representation (Cfr. Table 1.1, Authorization). Conversely, the policy 
responsiveness changes the question from who wins how much of the seats to how 
accurately the policy position of an electorate empowers a similar policy position in 
Parliament and government (McDonald & Budge, 2005: 185) and could be seen as the 
empirical counterpart of Pitkin’s normative assertion for substantive representation (Cfr. 
Table 1.1).  
As McDonald & Budge underline, while a vast literature has repeatedly shown that 
electoral responsiveness undoubtedly exists, the picture looks less clear when dealing with 
substantive policy responsiveness, which will be the object of this dissertation. 
 
1.2 A necessary condition for representative democracy: the double role of 
political parties 
Once specified the meaning in which the notion of political representation will be 
employed in this dissertation (i.e., that of substantive responsiveness of policy outcomes 
to voters’ preferences; cfr. Section 1.1), section 1.2 draws its attention on the most 
important vehicles for delegation in modern representative democracy, namely political 
parties. Indeed, I agree with Schattschneider, when he famously states at the outset of 
Party Government that political parties have been the makers of modern government and 
that, without parties, democracy, as we know it, is unthinkable: “The most important 
distinction in modern political philosophy, the distinction between democracy and 
dictatorship, can be made best in terms of party politics. The parties are not therefore 
merely appendages of modern government; they are in the center of it and play a 
determinative and creative role in it” (1942: 1). 
Schattschneider is not alone in associating political parties with representative democracy 
itself. David Robertson, for example, claims that “To talk, today, about democracy, is to 
talk about a system of competitive political parties.” (1976: 1). Similarly, Giovanni Sartori 
underlines that, unless one choses to reject the representative model, political parties have 
to be considered as “the principal instruments of democratic mass process” (1987: 148).  
Indeed, in political systems that do not allow face to face interactions with citizens and 
under the condition of increasing complexity of politics, parties are the main 
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organizational vehicles by which the delegation process between citizens and elected 
officials takes place. For this reason, they play a crucial role in the development, 
organization and legitimation of representative democracy (Müller & Strøm, 1999: 1; 
Rohrschneider & Whitefield, 2012: 1, 22)i.  
In particular, political parties combine within one organization two precious functions. 
They perform an expressive function, acting as representative agencies, and an 
instrumental function, behaving as governing agencies (Mair, 2009). Adopting Peter 
Mair’s words: “The same organization that governed the citizenry also gave the citizenry 
voice, and the same organization that channeled representation also managed the 
institutions of the polity […]. To adopt a more prosaic reference, it was a process in which 
there were few, if any, principal-agent problem: the principal was the agent” (Mair, 2009: 
10ff.).  
The expressive function performed by political parties is consistent with the notion of 
substantive political representation as proposed by Pitkin (Cfr. Section 1.1, Table 1.1). 
Parties are expected to serve as representative agencies, “acting in the interests of the 
represented, in a manner responsive to them” (Mair, 2009; Pitkin, 1967: 209). 
Moreover, this expressive function reminds the policy seeking model of party behavior, 
according to which political parties aim to maximize their impacts on public policies 
(Müller & Strøm, 1999). Abram De Swaan, a leading proponent of this approach, 
summarizes the assumption this way: “Considerations of policy are foremost in the minds 
of the actors […]. The parliamentary game is, in fact, about the determination of major 
government policy” (De Swaan, 1973: 88). This model has been developed in the realm 
of coalition theory as a response to the policy-blind assumption of the first generation of 
game theoretic studies of government formation. In particular, this model rejects the idea 
that all parties are equally feasible coalition partners, stating that only those that are similar 
in their policy proposals are likely to coalesce (Axelrod, 1970). Established and widespread 
findings demonstrate that this is the case. Indeed, in over 80% of cases, the parliamentary 
median party on the left-right continuum is a government member (Müller & Strom, 1999: 
564-8; Laver & Budge, 1992: 416). This empirical regularity could be considered as a proof 
for policy-based party behavior because the parliamentary median party would not have 
this importance for government if policies were not dominant, as the median position 
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would not have any special relevance for purely office seeking parties (McDonald & 
Budge, 2005: 55-56).  
At the heart of the policy seeking model of party behavior lies a belief in the significance 
of the political contest over public policy decisions. Citizens of democracies become 
engaged in the electoral process because they believe their electoral choices to matter and 
they decide to support certain political parties over others because these parties are seen 
as able to make a difference. Politicians trade in promises of public policies and the policy 
seeking literature implicitly assumes that the ultimate outcomes that flow from such 
policies matter to them (Müller & Strøm, 1999). 
Even if necessary, the expressive function of political parties is not sufficient to assure 
that the policy promises formulated by parties at the election time will be “reflected in the 
final product of the legislative decision-making process, that is, in enacted policy” (Cox, 
1997: 226). To achieve this goal, political parties, once charged with government 
responsibilities, have to perform their instrumental function, behaving as governing 
agencies. In particular, they had to recruit party members in public offices and to 
concretely organize the policy making process both in Parliament and government (Mair, 
2009).  
Of course, this instrumental function could and should be matched with the office seeking 
model of party behavior, according to which parties intend to maximize their control over 
political office benefits, which are private goods granted to recipients of politically 
discretionally governmental or sub-governmental appointments (Müller & Strøm, 1999). 
Quoting Anthony Downs, “politicians are motivated by the desire of power, prestige and 
income […]. Their primary objective is to be elected to public office” (1957: 30-31). As 
its policy seeking counterpart, this model of party behavior developed mainly in the realm 
of coalition theory in parliamentary democracies (Riker, 1962; Leiserson, 1968; Laver & 
Schofield, 1990). 
The expressive and the instrumental functions performed by parties, as the policy seeking 
and the office seeking models of party behaviorii, have to be conceived as supplements, 
rather than as substitutes, for each other (Müller & Strøm, 1999). As Downs (1957: 95-
107) points out, indeed, even office-seeking parties might be strongly committed to 
policies as they see their credibility and hopes of future re-election bound up with them. 
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Even if “parties formulate policies in order to win elections, rather than win elections in 
order to formulate policies” (Downs, 1957: 28), on gaining office, they are immediately 
confronted by the problem of party government, turning election promises into enacted 
policies (Rose, 1974). Similarly, Budge and Laver (1986) underline that there are both 
intrinsic and instrumental motivations pushing party leaders to strive for offices. In 
particular, they seek to maximize their control of the executives branches of the State to 
gain power, prestige and to increase their income, but, at the same time, they need those 
offices to be able to influence public policies. 
 
1.3 Assessing a single set of core stipulations for party government to emerge 
Section 1.2 explained that political parties have been long associated with, and indeed 
equated with, representative democracy because they combine into one organization two 
precious functions, namely the expressive and the instrumental ones. However, what are 
the conditions to be fulfilled so that political parties will be able to effectively serve as 
vehicles of delegation, implementing public policies consistent with the will of the 
electorate? Theories of party government help us to answer this question.  
Table 1.2: Conditions for party government according to Rose (1969) 
1. At least one party must exist and, after some form of contest, it must become 
dominant in the regime. 
2. Nominees of the party then occupy important positions in the regime. 
3. The number of partisans nominated for offices in large enough to permit 
partisans to participate in the making of a wide range of policies. 
4. The partisans in office must have the skills necessary to control large 
bureaucratic organizations. 
5. Partisans must formulate policy intentions for enactment once in office. 
6. Policy intentions must be stated in a “not unworkable” form. 
7. Partisans in office must give high priority to carrying out party policies. 
8. The party policies that are promulgated must be put into practice by 
personnel of the regime. 
Source: These conditions are a synthesis of statements made by Rose (1969). 
The notion of party government has been firstly applied to the European context by 
Richard Rose. In particular, he defines party government as the capacity of parties “to 
translate possession of the highest formal offices of a regime into operational control of 
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government” (1969: 413) and identifies the following conditions for it to emerge (Cfr. 
Table 1.2).  
According to these conditions, the “operational control of government” requires a 
winning party to have identifiable policy proposals and the capacity to adopt and 
implement them through the people it appoints for that purpose.  
In this first assessment on the notion of party government, Rose does not take directly 
into account the policy preferences expressed by the electorate, simply stating that the 
governing party must achieve its position in the regime “after some form of contest”. 
However, in a more recent formulation of this model (2014), the author clearly describes 
the ideal type of national party government as a principal-agent relationship between 
voters and parties, which are expected to promote policies consistent with voters’ 
preferences (Cfr. Figure 1.1). This second formulation of national party government is 
clearly consistent with Pitkin’s notion of substantive political representation (1967; cfr. 
Table 1.1) discussed above. 
Figure 1.1: Model of national party government according to Rose (2014) 
 
 
Source: This figure corresponds to Rose, 2014: 256, Figure 1.  
Moreover, as highlighted by Figure 1.1, Rose embeds in his model a feedback mechanism 
flowing from policy outcomes back to the electorate. This feedback mechanism 
graphically exemplifies the meaning of the notion of accountability, located by Pitkin in 
the formalistic definition of political representation (1967; cfr. Table 1.1). Indeed, periodic 
elections give to voters the opportunity to evaluate the governing party’s performance 
comparing the achieved policy outcomes to their own preferences. If the actions 
undertaken by the governing party tend to match the preferences of voters, the incumbent 
is likely to be re-elected. If they do not, then the governing party is expected to occupy 
the opposition benches. In this way, the model of party government formulated by Rose 
(1969, 2014) maintains an equilibrium between Pitkin’s formalistic and substantive 
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definitions of political representation, building a bridge between what voters demand and 
the policy outputs that government supplies through the mechanism of political elections. 
A similar, but more parsimonious, list of conditions for party government to emerge has 
been later elaborated by Richard S. Katz (1986: 43-44; 1987: 7).  
Table 1.3: Conditions for party government according to Katz (1986-1987) 
1. Government decisions are made by elected party officials or by those under 
their control. 
2. Government policy is decided within political parties or by negotiations among 
parties in case of coalition governments. 
3. These parties then act cohesively to enact and implement this policy. 
4. Public officials are recruited through political parties. 
5. Public officials are held accountable through political parties. 
Source: These conditions are a synthesis of statements made by Katz (1986, 1987). 
Table 1.3 shows that, under party government as depicted by Katz, parties perform the 
expressive function (Mair, 2009; Cfr. Section 1.2) because they function as devices 
through which voters can make their voices heard (Cfr. Table 1.3, point 5) and the 
instrumental function (Mair, 2009; Cfr. Section 1.2) because they organize policy making 
in government (Cfr. Table 1.3, points 1, 2 and 3) and control the recruitment of political 
personnel (Cfr. Table 1.3, point 4). That is, party government is manifest when winning 
parties both decide and enact polices through officials who are recruited and held 
accountable by parties (Müller & Strøm, 1999).  
Table 1.4: Conditions for responsible party model  
1. Voters have a choice, in the sense that they can choose between at least two 
parties with different policy proposals. 
2. The parties are sufficiently cohesive or disciplined to enable them to implement 
their policy. 
3. Voters vote according to their policy preferences, that is, they choose the party 
that most closely resembles their policy preferences. This in turn requires that: 
a. Voters have various packages of policy positions. 
b. Voters are aware of the differences among the policy positions 
expressed in the programs of different political parties. 
4. The party or coalition winning the elections takes control of government. 
5. Both the policy programs of political parties and the policy preferences of 
voters are constrained by a single ideological dimension.  
Sources: These conditions are a synthesis of statements made by Converse & Pierce (1986), Pierce (1999), 
Thomassen (1994), Thomassen & Schmitt (1999). 
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Almost at the same time, Philip E. Converse and Roy Pierce (together, 1986; Pierce alone 
1999) Jacques Thomassen and Hermann Schmitt (together, 1999; Thomassen alone, 
1994) outline the basic properties of their model of party government. This model is quite 
similar to those of Rose (1969, 2014; cfr. Table 1.2 & Figure 1.1) and Katz (1986, 1987; 
cfr. Table 1.3), but it emphasizes the role played by parties as transmission belts for the 
conversion of popular desires into public policies (Converse & Pierce, 1986: 706; see also 
Dalton, 1985; Miller et al., 1999). Due to this emphasis, the model of party government 
reported in Table 1.4 is better known as “responsible party model” (RPM; cfr. Table 1.4)iii. 
The fifth condition listed in Table 1.4 deserves a more detailed explanation. Thomassen 
(1994, 1999) states that the effectiveness of the responsible party model depends on the 
extent to which the policy views of both masses and élites are constrained by a one-
dimensional conflict dimension. Indeed, even admitting that both voters and parties 
behave according to the conditions 1 to 4 (Cfr. Table 1.4), if the fifth condition is not 
verified, the chaos theorem (McKelvey, 1976; Schofield, 1978) demonstrates that the 
election may fail to identify a Condorcet winner, missing to convey a clear electoral 
mandate. Indeed, as explained by Richard D. McKelvey (1976) and Norman Schofield 
(1978), if voters’ preferences are defined over a multidimensional policy space, the 
majority rule generates unstable outcomes: any point in the multidimensional policy space 
can be reached from any status quo by a sequence of majority votes (for a detail explanation, 
see Martelli, 2012). 
To put it simply, at the election time, people are forced to vote for the whole policy 
package offered by the party they chose, even if they do not agree on all the elements 
embedded in its electoral manifesto. Since electoral manifestos summarize commitments 
made by parties’ on several policy issues, without further assumptions, it is possible that 
the winning majority represents a minority on particular policy domains. Only when both 
the policy programs of political parties and the voters’ attitudes are based on the same 
one-dimensional conflict dimension, a Condorcet winner can be identified and the 
electoral majority can be interpreted in an unequivocal way. In other words, the mass 
public and the political élite have to share a common belief system.  
Thomassen’s argument recalls the function that Downs (1957) attributes to ideologies. 
Indeed, Down’s theory is based on the assumption that political preferences can be 
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ranked on a one dimensional scale from left to right, where the left end of the scale 
represent full government control of the economy and the right end means a completely 
free market. In his view, ideologies are useful to parties as well as to voters. In particular, 
“a voter finds party ideologies useful because they remove the necessity of his relating 
every issue to his own philosophy. Ideologies help him focus attention on the differences 
between parties; therefore, they can be used as samples of all the differentiating stands. 
With this short cut a voter can save himself the cost of being informed upon a wider range 
of issues” (Downs, 1957: 98). Similarly, parties use ideologies as short cuts to avoid the 
necessity of relating each policy decision directly to voter reaction, thereby reducing the 
cost of decision-making: “Each party realizes that some citizens vote by means of ideology 
rather than policies; hence it fashions an ideology which it believes will attract the greatest 
number of votes” (Downs, 1957: 100).  
Table 1.5: Conditions for a median mandate by McDonald & Budge (2005) 
1. At least two parties have policy profile distinct from one another. 
2. Voter recognize the policy profiles of each party. 
3. Voters cast their ballots on the basis of the party policy profile they prefer to 
see implemented by a government. 
4. Voters and parties arrange their policy preferences within broadly the same 
policy space, probably the left-right dimension. 
5. The election outcome makes the party supported by the median voter the party 
with which the median parliamentarian affiliates. 
6. Parties are motivated by a desire to see their own policy position control 
policymaking to the greatest extent possible. 
7. The occupant of the median position is crucial to the creation of a majority in 
both the electorate and Parliament.  
a. Majority–endorsed preferences tend toward the median voter position, 
so this form the best indicator of popular policy preferences in general.  
b. Public policy tends toward the policy of the parliamentary median under 
legislative majority voting procedures.  
Source: This table corresponds to McDonald & Budge, 2005: 26, Table 2.4. 
In 2005, McDonald and Budge reframe the conditions for party government to emerge 
listed in Table 1.4 in their path breaking contribution Elections, Parties, Democracy. Conferring 
the Median Mandate (2005: 25-27). Their key theoretical improvement consists in a shift 
from a government-centered conception of mandate to a median-centered one. In 
particular, they maintain that when both the policy programs of political parties and the 
policy preferences of voters are constrained by a single ideological dimension 
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(Thomassen, 1994, 1999; cfr. Table 1.4, point 5), the policy position which is more likely 
to be reflected in consistent policy outcomes is that of the median voter, which in turn  is 
the best predictor for that of the median parliamentarian (Cfr. Table 1.5). 
This brief overview demonstrates that, at least since the Sixties, students of political 
science repeatedly dealt with the notion of party-government, each time building on 
previous contributions shedding light on peculiar aspectsiv. 
Table 1.6 critically reorganizes in a single set of core stipulations the conditions identified 
by these previous works as necessary for party government to emerge. In particular, Table 
1.6 emphasizes the common ground these contributions share, although the bias varies 
somewhat between an emphasis on policy making in the case of Rose (1969), on 
recruitment in the case of Katz (1986; 1987) and on the linking mechanism between the 
electorate and the political élites in the case of responsive party model and median 
mandate theory. In brackets, each core condition is linked to the corresponding ones in 
the previous models of party government. 
The first group of conditions for party government to emerge, “Electoral 
Competitiveness”, corresponds to Pitkin’s notion of formalistic representation (Cfr. Table 
1.1) and refers to the necessary condition for representative democracy to emerge 
according to democratic elitists (Cfr. Section 1.1): namely, the occurrence of competitive 
elections. The equilibrium of party government assumes that electors alternate support 
between government and opposition parties according to the extent to which they fulfill 
or are expected to fulfil policy pledges. Therefore, electoral competition is the mechanism 
through which representatives legitimately obtain their offices and are held accountable 
for the actions they undertake. 
The second and the third sets of core conditions deal, respectively, with individual voters’ 
and political parties’ behaviors and, if fulfilled, allow for substantive policy responsiveness 
to emerge (Cfr. Section 1.1). 
In particular, the second group casts the requirements for the individual level behavior to 
be policy-oriented. Intuitively, people need to be endowed with distinctive policy 
preferences, which in turn have to be constrained by a single ideological dimension. 
Moreover, voters have to know political parties’ policy supply and to be driven by those 
policy promises in their choices at the election time.  
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Table 1.6: A single set of core stipulations for party government 
1. Electoral competitiveness 
a. Authorization: A party (parties) wins control of the executive through 
competitive elections (Rose 1; RPM, 4; McDonald & Budge 5, 7 but 
with reference to the role of the median voter). 
b. Accountability: Elected representatives and public officials are held 
accountable for the actions they undertaken through competitive 
elections (Katz, 5; Rose, 2014) 
2. Individual level behavior: 
a. Voter distinctiveness: Voters have distinctive policy preferences and 
successfully feed the process of policy formation with these preferences 
(RPM, 3.a). 
b. Common belief system: Voters’ preferences are constrained by a single 
ideological dimension, probably the left-right one (RPM, 5; McDonald 
& Budge, 4). 
c. Voter Information: Voters recognize the policy profiles of each party 
(RPM, 3.b; McDonald & Budge, 2). 
d. Voter policy commitment: Voters cast their ballots according to the extent 
to which parties have fulfilled or are expected to fulfil their preferred 
policy programs (RPM, 3; McDonald & Budge, 3). 
3. Party level behavior:  
a. Party distinctiveness: At least two parties offer voters policy alternatives 
for enactment once in office (Rose, 5, 6; RPM, 1; McDonald & Budge, 
1). 
b. Common belief system: The policy alternatives offered by parties are 
constrained by a single ideological dimension, probably the left-right 
one (RPM, 5; McDonald & Budge, 4). 
c. Office-seeking behavior: The party (parties) in government recruits its 
members in important executive positions and public offices. These 
partisans must be enough and must have the necessary skills to control 
large bureaucratic organizations (Rose, 2, 3, 4; Katz, 4). 
d. Policy-seeking behavior: The party (parties) in government acts cohesively 
to formulate and implement the policies announced at the election time 
(Rose, 7, 8; Katz, 1, 2, 3; RPM, 2; McDonald & Budge, 6). 
Sources: This table critically reviews and reorganizes in a single set of stipulations several statements 
made by many authors about conditions required by party government to emerge, variously referred to 
as conditions for the “mandate theory”, the “responsible party model”, the “Westminster model” and 
popular control over public policies (Cfr. Rose, 1969, 2014; Polsby & Wildavsky, 1971; Sullivan & 
O’Connor, 1972; Kavanagh, 1981; Katz, 1986, 1987; Converse & Pierce, 1986; Pierce, 1999; Thomassen, 
1994; Aldrich, 1995; Thomassen & Schmitt, 1999; Keman, 2002; McDonald & Budge, 2005). 
Moving to the last group, the first two conditions of parties’ behavior mirror the ones 
referred to voters: parties need to express distinctive policy proposals, which have to be 
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constrained by a single ideological dimension. Finally, the last two conditions combine 
the expressive and the instrumental functions of political parties (Cfr. Section 1.2), 
allowing them to be driven both by policy and office seeking incentives. 
 
1.4 Breaking down the chain of responsiveness: outline of the dissertation 
Party government theories recalled in the previous section belong to normative political 
theory (Cfr. Section 1.3). They regard modern representative democracy as potentially 
open to change and, therefore, as standing in need of philosophical justification. For this 
reason, they search for prescriptive indications, principles and reasons telling how the 
representative democratic process should be organized.  
Although acknowledging this belonging, party government theories come closer to 
applied political theory than most normative theories do. Indeed, they provide ideal 
standards to be employed as criteria to measure the distance between the actual 
representative processes and the normatively informed vision of representative 
democracy (For a schematic rendering of the ideal chain of responsiveness from voters’ 
policy preferences to government’s public policies, see Figure 1.2). To put it simple, party 
government theories are helpful to evaluate to what extent modern representative 
democracy really function that way.  
Figure 1.2: Ideal chain of responsiveness from voters’ preferences to 
governmental outcomes 
 
 
 
The central questions around which this dissertation revolves are the following ones. 
Does the set of core stipulations for party government to emerge depicted in Table 1.6 
capture enough of the essential relations among voters, political parties and policy 
outcomes? Specifically, do political parties help translate voters’ wants, needs and 
preferences into governmental policies or is party politics best described as a semi-
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autonomous and strategic élite behavior? Do political parties fulfill the expressive and the 
instrumental functions that any stable and effective democracy might expect of them (Cfr. 
Section 1.2) or are they little more than moribund anachronisms, now superseded by other 
mechanisms of linkage between state and society? 
Providing answers to these questions is of great importance because, in recent years, the 
notion of representative democracy has come under serious attack both inside and outside 
the academia. 
In the canon of Western political science, scholars have long expressed high hopes for 
the central role played by political parties in democratic societies (Cfr. Section 1.2, and 
see, inter alia, Ostrogorski, 1902; Michels, 1915). However, examining the reality of party 
politics, they have just as frequently been confronted with disturbing results. An 
increasing volume of literature denounces that elected politicians are no more able to 
provide authoritative solutions due to increasing globalization, internationalization and 
European integration (Nie et. al., 1997; Norris, 1999; Scharpf, 1999; Pharr & Putnam, 
2000). Mair (2002), for example, describes what he expects to be our next future as a 
“populist” or a “partyless democracy”, a neutral and non-partisan system of governance, 
appealing to a largely undifferentiated mass electorate whose relations with government 
are no longer mediated by political parties.  
This lack of confidence toward elected politicians is so deep that policy-making literature 
advances the case for a transfer for key decision making power from elected politicians 
to more politically neutral experts (Majone, 1996; Blinder, 1997). In particular, Alan 
Blinder (1997), a leading economists and deputy head of the Federal Reserve, suggests to 
extend the model of independent central banks to other key policy areas, so that decisions 
on health services, welfare state provisions and so on would be taken by non-partisan 
experts. Analogously, Giandomenico Majone (1996) affirms that expert decision making 
is able to achieve better policy outcomes than political decision making because experts 
are more likely to take into account long term interests, while politicians are dominated 
by considerations of the short term electoral cycle. Moreover, he adds that experts are 
better able to deal with the technical complexities of modern-law making, which confuse 
elected politicians (Majone, 2003). In this context, answering to the questions listed above, 
hopefully in a positive way, could be fruitful for political science as discipline, whose 
relevance depends on the substantive importance of the phenomena it examines. 
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Outside the academia, in all the advanced democracies, citizens are increasingly distrustful 
toward the political process, with lower levels of electoral participation and party 
membership and a fading sense of identification with traditional party families. In this 
context, assessing whether and to what extent political parties represent diverse voters in 
an increasingly complex and de-aligned political environment is relevant because citizens’ 
electoral choices, willing or not, are the main means by which they can express their policy 
preferences and influence legislative and governmental decisions. In other words, 
answering to the questions listed above means testing, and hopefully falsify, the validity 
of common sentences broadcasted by the media, according to which “Voting is useless”, 
“Politicians are all the same” and “There is no difference between Left and Right”.  
Moving from the normative to the empirical ground, the problem to be faced is the 
absence of any institutional mechanism ensuring the “necessary correspondence between 
acts of governance and the equally weighted felt interests of citizens with respect to these 
acts” (Saward, 1998: 51; Weale, 1999: 14, see also Wessels, 1999: 137). Elected 
representatives and political parties may be benevolent and act according to what they 
judge the proper course of action, or they could be narrowly self-interested, successfully 
manipulative and still get re-elected, especially given difficulties with accountability in 
coalition situations (Powell & Whitten, 1993). Quoting McDonald and Budge (2005: 55): 
“In actual practices, there are so many strategies parties could adopt to blur responsibility 
that a strong policy-commitment on their own part is all but essential to ensure they carry 
through what they have said they would do”. 
In the real world, the chain of responsiveness can be quite complex (Powell, 2005). Ideally, 
as depicted by Figure 1.2, it is a process by which governments implement the policies 
that their citizens desire. However, the linkages that connect citizens’ preferences, 
electoral choices and policymaking can be subverted at each stage (Powell, 2004). Just to 
sketch some of the issues that will be discussed in the next chapters, citizens need to be 
able to identify and evaluate their interests and preferences. Moreover, voting behaviors 
and electoral processes have to be taken into account to verify if voters’ policy preferences 
correspond to the policy supply of the political parties they choose.  
Additional problems could arise after the dust of the election has settled, on the one hand, 
when a government coalition must be formed in Parliament and, on the other hand, when 
the government must confront the constraints imposed by external reality. It is at this last 
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stage of the chain of responsiveness that elected representatives may be confronted with 
a “hard choice” (Müller & Strøm, 1999). Namely, they have to decide the relative priority 
to be given to strict adherence to party’s policy commitments at the possible expense of 
offices versus accepting the policy compromises required to achieve offices along with 
the benefit of a more direct influence over the formulation of government policies. 
This illustrative overview of the obstacles that voters’ policy preferences need to 
overcome to translate into policy outcomes highlights that, to measure how far actual 
representative processes are from the normatively informed vision of representative 
democracy, electoral studies, party research and policy studies have to be integrated. 
Moreover, the ideal chain of responsiveness between voters’ preferences and 
governmental outcomes (Cfr. Figure 1.2) has to be broken down and each linkage has to 
be theoretically and empirically analyzed. This is what this dissertation is about.  
 
1.4.1 Focusing on social policies: a suitable domain to shed light on the politics of constrained choice 
In order to investigate the rough path between voters’ preferences and governmental 
outcomes, passing through political parties’ and executives’ positions, this dissertation 
focuses on social and labor policies. Indeed, these policy areas have been picked by 
previous relevant comparative studies on democratic policymaking as particularly 
important (See, inter alia, Lijphart, 1999) and have been ones of the most salient, and often 
contentious, issues dealt with by governments in advanced industrial democracies, 
particularly in the era of welfare state retrenchment (Knotz & Lindvall, 2015).  
Since the 1970s scholars concerned with the role of parties in achieving policy congruence 
largely drew their attention on macroeconomic and social policy areas because these fields 
are related to the main cleavage in industrial democracies: the capital-labor conflict (Lipset 
& Rokkan, 1967). For this reason, social and labor policies have been described as the 
most conflict-ridden (Pierson, 1994; Jensen, 2012) and suitable domains to detect partisan 
effects (Schmidt, 1987; Esping-Andersen, 1990; McDonald & Budge, 2005), given the 
high positive correlation between the pro-versus welfare continuum and the traditional 
left-right one.  
Moreover, it is also the case that most of parties in most elections explicitly address issues 
related to social and labor policies in their manifestos. This circumstance allows me to 
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take directly into account the policy commitments made by political parties at the election 
time and the subsequent policy choices made by governments in a large number of 
countries over an extensive period of time (Cfr. Chapter VI, Table 6.1). 
Finally, providing welfare support is a large part of what industrial democracies do. Of 
course, the organization of social and economic life takes such activity fairly much for 
granted and, consequently, the political debate does not concern the opportunity to 
provide welfare support to citizens, but, more interestingly, how extensive such system 
should be. This is the reason why the choice to focus on social and labor policy areas, 
which imply heavy budgetary consequences, allows to shed light on the so-called “politics 
of constrained choice” (Laffan, 2014). Indeed, as it will be better detailed in chapters IV 
and V, the increasing processes of globalization, trade and financial openness and 
European integration constrain national governments’ ability to shape social and labor 
policies according to their ideological positions, forcing them to comply with international 
standards (See, inter alia, Rose, 2014).  
This kind of politics is much more difficult to manage for political parties than populist 
appeals because it involves structural reform that impinges on favored constituencies. In 
particular, it appears particularly challenging for parties of the center-left, as center-right 
voters are expected to be more in favor of measures of welfare state retrenchment. Does 
it imply, however, that choice is so heavily constrained that it is drained of all meaning or 
are there still significant political choices to be made? This is a crucial question because if 
it appears that “elections and changes of government cannot make a difference, the 
democratic legitimacy of the political regime itself may be undermined” (Scharpf, 2011: 
4). If party differences do not matter, why have party government? If parties cannot be 
responsive to electorates, why vote? (Laffan, 2014).  
 
1.4.2 Looking at the first link of the chain of responsiveness: from voters’ to political parties’ social 
policy preferences 
Chapter II, titled “Labor market risk, redistributive demand and parties’ social policy 
supply. Not all labor market outsiders are created equal”, is devoted to the analysis of the 
first link of the chain of responsiveness, which operates along the well-known AB bond 
of the paradigmatic Miller and Strokes (1966) diamond. In the original formulation by 
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Miller and Strokes, the A terminal represented the attitude of a constituency on a certain 
issue, while the B terminal stood for the attitude of an elected representative on the same 
issue. However, the analysis developed in chapter II relates the issue position of an 
individual voter (i.e., the A terminal) with that of the national party to which the same 
voter declared to feel closer to (i.e., the B terminal). 
The large majority of studies investigating the role played by political parties in shaping 
social policies is grounded on the stylized argument according to which parties are 
endowed by enduring policy preferences, which broadly mirror the economic interests of 
their core electoral constituencies. Moreover, these economic interests are seen as time-
invariant and largely given by individual class belonging (See, inter alia, Hibbs, 1977, 1992; 
Korpi, 1983; Cusack et al., 2006).  
Figure 1.3: Looking at the first link of the chain of responsiveness 
 
 
 
This stylized argument seems to almost completely neglect the wide literature on electoral 
behavior, which argues that post-industrialization brought changes, on the one hand, in 
the social groups mobilized by left parties (i.e., shift in the electorate), and, on the other 
hand, in the policy preferences expressed by left parties’ traditional electoral 
constituencies (i.e., shift in preferences).  
Referring to electoral shifts, literature underlines that left parties increasingly attract highly 
skilled middle-class voters, having more market-liberal social investment policy 
preferences (Kitschelt, 1994; Kriesi, 1998).  
Concerning shifts in preferences, more and more contributions explained that the 
economic growth in the late 1960s as well as the union activism in the early 1970s 
decreased unemployment’s threat to the working class as a whole, granting high levels of 
employment protection to a large proportion of labor class, while letting an increasing 
group of precarious workers enduring the most of economic fluctuations (see, inter alia, 
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Bentolila & Bertola, 1990). This segmentation of labor into individuals with secure jobs, 
the insiders, and individuals without, the outsiders, changed the electoral constituency of 
left parties. Specifically, left parties tend to neglect the interests of the working class as a 
whole, becoming the advocates of the insiders only (see, inter alia, Rueda, 2005, 2006, 
2007).  
In sum, the assumptions regarding the AB bond between voters’ and parties’ social policy 
preferences need to be updated through a systematic empirical test. In this dissertation, 
this updating takes place in chapter II, which investigates whether individuals’ 
redistributive preferences, explained by the position the same occupy in the labor market, 
are consistent with political parties social policy supply at the election time. Indeed, saying 
that parties “do different things” from what they did in the past does not mean they do 
not represent their voters. They may supply different policy proposals simply because 
they represent different groups of voters (i.e. shift in the electorate) or because the policy 
preferences expressed by their traditional voters have changed (i.e., shift in preferences). 
Note that, by testing this claim, I am not maintaining that political parties have not 
autonomous policy preferences and that they are simply executors of voters’ will. Instead, 
I embrace Katz’s and Mair’s (1993) argument according to which parties are “three faces” 
organizations made up of the so called party on the ground, party central-office and party 
in public offices, which are likely to be endowed by similar, but non identical, policy 
preferences.  
Do outsiders in the labor market, which are insecure about their future income, express a 
higher redistributive demand than their insider counterparts do? Does their 
marginalization in the labor market translate into political disenchantment? When they 
take part in national elections, do they vote for the same political parties supported by 
individuals experiencing better labor market conditions? Alternatively, do they perceive 
their interests to be marginalized in the political arena, becoming disenchanted with 
politics or even assuming radical political positions, as suggested by the recent insider-
outsider debate?  
Chapter II answers these questions combining individual level data from the European 
Social Surveys for 23 OECD countries with party level information from the Comparative 
Manifesto Database (MARPOR, 2014). In particular, beside the commonly used discrete 
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choice models, the empirical analysis adopts instrumental variables and matching 
statistical techniques to test the robustness of the main findings. These last techniques, 
indeed, allow obtaining consistent estimates even in presence of reverse causation, 
omitted relevant explanatory variables and measurement errors. 
 
1.4.3 Looking at the second link of the chain of responsiveness: from parties’ to government’s social 
policy preferences 
Once verified whether voters’ redistributive preferences are translated into parties’ 
proposals at the election time, chapter III, titled “From parties’ policy supply to declared 
governments’ positions: who affects the coalition agreement on the left-right and on the 
welfare dimensions and why”, investigates the second link of the chain of responsiveness.  
In detail, chapter III focuses on the BC bond between parties’ and government’s social 
policy preferences to determine whether and to what extent the weighted mean positions 
of governing parties (i.e. the B terminal), as derived from their electoral manifestos, 
corresponds to declared cabinet’s positions (i.e., the C terminal), as stated by coalitions 
agreements (Budge et al., 2001), in 10 West European parliamentary democracies. 
Furthermore, if declared cabinet’s positions (i.e., the C terminal) turn not simply to reflect 
the policy stances staked out by governing parties at the election time (i.e., the B terminal), 
chapter III aims to identify which additional political actors and external forces might be 
influencing them.  
Figure 1.4: Looking at the second link of the chain of responsiveness 
 
 
 
The main contribution that chapter III intends to bring to the existing literature (See, for 
example, McDonald & Budge, 2005; Warwick, 2011) consists in the choice to contrast 
the traditionally employed ideological left-right scale with a more genuinely policy-based 
welfare scale (Cfr. Chapter III, Section 3.2). Indeed, I maintain that, to test whether 
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multiparty governments are likely to distribute policy payoffs to their members according 
to a proportional criterion (Warwick, 2001, 2011), exactly as they are expected to do for 
office payoffs (Gamson, 1961), this additional policy based dimension allows to better 
control for any possible ideological bias.  
More interestingly, the comparison between the ideological left-right dimension and the 
welfare dimension allows verifying if the political actors holding the “agenda setting 
power” on the left-right scale behave in the same way also on the social policy dimension. 
Indeed, the distributive and redistributive nature of the programs included in the welfare 
dimension, which usually see governments to provide economic resources to specific 
societal segments, sometimes at the expense of other groups, is likely to determine a 
higher engagement of parliamentary parties and of the competent ministers in decision-
making processes than the ideological nature of the left-right dimension does. 
Analogously, declared cabinet positions on the welfare dimension is expected to be more 
affected by the economic conditions experienced by the coalescing parties when in office 
than declared cabinet positions on the left-right dimension. 
 
1.4.4 Looking at the third link of the chain of responsiveness: from government’s social policy 
preferences to social policies 
Once assessed whether there is a relationship between the electoral positions of governing 
parties and declared cabinet’s positions (Cfr. Chapter III), chapter IV, titled “Partisan 
influence on social and labor policies: Do parties matter?” focuses on the last link of the 
chain of responsiveness. Indeed, it analyzes the degree of congruence between 
government’s social policy preferences (i.e., the C terminal) and actual social policy 
outcomes (i.e., the D terminal).  
The CD bond is, at the same time, the most intriguing and the most awkward linkage of 
the chain of responsiveness to be studied. Indeed, it is exactly in this last segment that the 
battle for a substantive political representation (Pitkin, 1967; Cfr. Section 1.1, Table 1.1) 
is won or lost. Is representative democracy, as we know it, able to achieve the “necessary 
correspondence between acts of governance and the equally weighted felt interests of 
citizens with respect to these acts” (Saward, 1998: 51), as endorsed by normative theorists 
(Cfr. Section 1.1)?  
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Discussing the notion of substantive representation, I pointed out how it is deeply 
intertwined with those of responsiveness, broadly defined as the normative claim that 
governing parties act as representative agencies, executing public policies consistent with 
the short-term demands of voters, public opinion and interest groups (Cfr. Section 1.1).  
Figure 1.5: Looking at the third link of the chain of responsiveness 
 
 
 
However, to assess whether and to what extent political parties, once in office, 
significantly affect government’s behavior and shape public policies according to the will 
of their voters, parties long lasting ideological beliefs, their policy preferences and even 
their electoral commitments have to face the obstacles of the real world. Using Mair’s 
words, the CD bond is where the responsiveness of governing parties’ encounters “the 
burden of responsibility” (Mair, 2009). 
Responsibility is a difficult term, which has been used in different ways in the various 
branches of political science. According to Downs (1957: 105), responsibility implies 
predictability and consistency: a party is responsible “if its policies in one period are 
consistent with its actions or statements in the preceding period”. For Sartori (1976: 18-
24), the term responsibility is a synonym of the term accountability: politicians, the parties 
they belong to and the governments they form give account to parliaments and to the 
voters and are in this sense responsible. Leroy Rieselbach (1977: 8-10) links the notion of 
responsibility to those of efficiency and effectiveness: “a responsible institution provides 
reasonably successful policies to resolve the major problems it is faced with. The emphasis 
of the responsibility criterion is on speed, efficiency, and, of course, success”.  
The definition proposed by Mair (2009) is perhaps one of the best because he attributes 
to the term responsibility a narrower and formalized sense, disentangling its specificity 
from the notions of accountability and responsiveness (Cfr. Section 1.1). In particular, he 
maintains that political parties in office prove to be responsible if they act prudently, 
following accepted procedural norms and practices. In particular, parties in government 
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behave responsibly if they take into account (Bardi et. al., 2014): 1. the long-term needs of 
their people and countries, which have not necessarily been articulated as specific 
demands and which go beyond the short-term demands of those same people (e.g. 
intergenerational fairness, sustainability of public expenditures, long-term investments in 
security, education, etc.); and 2. the claims of audiences other than the national electorate, 
including the international markets that ensure their financial alimentation, the 
international commitments and organizations that are the root of their international 
credibility, and, in the European context, the heavy transnational constraints that are the 
result of a common currency and common market.  
Classic democratic theory considers it desirable for political parties in office to be 
responsive to public opinion and, at the same time, responsible toward the internal and 
international systemic constraints and compatibilities. In the past, political parties were 
regarded as the antidotes to the responsiveness–responsibility tension because they were 
able to perform both the expressive and the instrumental functions (Cfr. Section 1.2). 
Recently, however, more and more scholars started to denounce that these two roles have 
become more difficult to reconcile and even increasingly incompatible, with ensuing 
damage to the legitimacy of democracy in contemporary society (Mair, 2006, 2009; 
Keman, 2011, 2014; Ezrow & Xezonakis, 2012; Bardi et. al., 2014; Laffan, 2014). 
Therefore, the first task of chapter IV is to document if and to what extent the burden of 
responsibility is making it harder for political parties to respond sympathetically to their 
electorate, executing social policies consistent with their long lasting ideological 
preferences. As better discussed hereafter (Cfr. Chapter IV), indeed, studies focusing on 
the effect of political parties on social policy outcomes fail to reach any firm conclusion, 
providing mixed results. For sake of simplicity, empirical literature on this topic could be 
split into two schools of thought: the “parties-do-matter” and “parties-do-not-matter” 
hypotheses.  
Under the label “parties-do-matter” hypothesis, it is possible to locate at least three broad 
streams of literature, namely Partisan Theory (PT), Power Resources Theory (PRT) and 
Mandate Theory (MT). These three approaches establish a clear linkage between parties’ 
long lasting ideological preferences, their contextual electoral pledges and social policy 
outcomes pursued once they are in office. Moreover, they are consistent with the 
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“canonical principal–agent model” of party government (Miller, 2005: 205; cfr. Section 
1.3),  
Vice-versa, scholars belonging to the opposite school of thought, the “parties-do-not-
matter” hypothesis, claim that the burden of responsibility vanished the ability of political 
parties to manipulate social policies for electoral and partisan gains. In particular, they 
emphasize the role played by external constraints, such as globalization, trade and 
financial openness and European integration, by internal limits, such as public debt and 
budget deficit, and by structural changes, as de-industrialization processes, union decline 
and population ageing. 
Despite the conventional wisdom on the “dependent variable problem” (Green-Pedersen, 
2002), according to which empirical works using aggregate spending measures as 
dependent variables are more likely to confirm the “parties-do-not-matter” hypothesis, 
while studies adopting measures of welfare state generosity tend to support the “parties-
do-matter” hypothesis, I posit that such mixed results could be driven by an independent 
variable problem.  
Indeed, the large majority of studies dealing with party politics and social policy outcomes 
adopts an overly rough measure of government partisanship. In particular, scholars use 
to operationalize the ideological position of governments either by clear-cut dichotomies 
at party level between parties of the left and the right or by categorical variables referring 
to party families. Adopting these questionable approaches, groups of parties in coalition 
governments are treated with simple dummy variables, indicating whether a government 
is more left or right leaning or whether the government coalition embeds certain party 
families. However, these operationalizations of governments’ ideological positions do not 
make much sense anymore: political parties in office may still have the same names as 
thirty or forty years ago, but, under the pressure of economic and social transformations, 
they may have changed their positioning over the left-right spectrum and, thus, their 
policy preferences. The assumption that, when charged with government responsibilities, 
parties classified as conservative would systematically aim at dismantling the welfare state, 
while parties classified as progressive would defend it may no longer be true (Häusermann 
et al., 2013). 
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I intend to contribute to the literature in this field also from an empirical point of view 
going beyond such dichotomous left-right classification of political parties. In particular, 
as better detailed in chapter IV, I operationalize government’s partisanship building a 
continuous variable based on all of the major party expert surveys. I maintain that, 
adopting this measure, the “parties-do-matter” hypothesis will be confirmed, no matter 
the choice of the dependent variable to account for social policies. 
This expectation is borne out in an empirical test of the effect of government partisanship 
on four dependent variables used to operationalize social and labor policies in 19 OECD 
countries from 1985-2011. In particular, the alternative hypotheses are tested through an 
Error Correction Model, a multiple time series model that is able to directly estimate the 
speed at which a dependent variable returns to equilibrium after a change in the 
independent variable of interest. In this case, the model  estimates whether and how the 
location of each government on a continuous left-right scale affects public spending in 
social policies, public spending in active (ALMP) and passive (PLMP) labor market 
policies and the level of unemployment insurance replacement rate. 
 
1.4.5 Zooming in on the third link of the chain of responsiveness: how party and intra-party politics 
affect the ability of Italian executives to shape social policy outcomes  
“Cross-nationalists are scholars who don’t begin with countries, but with data; who don’t 
look in depth, but more widely; who don’t generalize, but specify; and who place greater 
emphasis on method than on understanding” (Mair, 2011). This is the harsh critique that 
the genuine comparativist Mair addressed to scholars educated and socialized in the 
Anglo-Saxon tradition, guilty of conducting large-N quantitative works, shying away from 
concept formation and normative questions.  
Trying to compensate Mair’s disapproval, chapter V, titled “Missing links in explaining 
government’s ability to shape social expenditure according to its will: an application to 
the Italian case (1946-2009)”, focuses once more on the CD bond between government’s 
preferences and social policy outcomes, but develops a single-country case study to shed 
light on two important, but empirically under researched, aspects of congruence. In 
particular, it addresses the role exercised by Prime Ministers (PMs) in the cabinets and the 
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one played by factions inside the major parties of the governing coalitions in shaping 
social policy outcomes. 
This single-country case study is conducted on Italy, using data from 1946 to 2009. Several 
reasons could be put forward to justify this choice. The first one is the availability of two 
datasets suitable to analyze both the role of PMs and the one of party factions: the first 
one (Curini &Martelli, 2009; Curini, 2011) provides data on the positions of Italian PMs 
and legislative parties from 1946 to 2014; the second one reports factions’ policy positions 
among Italian parties from 1946 to 2010 (Ceron, 2012). Moreover, Italy appears a fruitful 
case-study because the Italian political system has experienced relevant modification in 
governments’ agenda-setting power and repeated changes in its electoral system during 
its nearly 70 years of history (Curini & Zucchini, 2014). Finally, this case-study allows to 
control for any idiosyncratic country factors referring to the institutional setting. 
Concerning the special position occupied by PMs, chapter V evaluates the ability of the 
Italian executives to shape social policies according to the preferences expressed by the 
PMs in their investiture and confidence speeches. Moreover, it assesses the conditional 
roles played by the parliamentary majority that PMs enjoy in the lower chamber and by 
the ideological alternation between subsequent governments.  
Concerning intra-party factions, chapter V tries to contribute to the empirical literature 
on congruence going beyond the assumption of political parties as unitary actors, whose 
members display cohesive behaviors consistent with party preferences. I maintain that 
this claim is nothing but a fictional representation of reality (Schumacher, 2012; Ceron, 
2012; Marx & Schumacher, 2013; Bevan & Greene, 2015). Parties are complex 
organizations composed by a variety of subgroups retaining similar, but non-identical, 
policy preferences (Ceron, 2012). Accordingly, PMs supported by political parties which 
show a high internal fractionalization are expected to be less likely to shape social policy 
outcomes (i.e. the D terminal) according to their policy preferences (i.e., the C terminal).  
 
1.5 A final look at the overall chain of responsiveness 
As briefly anticipated in section 1.4, chapters II to V are going to dissect the rough path 
from voters’ redistributive preferences (i.e., the A terminal in figure 1.6) to governmental 
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social policy outcomes (i.e., the D terminal in figure 1.6) so that each linkage of the ideal 
chain of responsiveness (Cfr. Figure 1.2) will be analyzed.  
At the end of this journey, chapter VI, titled “Putting the pieces back together”, tries to 
provide an overall view of the chain of responsiveness from voters’ preferences directly 
to governmental outcomes (i.e., the AD bond in figure 1.6), controlling for parties’ 
preferences (i.e., the B and C terminals in figure 1.6). In detail, this last chapter intends to 
assess whether and to what extent voters’ preferences on the left-right and on the welfare 
dimensions manage to overcome the potential obstacles identified in chapters II to V so 
that they can be translated into consistent spending choices in the field of social policies.  
Figure 1.6: Looking at the overall chain of responsiveness 
 
 
 
 
To do it, chapter VI performs a comparative analysis on 27 OECD countries observed 
from 1985 to 2011 (Cfr. Chapter VI, Table 6.1) largely drawing on data-sources already 
employed in the previous chapters. There is only one measure needing a more detailed 
explanation: namely, the A terminal in figure 1.6, referring to voters’ social policy 
preferences. Indeed, chapter II, which focuses on the degree of correspondence between 
individuals’ redistributive preferences and parties’ social policy supplies, addresses the first 
link of the chain of responsiveness (i.e., the AB bond in figure 1.3) by adopting a micro-
level approach (Cfr. Section 1.4.2). Chapter VI, instead, employs two aggregate measures 
of voters’ needs and preferences based on the procedure developed by Heemin Kim and 
Richard C. Fording (1998; 2002; 2003), as adjusted by McDonald & Budge (2005: 113-
115). In detail, these measures assess the median voter’s positions on the left-right and on 
the welfare dimensions and are suitable to be confronted with social expenditure by 
country and over time (Cfr. Chapter VI, Section 6.2.1). 
 To be able to affirm that representative processes largely work as they are intended to at 
least in the social policy domain, it is important to verify that voters’ preferences, at the 
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aggregate level, do not get stuck at any intermediate link of the chain of responsiveness. 
This is what the last chapter of this dissertation is about.  
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bureaucrats and citizens fostering the transparency of governments and strengthening the 
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dissertation, for further details on the potential role of social media in enhancing policy 
congruence, see Ceron & Negri, 2015; 2016. 
ii The enormous literature concerning parties identified a third model of party behaviour, 
namely vote seeking parties (Müller & Strøm, 1999). Vote seeking parties are “teams of 
men” aiming to maximize their electoral support to control government”. This model had 
a tremendous appeal to students of party and legislative behavior, particularly in the 
United States. However, while office seeking and policy seeking are defined as “primitive 
motivations”, valued by parties for their own sake, to maximize the electoral support is 
instrumental to the pursuit of offices and/or to the adoption of policies (Downs, 1957: 
30-31). 
iii The main alternative to the responsible party model is the constituency-centered model. 
It too rests on a mandate theory of representation, but it differ in its designation of the 
agents that supply and implement the mandate. Indeed, in the responsible party model, 
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centered model, the voters of each separate constituency communicate their wishes to 
their representatives, which are expected to satisfy them. The responsible party model 
allows for occasional attention for special interest, but those of national party’s voters are 
paramount. Conversely, the constituency-centered model does not prohibit the legislator 
from expressing broader partisan interests, but in case of conflict between those and 
constituency opinion, the latter must prevail. Ideology plays an equally important role in 
both models (Pierce, 1999; Katz, 2014).  
iv I decided to contain this review to the sets of stipulations that have been identified as 
breaking points in the development of the literature on party government (Mair, 2008). 
However, relevant academic writings are still omitted (inter alia, Polsby & Wildavsky, 1971; 
Sullivan & O’Connor, 1972; Kavanagh, 1981; Aldrich, 1995). 
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Chapter II 
Looking at the first link of the chain of responsiveness 
Labor market risk, redistributive demand and parties’ social 
policy supply: Not all outsiders are created equal 
 
 
Abstract. This chapter investigates the role played by labor market risk in shaping 
individual social policy preferences and political orientations. Do outsiders in the labor 
market, which are insecure about their future income, express a higher redistributive 
demand than their insider counterparts do? Does their marginalization in the labor market 
translate into political disenchantment? When they take part in national elections, do they 
vote for the same political parties supported by individuals experiencing better labor 
market conditions? This paper tries to answer these questions combining individual level 
data from the European Social Surveys for 23 OECD countries with party level 
information from the Comparative Manifesto Project Database. In particular, beside the 
commonly used discrete choice models, the empirical analysis adopts instrumental 
variables and matching statistical techniques to test the robustness of the main findings. 
The results confirm that labor market status is a strong determinant of individual 
redistributive and political preferences. Moreover, they suggest that future research 
should overcome the simple notion of dualization between insiders and outsiders, 
emphasizing the differences between temporary workers and unemployed individuals. 
Indeed, temporary workers proved to be clearly distinguished from labor market insiders 
by their stronger support for redistributive policies and by their more pro-left and pro-
welfare lining political preferences. However, they appear to be more integrated in the 
political process than unemployed individuals are. Moreover, their stronger support for 
left and pro-welfare parties seems not to be combined with more pronounced non-
corporatist attitudes. 
 
 
Introduction 
Once sketched the general theoretical background of this dissertation (Cfr. Chapter I), 
Chapter II begins the theoretical and empirical journey along the ideal chain of 
responsiveness from voters’ redistributive preferences to actual social policy outcomes. 
Indeed, this chapter focuses on the AB bond of this ideal chain (Cfr. Chapter I, Figure 
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1.3) in the attempt to verify whether and to what extent the economic conditions 
individuals experience in their everyday life, which are largely given by the positions they 
occupy in the labor market, determine their social policy preferences and political 
orientations.   
Decades of research demonstrated that redistributive policies have two natural 
constituencies: the disadvantaged and the insecure. On the one hand, low-income citizens 
are more likely to favor redistributive policies because they seek to protect themselves 
against poverty and economic dislocation (Esping-Andersen, 1990; Huber & Stephens, 
2001; Korpi, 1983). On the other hand, individuals facing higher levels of labor market 
insecurity are expected to demand social insurance programs to shelter themselves from 
future income losses and unpredictable non-discretionary expenditures, no matter their 
current income (Iversen & Soskice, 2001; Cusack et al., 2006; Rehm, 2009, 2011a; Marx, 
2014). Of course, these two groups of potential welfare state supporters are not inherently 
distinct. In some countries, the disadvantaged and the insecure are more or less the same 
individuals; while in others the two groups overlap much less (Rehm et al., 2012). 
However, once proved that insecure workers tend to be more inclined to endorse 
redistributive policies than those with better labor market conditions are, further 
questions arise. Does the stronger redistributive demand expressed by insecure workers 
translate into patterns of partisan support? Specifically, does their marginalization in the 
labor market turn into political disenchantment? Vive-versa, if insecure workers decide to 
take part in national elections, do they support political parties supplying social policy 
promises consistent with their redistributive preferences? Do they feel closer to the same 
political parties chosen by individuals experiencing better labor market conditions?  
So far, scholars failed to formulate any firm prediction regarding these questions. Indeed, 
as better detailed in the following section, classic studies denounced that labor market 
disadvantage, particularly unemployment, alienate people from the political process, 
inducing them to abstain in national elections (Pateman, 1970; Jahoda et al., 1972; 
Schlozman & Verba, 1979; Rosenstone, 1982; Sobel, 1993; Rosenstone & Hansen, 1993; 
Verba et al., 1995; Greenberg et al., 1996; Schur, 2003; Gallego, 2007; Adman, 2008). 
Vice-versa, according to two important streams of literature, namely “Partisan Theory” 
(PT) and “Power Resource Theory” (PRT), the redistributive demand expressed by 
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insecure workers make them more inclined to lean toward left parties, which have 
historically been the advocates of the working class (Hibbs, 1977, 1992; Korpi, 1983; 
Korpi & Palme, 2003).  
More recently, however, scholars suggested that, since the 1970s, the segmentation of 
labor into standard dependent workers holding open-ended contracts (the so-called 
“insiders”), atypical workers with temporary contracts and unemployed people actively 
searching for job (the so-called “outsiders”) changed the social constituency of left parties. 
In detail, left parties are described as the advocates of the insiders only. Accordingly, 
scholars hypothesized that insecure workers are likely to abandon left parties, feeling their 
interests to be neglected by the them (See, inter alia, Rueda, 2005, 2006, 2007).  
While the starting point of this theoretical approach, namely the left parties’ inability to 
represent outsiders’ interests, seems promising, the final outcomes on political behavior 
of labor market insecurity is still unclear. Precisely, if insecure workers are no more 
expected to endorse left parties, to which parties are they going to feel closer to?   
To my knowledge, the causal mechanism linking insecure employment, redistributive 
demand and individual political orientations has been the object of only one comparative 
empirical analysis, recently published by Paul Marx (2014). In particular, analyzing 
individual level data collected in 15 European countries from 2007 to 2011, the author 
proved that dependent workers holding temporary contracts are more likely to favor 
redistributive policies than their permanent counterparts are. Moreover, his empirical 
analysis revealed that these preferences concerning redistributive policies translate into 
patterns of partisan support. Holding a temporary contract, indeed, positively correlates 
with a stronger support for the new-left, namely for green and other left-libertarian 
parties. This remarkable finding is partially explained by the difficulties experienced by 
traditional left parties in integrating temporary workers and by the new-left’s capability to 
combine the advantages of pro-welfare parties with a more “outsider-friendly” stances in 
social policy design (Hausermann, 2010; Marx & Picot, 2013). However, as suggested by 
the author himself (Marx, 2014), the relationship among temporary employment, 
redistributive demand and individual party preferences deserves greater attention.  
Following this suggestion, chapter II contributes to the existing literature on redistributive 
and party preferences as follows. As first, it analyzes the effect of exposure to labor market 
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risk on redistributive demand and political preferences by making a distinction among six 
labor market statuses. In particular, I subdivide the main explanatory variable in the 
following categories: 1. self-employed with employees; 2. free-lancer (self-employed 
without employees); 3. dependent worker holding an open ended contract; 4. dependent 
worker holding a temporary contract; 5. unemployed actively searching for job and 6. 
inactive. The operationalization of the main explanatory variable in these six categories 
allows to verify whether or not the composite group of the outsiders in the labor market, 
which includes temporary workers and unemployed individuals actively searching for a 
job (Rueda, 2005, 2006), express distinct social policy and political preferences from 
individuals with better labor market integration.  
As second, the analysis here provided relates individuals’ labor market statuses and 
redistributive preferences to political parties’ social policy supply as expressed in their 
electoral manifestos (MARPOR, 2014). Specifically, to my knowledge, the available 
studies (Emmenegger, 2009; Lindvall & Rueda, 2012; Marx & Picot, 2013; Marx, 2014) 
operationalized individual political preferences by classifying the political party to which 
respondent feels closer to by its party family. However, this classification may lead to 
confounding results. Indeed, the actual social policy proposals supplied by an individual 
party at the election time may differ from the ones supported by another party belonging 
to the same party family (e.g., the social-democratic or the conservative ones). 
Analogously, under the pressure of economic and social transformations, social policy 
proposals endorsed by a political party may change over time, even if this party keeps its 
name and continues to belong to the same party family. For this reason, I explore the 
linkage between labor market status and individual political preferences building three 
continuous dependent variables based on parties’ actual social policy supplies. As better 
explained later, I recoded the political party to which respondent feels closer to with the 
scores totalized by the same party on three dimensions in the Comparative Manifesto 
Project Database (CMP; MARPOR, 2014), namely the general right-left (RILE) index and 
the amount of favorable mentions on welfare state expansion and corporatism.  
Chapter II is structured as follows. The first section critically reviews the existing 
contributions linking exposure to labor market risk, redistributive demand and individual 
party preferences. The second section presents the research design: specifically, it 
introduces the dataset, it discusses the criteria determining case studies’ selection and it 
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provides a brief description of dependent and independent variables. Then, I develop the 
empirical analysis in three steps. As first, I test whether labor market status affects 
individual social policy preferences. As second, I verify whether it is a determinant of 
individual involvement in the political process. As third, I analyze its impact on individual 
party preferences. The fourth section takes into account the major limitation of the 
available data, namely their observational nature, and uses two additional approaches (i.e. 
matching and instrumental variables statistical techniques) to obtain consistent estimates 
even in presence of omitted relevant explanatory variables, measurement errors and self-
selection into treatment. The last section summarizes the main findings and indicates 
paths for future research. 
 
2.1 The debate on labor market status, redistributive demand and political 
preferences 
Does exposure to labor market risk affect individual social policy preferences and political 
behavior? Despite the considerable attention devoted to this question, political scientists 
and political economists failed to reach firm conclusions. 
Empirical studies demonstrated that individuals facing high levels of labor market 
insecurity are more likely to support redistributive policies than individuals experiencing 
better labor market conditions are. These individuals, indeed, feel uncertain about their 
future income and tend to demand increasing redistribution and social protection as 
insurances against future income losses, no matter their level of education and current 
income (Iversen & Soskice, 2001; Cusack et al., 2006; Rehm, 2009, 2011a; Marx, 2014). 
However, once proved the positive relationship between labor market disadvantage and 
support for redistribution, a further question arises. Does this stronger redistributive 
demand translate into patterns of partisan support? Literature formulated competing 
hypotheses regarding this issue. 
On the one hand, political scientists and sociologists identified sociological and 
psychological mechanisms able to alienate individuals experiencing labor market 
disadvantages from the political process (Jahoda et al., 1972; Schlozman & Verba, 1979; 
Rosenstone, 1982; Rosenstone & Hansen, 1993; Verba et al., 1995). In particular, classics 
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studies highlighted two possible mechanisms. As first, unemployment and precarious 
labor market conditions may lower workers’ self-esteem and sense of self-mastery, which, 
in turn, may lead people to feel incompetent about politics (Pateman, 1970; Sobel, 1993; 
Verba et al., 1995; Greenberg et al., 1996; Schur, 2003; Adman, 2008). As second, 
individuals experiencing labor market failures tend to be so afraid by everyday job-related 
concerns that they do not have additional time and cognitive resources to devote to 
political participation (Rosenstone, 1982; Gallego, 2007). The expected outcome of these 
two psychological and sociological mechanisms is the same: individuals facing high levels 
of labor market risk are more likely to abstain in national elections than those experiencing 
better labor market integration are.  
On the other hand, since the 1970s, “Partisan Theory” (PT) and “Power Resource 
Theory” (PRT) postulated that individuals exposed to high levels of labor marker 
insecurity are more likely to vote for traditional left parties than other people. This 
hypothesis is grounded on the underlying idea that labor market disadvantages 
experienced by people in their everyday life shape their social policy preferences, making 
them more inclined to support redistribution. Accordingly, these individuals are expected 
to follow their instrumental rationality voting for left parties, which, in turns, are more 
likely to pursue welfare state expansion than right ones (Hibbs, 1977, 1992; Korpi, 1983; 
Cusack et al., 2006).  
However, more recently, the insider-outsider literature (Saint-Paul, 1996; Lindbeck & 
Snower, 2001; Rueda, 2005, 2006, 2007) reframed the stylized argument at the basis of 
PT and PRT to take into account socio-economic transformations in post-industrial labor 
market. During the 1980s and the 1990s, indeed, production changes, international 
competitiveness and the entrance of a large number of women in the labor force resulted 
in a generalized need to compensate employers for the rigidity of permanent workers with 
an additional tier of flexible jobs. The political power answered to this need by adopting 
marginal contractual reforms. In particular, it introduced temporary contractual forms to 
be applied only to new entrants in the labor market and not to incumbent workers 
(Bentolila & Bertola, 1990; Barbieri & Scherer, 2009). In this context, employment risk 
and insecurity shifted from the working-class as a whole to the segment of new temporary 
workers (Lazear, 1990; Bertola, 1999; Esping-Andersen & Regini, 2000; Breen, 2005; 
Allard & Lindert, 2006; Kahn, 2007; Berton & Garibaldi, 2012), establishing the divide 
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between the so-called “insiders” and “outsiders” in the labor market (Saint-Paul, 1996). 
The first category encompasses dependent workers with open-ended contracts; the 
second one comprises individuals hired under temporary contracts and unemployed 
people actively searching for job. 
Rueda (2005, 2006, 2007) argued that this segmentation of labor into insiders and 
outsiders changed the electoral constituency of left parties. Specifically, left parties tend 
to neglect the interests of the working class as a whole, becoming the advocates of the 
insiders only. Accordingly, he predicted that outsiders should be less likely to side for 
traditional left parties than individuals with better labor market conditions because they 
know their interests will be neglected by these parties.  
Whereas the pars destruens of the insider-outsider literature seems to be clear, it is not the 
same for the pars construens (Marx, 2014). Precisely, if individuals experiencing high levels 
of labor market risk are no more expected to endorse traditional left parties, which parties 
are they going to support? Rueda suggested that they could support liberal or conservative 
parties, seen as capable to remove employment barriers through deregulatory stances 
(Rueda, 2005, 2006, 2007). Alternatively, the same author stated that they could lean 
toward anti-system parties, seen as a way to protest against a political system unable to 
represent their interests (King & Rueda, 2008; Lindvall and Rueda, 2014). Otherwise, he 
embraced the idea formulated by the first stream of literature previous recalled, stating 
that outsiders’ labor market marginalization could translate into political disenchantments, 
inducing these individuals to abstain from voting (Häusermann & Schwander, 2012; 
Lindvall & Rueda, 2014).  
Recently, two single-country case studies respectively focused on Germany (Marx & 
Picot, 2013) and the Netherlands (Emmenegger et al., 2015) and a comparative analysis 
(Marx, 2014) put forward another hypothesis concerning the relationship between 
exposure to labor market risk and individual political behavior. In particular, these studies 
suggested that labor market outsiders, especially temporary workers, are more likely to 
support the new-left than insiders are. Indeed, green and left-libertarian parties should be 
more attractive for temporary workers because they share with traditional left parties 
similar policy positions regarding the economic dimension (Müller-Rommel, 1985; 
Kitschelt, 1988; Dalton, 2009), but are less biased toward the interests of trade unions 
(Hausermann, 2010; Marx & Picot, 2013) than traditional left parties are. Moreover, they 
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have come to embrace post-material values as well as environmental concerns, which 
could be appealing for temporary workers, usually clustered in the younger segments of 
the population. 
In conclusion, this literature review proved that we are confronted with a multitude of 
plausible causal mechanisms linking exposure to labor market risk, preferences toward 
redistribution and political behavior. Theories sketched so far underlined both the role 
played by psychological and sociological mechanisms in pushing individuals outside the 
political arena and the action of instrumental rationality, according to which individuals 
choose the party offering the nearest policy option to their preferred policy outcome. 
However, all these perspectives failed to provide coherent theoretical predictions. 
Given this lack of knowledge, I decided to test the robustness of the available competing 
hypotheses. As better explained in the next section, I will verify whether exposure to labor 
market risk affects individual attitudes toward redistribution and the political process by 
devoting considerable attention to the operationalization of the main dependent and 
independent variables.  
 
2.2 Data description and case selection 
The empirical analysis is performed on two merged data-sources. The first one provides 
comparative information on individual employment status and political behavior; the 
second one contains quantitative content analyses of  political parties’ electoral programs. 
The first information set is composed by the last three pooled waves of  the European 
Social Survey (ESS), conducted in the years 2008, 2010 and 2012. This academically driven 
survey is performed every two years since 2001 across more than thirty European 
countries. Unfortunately, this survey has a cross-sectional structure, which means that 
each individual is interviewed only once in time. The absence of  the temporal dimension 
is a huge limitation: indeed, it makes it hard to find out causal mechanisms, not allowing 
researchers to measure individual behavior in its temporal evolutioni.  
The second information set, instead, is drawn from the CMP dataset, which performs 
quantitative content analyses of  parties’ electoral programs in more than fifty countries 
since 1945 (MARPOR, 2014). 
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The case-studies’ selection has been driven by the following criteria. Firstly, the empirical 
analysis has been restricted to OECD countries to improve comparability. Then, 
following Marx (2014), I verified that all the selected countries reported an absolute 
number of  actually observed temporary contracts in the total workforce equals or higher 
than 5%ii. Lastly, I dropped countries having an excessive amount of  missing values for 
the variables of  interests. The final sample consists of  119,167 individuals from 23 OECD 
countries, namely Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, 
Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey and United Kingdomiii.  
Appendix Table 2.1 lists all the variables that will be used in this study, their 
operationalization and descriptive statistics. The operationalization seems straightforward 
for the large majority of them. However, it could be useful to briefly describe the most 
important ones. 
The empirical analysis will be performed using five dependent variables.  
Individual preferences for redistribution are measured by levels of agreement on a five-
point scale to the statement: “The government should reduce differences in income 
levels”, in which 1 means strong disagreement and 5 strong agreement (ESS variable 
gincdif, recoded).  
Individual attitudes toward the political process are measured through a categorical 
dependent variable, which combines the information provided by two items in the ESS. 
The first item, called “vote”, is a dummy variable equal to 1 if respondent confirmed to 
have participated in the last national elections, 0 otherwise. The second item, named 
“clsprty”, is a dummy variable equal to 1 if he/she declared to feel close to any political 
party, 0 otherwise. Table 2.1 displays the possible combinations of these two items and 
their labels.  
The categorical dependent variable measuring individual attitudes toward the political 
process takes three values. It is equal to “Non-voter” if the respondent declared to have 
abstained in the last national elections and not to feel close to any political party. It 
corresponds to “Non-partisan voter” if he/she stated to have voted in the last national 
elections, but not to feel close to any political party. Respondents that maintained to have 
voted in the last national elections and to feel close to a political party are coded as 
CHAPTER II 
56 
 
“Partisan voters”. Finally, there is also a limited amount of individualsiv that declared to 
feel close to a political party, but not to have voted (cfr. “Partisan non-voter” in Table 1). 
These individuals are usually young, suggesting that maybe at the election time in their 
countries they might not have had the right to vote. Taking into account their limited 
occurrence in the final sample and not willing to lose the information concerning the 
name of the political party to which they declared to feel closer to, I decided to add these 
individuals to the group of “Partisan voters”.       
Table 2.1: Measuring individual attitudes toward the political process 
 Do you feel close to any political party? 
  Yes No 
Did you take part in the last 
national elections? 
Yes Partisan voter Non-partisan voter 
No Partisan non-voter Non-voter 
 
Once established whether respondent took part or not to the last national elections, I 
analyzed the linkage between his/her labor market status and the actual social policy 
promises made by the political parties to which respondent declared to feel closer to. To 
my best knowledge, this is the first analysis adopting this operationalization. Indeed, all 
the available studies (Emmenegger, 2009; Lindvall & Rueda, 2012; Marx & Picot, 2013; 
Marx, 2014) recoded the political party to which respondent feels closer to by its party 
family.  
As anticipated, indeed, I argue that classifying parties according to their ideological family 
may lead to confounding results. Parties may still have the same names as thirty or forty 
years ago, but, under the pressure of economic and social transformations, they may have 
changed their positioning over the left-right spectrum and, thus, their policy preferences. 
The assumption that parties classified as belonging to the conservative family would 
systematically aim at dismantling the welfare state, while parties classified as social 
democratic would defend the welfare state may no longer be true (Häusermann et al. 
2012).  
For these reasons, I built three continuous variables based on parties’ actual social policy 
supply as coded by the CMP dataset. In particular, I recoded the political party to which 
each respondent feels closer to (ESS variable clsprtyv) with the scores totalized by the 
same party in three dimensions (MARPOR 2014). These three dimensions are the general 
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RILE index and the percentages of favorable mentions on welfare state expansion and 
corporatism in parties’ electoral manifestos. 
The general RILE ideological index provided by the CMP dataset (CMP variable RILE) 
is calculated by summing up the relative frequencies of thirteen right categories and 
subtracting the relative frequencies of thirteen left categories (Laver & Budge, 1992). The 
theoretical range of this scale is −100 (extreme left) to +100 (extreme right), although in 
practice all RILE scores are comprises between -74 and +90vi. Although a lively debate 
has arisen over both the coding scheme and the measure of the RILE position derived 
from it (see, for example, Electoral Studies 26 (1), 2007), it has yet to be demonstrated that 
any other approach yields clearly superior party position estimates (Warwick, 2011: 1679). 
The dimension called “welfare” is equal to the sum of two distinct categories, specifically 
Equality Positive (CMP variable per503) and Welfare State Expansion (CMP variable 
per504). The first category is equal to the percentage of favorable mentions regarding the 
wide concept of social justice and the need for fair treatment of all people. The second 
category is equal to the percentage of favorable mentions regarding the need to introduce, 
maintain or expand any public social service or social security scheme. The theoretical 
range of this variable is 0, meaning that there are no quasi-sentences concerning welfare 
state expansion in the whole electoral program of the selected political party, to +100, 
meaning that the whole electoral program is devoted to this topic. In practice, however, 
the highest percentage ever registered for this variable is 70. 
Finally, the category “corporatism” (CMP variable per405) is equal to the percentage of 
favorable mentions regarding cooperation among government, employers and trade 
unions simultaneously. As before, the theoretical range for this variable is 0-100, but 
political parties use to devote to this argument less than 10% of their electoral manifestos.  
Concerning the main explanatory variable, labor market status, I generated six dummy 
variables, referring to the following categories: 1. self-employed with employees; 2. free-
lancer (self-employed without employees); 3. dependent worker holding an open ended 
contract; 4. dependent worker holding a temporary contract; 5. unemployed actively 
searching for a job and 6. inactive. Being interested in labor market exclusion, I set the 
arguably most integrated group, dependent worker with an open-ended contract, as the 
reference category (Marx & Picot, 2013)  
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According to my re-codification, belongs to the first category an individual that is 15 and 
over (16 in Norway) years old (ESS variable egea); that declared to be self employed (ESS 
variable emplrel) with at least one dependent worker (ESS variable emplno)vii. Similarly, 
belongs to the second category an individual that is 15 and over (16 in Norway) years old 
and that declared to be self employed without dependent workersviii. 
Moving from independent to dependent workers, is part of to the third category an 
individual that is 15 and over (16 in Norway) years old and that declared to be an employee 
(ESS variable emplrel) with an open ended contract (ESS variable wrkctra)ix. Similarly, 
falls into the fourth category an individual that is 15 and over (16 in Norway) years old 
and that declared to be an employee with a temporary contractx. 
Referring to unemployed people, is a component of this fifth category every individual 
that is 15 and over (16 in Norway) years old and that declared to be unemployed actively 
searching for a job in the reference week (ESS variable uempla).  
Finally, a person is economically inactive if he/she is not part of the labor force. Inactive 
individuals are defined as a residual category, including students, disables, pensioners, 
housewives or -men, provided that they are not working at all and not available or looking 
for work either (ESS variables edctn, dsbld, rtrd, uempli). 
All models include a set of conventional control variables: age, gender, citizenship, 
educational level, household income, church attendance, trade union membership, public 
sector employment and post materialistic values. Country and year dummies are included 
in all models (See Appendix Table 2.1 for descriptive statistics). 
 
2.3 Exploring the relationships between labor market status, individual 
attitudes toward redistribution and parties’ social policy supplies 
The analysis develops in three steps. As first, it tests whether labor market status has an 
impact on individual attitudes toward redistributive policies. Then, it investigates whether 
the same affects the individual likelihood to vote in the last national elections. Lastly, once 
established whether respondent took part or not to the political process, it verifies 
whether or not labor market status shapes individual party preferences, operationalized 
as the actual social policy promises made by political parties in their electoral manifestos. 
LOOKING AT THE FIRST LINK OF THE CHAIN OF RESPONSIVENESS 
59 
 
Table 2.2: Individual attitudes toward redistribution 
 M1 
Labor market status:  
Standard worker (reference category)  
Self-employed -0.359*** 
 (0.0755) 
Freelancer -0.113** 
 (0.0417) 
Temporary worker 0.152*** 
 (0.0414) 
Unemployed 0.119** 
 (0.0423) 
Inactive 0.0242 
 (0.0664) 
Age 0.0247*** 
 (0.00613) 
Age2 -0.000223*** 
 (0.0000499) 
Education:  
Low education (reference category)  
Medium education -0.0343 
 (0.0475) 
High education -0.380*** 
 (0.0826) 
Female 0.167*** 
 (0.0170) 
Migrant 0.0374 
 (0.0425) 
Church attendance -0.105 
 (0.0584) 
Union member 0.271*** 
 (0.0502) 
Public sector 0.0891** 
 (0.0280) 
Income -0.0837*** 
 (0.0162) 
N 90833 
Pseudo R2 0.043 
Notes: The models are ordered logistic regressions. The independent variables concerning labour market 
status are defined using the less restrictive definitions. Country and year dummies included in all models. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Population size and design weights applied. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, 
*** p<0.001 
As better explained in section 2.2, individual preferences toward redistribution are 
operationalized through an ordinal dependent variable that reports respondent’s 
agreement to the statement: “The government should reduce differences in income 
levels”. It ranges from 1 (strong disagreement) to 5 (strong agreement). Taking into 
account the nature of this dependent variable, I opted for the ordered logistic model 
specification. Results are reported in Table 2.2. 
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Model M1 clearly confirms the expectation derived from literature that outsiders in the 
labor market are more likely to favor redistributive policies than insiders are. Specifically, 
looking at the estimated coefficients of the five dummy variables referring to labor market 
status, self-employed and free-lancers individuals are less likely to support redistributive 
policies than dependent workers with open ended contracts; whereas dependent workers 
with temporary contracts and unemployed people are more likely to endorse 
redistribution than their permanent counterparts. Lastly, individual preferences toward 
redistribution expressed by inactive people are not statistically different from those 
expressed by dependent workers hired with open-ended contracts.  Control variables 
behave as expected: in particular, women, trade union members and individuals working 
in the public sector are more likely to endorse redistribution and social protection; rich 
and educated people are less likely to do the samexi.  
Once empirically demonstrated that the working status affects individual preferences 
toward redistributive policies, I move to the second step of this analysis. Specifically, I 
intend to verify whether labor market status has an impact on individual attitudes toward 
the political process.  
Following Marx and Picot (2013), individual attitudes toward the political process are 
measured through a categorical dependent variable, taking three values: “Non-voter”, 
“Non-partisan voter” and “Partisan voter” (Cfr. Table 2.1). Taking into account the 
nature of this dependent variable, I opted for the multinomial logistic model specification. 
Table 2.3 reports the average marginal effects because standard coefficients of 
multinomial logistic regressions are not easy to be interpreted in a straightforward way. 
This table shows the average effect over all respondents of a discrete (for a dummy 
variable) or marginal (for a continuous one) change in an independent variable on the 
probability to be a “Non-voter”, a “Non-partisan voter” or a “Partisan voter”. Therefore, 
for the main explanatory variables referring to labor market status, the indicated effects 
report the change in probability to be  a “Non-voter”, a “Non-partisan voter” or a 
“Partisan voter” if the respondent is, for example, a dependent worker hired with a 
temporary contract rather than a dependent worker hired with an open-ended contract. 
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Table 2.3: Individual attitudes toward the political process 
 Non-voter Non-partisan 
voter 
Partisan voter 
Labor market status:    
Standard worker (ref.)    
Self-employed -0.0278** -0.0194 0.0471* 
 (0.0106) (0.0105) (0.0190) 
Freelancer -0.0257*** -0.0142 0.0398*** 
 (0.00592) (0.00790) (0.0116) 
Temporary worker -0.00680 -0.00276 0.00955 
 (0.00388) (0.00659) (0.00526) 
Unemployed 0.0334** -0.0359* 0.00250 
 (0.0121) (0.0151) (0.0155) 
Inactive 0.000495 -0.0718*** 0.0713** 
 (0.0151) (0.0154) (0.0252) 
Age -0.00627*** 0.00936*** -0.00310 
 (0.00163) (0.00178) (0.00167) 
Age2 0.0000347* -0.000101*** 0.0000667*** 
 (0.0000166) (0.0000170) (0.0000180) 
Education:    
Low education (ref.)    
Medium education -0.0292*** 0.0179* 0.0113 
 (0.00834) (0.00766) (0.0103) 
High education -0.0819*** -0.00802 0.0900*** 
 (0.00942) (0.00702) (0.0130) 
Female 0.0224*** 0.0580*** -0.0803*** 
 (0.00321) (0.00389) (0.00589) 
Migrant 0.0823*** -0.107*** 0.0252 
 (0.0146) (0.0274) (0.0242) 
Church attendance -0.0250 -0.00872 0.0337 
 (0.0163) (0.0102) (0.0210) 
Union member -0.0181 -0.0266 0.0447 
 (0.0103) (0.0163) (0.0231) 
Public sector -0.0314*** -0.00306 0.0345*** 
 (0.00328) (0.00717) (0.00752) 
Income -0.0105*** -0.00210 0.0126*** 
 (0.00148) (0.00128) (0.00223) 
N 86584 86584 86584 
Pseudo R2 0.069 0.069 0.069 
Notes: The models are multinomial logistic regressions (average marginal effects). The independent 
variables concerning labor market status are defined using the less restrictive definitions. Country and 
year dummies included in all models. For dummy variables, the indicated effects report the change in 
probability to be a non-voter, a non-partisan voter or a partisan voter if the condition applies as opposed 
to the base category. For continuous variables the reported effects are based on a marginal change in the 
variable. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Population size and design weights applied. * p<0.05, 
** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
Findings suggest that self-employed and freelancer individuals are less likely to abstain in 
national elections and are expected to be more involved in the political process than 
standard workers do. Conversely, unemployed individuals have a higher probability to be 
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marginalized in the political process than standard workers do. These findings are 
consistent with theories underlying how individual failure in the labor market could 
activate psychological and sociological mechanisms able push individuals outside the 
political arena (Cfr. Section 2.1). 
More significantly, these findings prove that temporary workers do not share with 
unemployed individuals the tendency to abstain in national elections, behaving exactly as 
their permanents counterparts. 
This result is quite interesting. Indeed, it raises doubts on the main argument at the basis 
of the insider-outsider literature, showing that the two main constituencies of the 
composite group of the outsiders do not share the same attitudes toward the political 
process, even if they share the same social policy preferences. In particular, 
unemployment seems to have a stronger negative impact on individual political behavior 
than temporary employment, making the affected individuals more likely to be alienated 
from the political process.    
Finally, inactive people are more likely to vote in national elections than standard workers 
do. Control variables behave as expected. Rich and educated people are expected to be 
more involved in the political process than poor and less educated ones. Women and 
migrants tend to abstain more than men and individuals born in the respective countries 
do. Public sector employees tend to be more engaged in the political process than 
individuals working in the private sectorxii. 
Once proved that temporary workers and unemployed individuals do not share the same 
attitudes toward the political process, I verify whether they express similar political 
preferences when they decide to take part in national elections. Put it simply, the last stage 
of this empirical analysis will test whether or not respondent’s labor market status affects 
his/her party identification. 
As detailed before (Cfr. Section 2.2), I adopted a new operationalization for individual 
party preferences. Specifically, rather than recoding individual political preferences by 
classifying the political party to which respondent feels closer to by its party family, I 
generated three continuous dependent variables based on parties’ actual social policy 
supply on three dimensions (CMP variables RILE, welfare, per405). 
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Table 2.4: Individual preferences toward political parties 
 RILE1 RILE2 Welfare1 Welfare2 Corporatism1 Corporatism2 
Labor:       
Stand. (ref.)       
Self-empl. 3.729** 3.939*** -1.357*** -1.402*** -0.123* -0.123* 
 (1.005) (0.886) (0.235) (0.229) (0.0515) (0.0502) 
Freelancer 0.888 0.926 -0.337 -0.361 -0.0858* -0.0874* 
 (0.490) (0.451) (0.240) (0.222) (0.0390) (0.0388) 
Temp. w. -0.893* -0.946* 0.413* 0.407* -0.0115 -0.0104 
 (0.427) (0.434) (0.160) (0.154) (0.00908) (0.00932) 
Unemployed -2.317* -2.202* 0.576** 0.566** 0.0113 0.0101 
 (0.992) (0.859) (0.166) (0.174) (0.0147) (0.0167) 
Inactive -0.167 -0.401 0.0533 0.130 -0.0374 -0.0351 
 (0.387) (0.349) (0.141) (0.136) (0.0253) (0.0219) 
Age -0.115*** -0.0862*** 0.0524*** 0.0432*** 0.00645* 0.00656* 
 (0.0238) (0.0169) (0.0121) (0.00913) (0.00303) (0.00275) 
Age2 0.00154*** 0.00113*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.0000579 -0.0000566* 
 (0.000226) (0.000198) (0.000159) (0.000130) (0.0000282) (0.0000247) 
Education:       
Low (ref.)       
Medium ed. 0.0990 0.425 -0.193 -0.280* -0.00893 -0.0107 
 (0.330) (0.325) (0.128) (0.134) (0.0123) (0.0138) 
High ed. -0.553 -0.0264 -0.0910 -0.230 -0.0291* -0.0341* 
 (0.610) (0.562) (0.167) (0.157) (0.0134) (0.0143) 
Female -0.157 0.222 0.134 0.0272 0.0106* 0.00699* 
 (0.216) (0.218) (0.0899) (0.0707) (0.00407) (0.00328) 
Migrant -2.428* -2.877** 0.677 0.785* 0.0568** 0.0648** 
 (0.955) (0.913) (0.329) (0.293) (0.0180) (0.0192) 
Church att. 1.479** 1.238*** -0.638 -0.583 -0.0321 -0.0294 
 (0.392) (0.326) (0.319) (0.318) (0.0175) (0.0153) 
Union m. -2.354*** -2.306*** 1.033** 1.004** 0.0307 0.0300 
 (0.336) (0.354) (0.323) (0.328) (0.0205) (0.0208) 
Public sector -2.068*** -1.950*** 0.533*** 0.503*** 0.0222 0.0198 
 (0.480) (0.464) (0.128) (0.132) (0.0283) (0.0262) 
Income 0.444*** 0.449*** -0.106** -0.113** -0.00758** -0.00819*** 
 (0.0502) (0.0416) (0.0318) (0.0306) (0.00205) (0.00203) 
Gay rights  -1.553***  0.426***  0.0217 
  (0.272)  (0.108)  (0.0118) 
Environment  -0.572***  0.177  -0.00109 
  (0.149)  (0.0880)  (0.00536) 
N 42608 41232 42608 41232 42608 41232 
R2 0.299 0.310 0.403 0.400 0.153 0.153 
Notes: The models are OLS regressions. The independent variables concerning labor market status are 
defined using the less restrictive definitions. Country and year dummies included in all models. Robust 
standard errors in parentheses. Population size and design weights applied. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** 
p<0.001 
I estimated two model specifications for each dependent variable: the first one, labelled 
with the number 1, includes the main independent variable referring to labor market status 
and the usual control variables; the second one, labelled with the number 2, adds two 
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attitudinal measures serving as proxies for libertarian and post-materialist values. These 
additional controls report respondent’s agreement with the statement “Gay men and 
lesbians should be free to live their own life as they wish” and the importance attributed 
by him/her to the environment (ESS variables freehms and impenv). They are embedded 
in the model specification to explain away a potential spurious correlation between being 
an outsider in the labor market and being a new-left’s supporter (Marx, 2014). Estimated 
coefficients are reported in Table 2.4. 
Results suggest that self-employers tend to support political parties embracing more right 
ideological positions than the ones endorsed by dependent workers hired with open-
ended contracts. Conversely, temporary workers and unemployed people are expected to 
favor political parties located at the ideological left than the parties supported by their 
permanent counterparts. Moreover, the magnitude of the estimated coefficients highlights 
that this shift toward the ideological left is more pronounced among unemployed 
individuals than among temporary workers. Freelancer and inactive people’s party 
preferences, instead, are not statically different from those of standard dependent 
workers. 
Is it possible to explain these heterogeneous party preferences on the RILE ideological 
scale by parties’ actual social policy supplies? Do the salience attributed by political parties 
to welfare state expansion and their propensity to cooperate with trade unions help us to 
understand individual political behavior? The last four models of Table 2.4 give partial 
answers. 
Parties’ attitudes toward welfare state expansion proves to be relevant: in particular, self-
employers are expected to support political parties devolving to welfare state expansion 
less space in their electoral manifestos than the parties supported by standard workers do. 
On the contrary, temporary workers are once again pooled with unemployed people by 
their tendency to favor political parties more focused on this issue in their electoral 
programs. As before, the magnitude of the estimated coefficients underline that this 
attitude is more pronounced among unemployed individuals than among temporary 
workersxiii. Party preferences expressed by freelancer and inactive individuals, instead, are 
not statically different from those of standard dependent workers. 
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Conversely, parties’ declared propensity to cooperate with trade unions proves to be 
relevant only for self-employed and free-lancer individuals: in particular, these two 
categories are less likely to support political parties devolving to this issue considerable 
space in their electoral manifestos. Adopting this dependent variable, however, temporary 
workers and unemployed people do not show statistically significant differences from 
standard workers in their party preferences. Assuming that the measure provided by the 
CMP (MARPOR 2014) is a good proxy of political parties’ proximity to trade unions, this 
finding is significant because it raises doubts on the main argument behind the stronger 
support of outsiders toward green and left-libertarians parties (Hausermann, 2010; Marx 
& Picot, 2013; Marx, 2014). Indeed, these parties have been described as more attractive 
for individual exposed to labor market risk because they share with traditional left parties 
similar policy positions regarding the economic dimension, but are less biased toward the 
interests of trade unions than traditional left parties are (Cfr. Section 2.1). Substituting to 
the party’s name the position occupied by the same party in the policy issue at stake, 
namely corporatism, this supposed pattern is not confirmed, asking for a more detailed 
analysisxiv. 
 
2.4 Testing the robustness of the findings through matching and instrumental 
variable statistical techniques 
The empirical analysis presented above is based on observational data. The major 
limitation of this kind of data is that the researcher does not randomly assign the 
treatment, but individuals in the sample self-select themselves into treatment. It means 
that they might have opted for one among the six labor market statuses previously listed. 
For instance, individuals might have chosen to become self-employers by starting private 
enterprises with dependent workers or freelancers by selling their work or services. 
Otherwise, they might have signed open-ended contracts, becoming standard workers, or 
fixed-term ones, siding with temporary workers. Instead, they might have preferred not 
to accept any job offer, remaining unemployed. Finally, people might have enough 
economic resources to stay inactive, out of the labor market. Reasons behind these 
different choices are partially unknown. They could have been influenced by costs and 
benefits associated to the treatment (e.g. the amount of time needed to accomplish the 
bureaucratic procedures to start a new enterprise for a self-employer or the amount of 
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salary for a dependent worker), or by individual observables characteristics (e.g. education 
level, skill specificity) and unobservable traits (above all, innate ability).  
In this section, I will test the robustness of the previous findings, as first, pre-processing 
the data through the “Coarsened Exact Matchingxv” (CEM) (Iacus et. al. 2007, 2009, 
2011a, 2011b), as second, adopting the instrumental variables approach. The first method 
addresses the problem of self -selection into treatment due to observables characteristics; 
the second technique helps to deal with individual unobservable traits.  
 
2.4.1 Testing the robustness of the previous findings through the Coarsened Exact Matching 
The “Coarsened Exact Matching” (CEM) is an algorithm to pre-process the data so that 
the estimation of the sample average treatment effect on the treated (SATT) based on the 
matched dataset will be less model dependent than the one based on the original full 
dataset. The basic idea of this technique is to drop observations from the original dataset 
so that the empirical distributions of the covariates in the treated and control groups are 
similar. When observations are exactly balanced (i.e. when the empirical distribution of 
the covariates between the treated and the control groups is identical), the simple 
difference in means between the outcome in the treated and control groups provides a 
fully nonparametric estimator of the SATT. Vice-versa, when the treated and control 
groups do not exactly match, it is possible to adjust for the remaining imbalance applying 
the same statistical model that would have been used without matching, with the benefit 
of having a lower risk of model dependence (Ho et al. 2007). The result is typically less 
model dependence, lower bias and increased efficiency. 
To check if the patterns identified above hold, I conceptualized the five dummy variables 
referring to different labor market statuses embedded in the previous models (i.e. self-
employer, freelancer, temporary worker, unemployed and inactive) as five distinct 
treatments. The aim of this analysis is to estimate the SATT of each of these five 
treatments on the same five outcomes used before, namely individuals’ attitudes toward 
redistributive policies (Cfr. Table 2.5, column “Redistribution”), their degree of 
involvement in the political process (Cfr. Table 2.5, columns “Non-voter”, “Non-partisan 
voter” and “Partisan voter”) and their party preferences (Cfr. Table 2.5, columns “RILE”, 
“Welfare” and “Corporatism”). 
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Because labor market statuses have not been assigned randomly, I controlled for a set of 
pretreatment variables by the CEM algorithm. These pretreatment variables include 
respondent’s age (ESS variable agea), level of education (ESS edulvla, edulvlb, recoded), 
gender (ESS variable gndr), citizenship (ESS variable brncntr), children (ESS variable 
chldhm) and parental levels of education (ESS variables eiscedm and eiscedf). All of them 
are dummy variables, with the exception of the ordinal variables referring to the age and 
to educational levels. As suggested by the authors of CEM, I set the coarsening for each 
of these variable such that substantively indistinguishable values are grouped and assigned 
the same numerical value (Blackwell et. al., 2009). Particularly, I recoded age by using 
standard labor force classes and education by using ISCED levels (Cfr. Appendix Table 
2.1).  
Appendix Table 2.5 provides, for each of the five labor market statuses, the initial number 
of treated and controls units, the number of treated units matched with control units after 
running CEM and the £1 statistic, which is a comprehensive measure of global imbalance 
ranging from 0 (perfect global balance) to 1 (complete global imbalance) (Iacus et. al., 
2007, 2009, 2011a, 2011b). Overall, the common ground between treated and control 
units is equal or greater than 60%.  
In order to control for the remaining imbalance, I estimated the SATT for each of the 
five dependent variables via the same statistical models used in the previous analysis, 
simply including the CEM weights. In particular, I ran five ordered logistic regressions to 
estimate the impact of the different labor market statuses on individual social policy 
preferences; five multinomial logistic regressions to assess their effect on individual 
attitudes toward the political process and fifteen (5 treatments x 3 dependent variables on 
parties’ positions) standard OLS regressions to evaluate the role of labor market statuses 
in shaping party choices. Table 2.5 provides, for each treatment, the estimated SATT (n.b., 
columns “Non-voter”, “Non-partisan voter” and “Partisan voter” are average marginal 
effects).   
As for the first dependent variable (i.e. individual attitudes toward redistribution), SATT 
largely confirms previous findings. In particular, being self-employed or freelancer 
decreases the likelihood to support more generous social policies, while outsiders in the 
labor market, both temporary workers and unemployed individuals, are expected to favor 
redistribution.   
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Table 2.5: Individual attitudes toward redistribution, political process and political parties - 
Coarsened exact matching 
 Redistrib. Non v. Non-p. v. Part. v. RILE Welfare Corporatism 
Self-empl. -0.317*** -0.0181*** -0.0103 0.0284** 3.231*** -1.089*** -0.0648*** 
 (0.0326) (0.00431) (0.00844) (0.00894) (0.380) (0.151) (0.0116) 
N 71575 70041 70041 70041 38122 38122 38122 
Pseudo R2 0.055 0.079 0.079 0.079    
R2     0.210 0.361 0.144 
Freelanc. -0.0584* -0.0213*** -0.0102 0.0315*** 0.421 -0.388** -0.0435*** 
 (0.0262) (0.00356) (0.00687) (0.00727) (0.311) (0.121) (0.00974) 
N 78679 76184 76184 76184 39464 39464 39464 
Pseudo R2 0.054 0.075 0.075 0.075    
R2     0.221 0.384 0.148 
Atyp. 
worker 
0.152*** 0.00321 -0.0149** 0.0117*   -1.280*** 0.447*** -0.00747 
 (0.0194) (0.00380) (0.00523) (0.00568) (0.256) (0.100) (0.00772) 
N 84537 80733 80733 80733 35176 35176 35176 
Pseudo R2 0.050 0.086 0.086 0.086    
R2     0.212 0.366 0.139 
Unempl. 0.186*** 0.0245*** -0.0251** 0.000628 -1.770*** 0.588*** 0.00161 
 (0.0300) (0.00625) (0.00789) (0.00870) (0.423) (0.163) (0.0128) 
N 69784 66551 66551 66551 27846 27846 27846 
Pseudo R2 0.048 0.085 0.085 0.085    
R2     0.230 0.400 0.145 
Inactive 0.0382 0.0169** -0.0202** 0.00331 1.124** -0.463** -0.00453 
 (0.0283) (0.00630) (0.00728) (0.00874) (0.408) (0.156) (0.0111) 
N 66289 63058 63058 63058 24720 24720 24720 
Pseudo R2 0.052 0.097 0.097 0.097    
R2     0.201 0.393 0.136 
Notes: The models under the column “Redistribution” are ordered logistic regressions. The models 
under the columns “Non-voter”, “Non-partisan voter” and “Partisan voter” are multinomial logistic 
regressions (average marginal effects). The models under the columns “RILE”, “Welfare” and 
“Corporatism” are OLS regressions. The treatment variables concerning labor market statuses are 
defined using the less restrictive definitions. All models embed the following control variables: age, age 
squared, medium education, high education, female, migrant, church attendance, union member, public 
sector, income, country and year dummies. Standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** 
p<0.001. 
The average marginal effects referring to the impact of labor market statuses on the 
individual involvement in the political process are consistent with the ones reported in 
Table 2.3. In particular, self-employed and freelancer individuals tend to be more engaged 
in the political process, while unemployed individuals show a higher degree of 
disenchantment. Being a temporary worker seems to decrease the probability to be a non-
partisan voter, while seems to increase the one of being a partisan voter. These average 
marginal effects are different than the ones reported in Table 2.3, underling even more 
the difference between temporary workers and unemployed people in their attitudes 
toward the political process. Finally, inactive people confirm their propensity to be non-
partisan voters, but their likelihood to be partisan voters loses statistical significance. 
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In conclusion, results for the last three dependent variables referring to individual party 
preferences hold. Self-employed individuals are expected to vote for more right parties, 
devoting less space to welfare state expansion and corporatism in their electoral programs. 
Being a freelancer does not exhibit any significant effect on party preferences, 
operationalized through the RILE scale, but it turns to be a significant determinant when 
the latest are measured with welfare and corporatist positions. In particular, freelancers 
are not expected to favor pro-welfare (this coefficient acquires statistical significance) and 
corporatist parties. Attitudes toward electoral politics expressed by temporary workers 
and unemployed people are confirmed. These two categories of outsiders are both 
inclined to support left-parties, focused on welfare issues in their electoral manifestos. 
Notably, both temporary workers and unemployed people do not show any positive 
attitude toward more corporatist parties, a pattern that will be better discussed in the last 
section. Lastly, being an inactive individual in the labor market, which previously failed to 
reach statistical significance, seems to be associated with more conservative attitudes, both 
in ideological and social expenditure terms. 
 
2.4.2 Testing the robustness of the previous findings through the instrumental variables approach 
Section 2.4.1 addressed the issue of self-selection into treatment due to individual 
observables characteristics. However, there could be unobservable traits, above all innate 
ability, leading individuals to opt for a specific labor market status. Indeed, people with 
higher innate ability are more likely to obtain higher levels of education and better labor 
market statuses than less talented individuals are. The omission of this relevant 
explanatory variable from the model specification is likely to generate endogeneity (i.e. a 
correlation between some covariates and the error termxvi), which, in turn, may lead to 
biased and inconsistent estimates. In these situations, the instrumental variables approach 
allows to obtain consistent estimates (Angrist & Krueger, 1991). Table 2.6 summarizes 
the findings for the independent variables of interests. 
This approach consists in a two-step estimation procedure. As first, I identified a set of 
instruments for the main independent variables referring to labor market statuses, which 
are supposed to be endogenous. Specifically, I instrumented labor market statuses by 
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respondent’s satisfaction toward the present state of the economy (ESS variable stfeco) 
and family background variables. The latest consists of father and mother levels of 
education (ESS variables eiscedm and eiscedf) and their working statuses when 
respondent was 14 years old (ESS variables emprm14 and emprf14). These variables are 
common, although disputed, instruments for labor market status (Blackburn & Neumark, 
1993; Parker & Van Praag, 2006). 
Table 2.6: Individual attitudes toward redistributive policies, electoral politics and political 
parties – Instrumental variables approach 
 Redistrib. Non v. Non-p. v. Part. v. RILE Welfare Corporatism 
Labor:        
Std. w. (ref.)        
Self-empl. -2.593*** 
(0.682) 
0.0555 
(0.0806) 
-0.301*** 
(0.0823) 
0.246 
(0.131) 
2.541 
(35.57) 
8.426 
(13.89) 
0.847 
(1.330) 
Freelancer 0.973 
(0.591) 
-0.182* 
(0.0732) 
0.0468 
(0.0727) 
0.136 
(0.105) 
19.75 
(23.52) 
-14.60 
(9.293) 
-1.210 
(0.904) 
Temp. w. 0.859 
(0.920) 
-0.252* 
(0.120) 
0.161 
(0.144) 
0.0904 
(0.1756) 
-40.56* 
(19.61) 
17.24* 
(7.515) 
1.402 
(0.718) 
Unempl. 0.866** 
(0.284) 
0.124* 
(0.049) 
-0.0674 
(0.0706) 
-0.0573 
(0.0810) 
-56.32* 
(18.84) 
8.958 
(7.053) 
0.885 
(0.685) 
Inactive -0.399 
(0.214) 
-0.0019 
(0.0739) 
-0.475*** 
(0.0796) 
0.477*** 
(0.1240) 
-14.94 
(27.55) 
-9.414 
(11.08) 
-0.217 
(1.049) 
N 82299 78422 78422 78422 39174 39174 39174 
Pseudo R2 0.044 0.070 0.070 0.070    
R2     -0.839 -0.947 -0.889 
Und.-id. T. 
(p-value) 
    5.959 
(0.1136) 
5.959 
(0.1136) 
5.959 
(0.1136) 
Hansen J. T. 
(p-value) 
    1.172 
(0.5566) 
0.697 
(0.7056) 
3.271 
(0.1949) 
Endog. T. 
(p-value) 
    136.543 
(0.0000) 
172.264 
(0.0000) 
54810 
(0.0000) 
Notes: The model Redistribution is an ordered logistic regression estimated through an IV two stage 
procedure. Models reported under the columns “Non-voter”, “Non-partisan voter” and “Partisan voter” 
are multinomial logistic regressions (average marginal effects) estimated through an IV two stage 
procedure. For dummy variables, the indicated effects report the change in probability to be a non-voter, 
a non-partisan voter or a partisan voter if the condition applies as opposed to the base category. For 
continuous variables the reported effects are based on a marginal change in the variable. Models reported 
under the columns “RILE”, “Welfare” and “Corporatism” are estimated through a 2SLS procedure. The 
independent variables concerning labor market status are defined using the less restrictive definitions. 
All models embed the following control variables: age, age squared, medium education, high education, 
female, migrant, church attendance, union member, public sector, income, country and year dummies. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Population size and design weights applied. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, 
*** p<0.001 
The selected instruments have to satisfy two main requirements: 1. validity (i.e. they must 
be uncorrelated with the error term) and 2. relevance (i.e. they must be correlated with 
the endogenous regressors). 
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As first, I tested the validity of the instruments through an informal testxvii for the models 
reported under the columns “Redistribution”, “Non-voter”, “Non-partisan voter” and 
“Partisan voter” (Evans & Schawb, 1995) and through the formal Hansen J. test of over 
identifying restrictions (Sargan, 1958; Hansen, 1982; Hausman, 1978) for the remaining 
ones. The informal test consists in adding the instrumental variables to the original model 
specifications (cfr. M1 in Table 2.2 and “Redistribution” in Table 2.6) to verify that their 
coefficients are not statistically significant. The large majority of the instruments fails to 
reach statistical significance, demonstrating that they are not correlated with the error 
termxviii. For the models referring to individual party preferences, the validity of the 
instruments is tested more formally through the Hansen J. statistics. All the p-values are 
well above the significance level of the rejection region, meaning that the joint null 
hypothesis, according to which the selected instruments are valid, can not be rejected.  
Once checked the validity of the instruments, I tested their relevance looking at the 
estimates obtained in the first stage regressions, at the Angrist-Pischke under-
identification tests in the first stage regressions and at Kleibergen-Paap LM statistic under-
identification tests on all the instruments together in the second stage regressions.  
Specifically, for the models reported under the columns “Redistribution”, “Non-voter”, 
“Non-partisan voter” and “Partisan voter”, each endogenous variables is regressed on the 
exogenous ones plus the instruments. In order to be relevant, the instruments should be 
statistically significant. Results suggests that while parental employment statuses are 
strong determinants of respondent’s labor market status, mother’s and father’s levels of 
education and respondent’s satisfaction toward the present state of the economy seem to 
be weak instrumentsxix.  
In the last three columns of Table 2.6, I addressed this issue more formally, through the 
under-identification tests mentioned above. The Kleibergen-Paap LM statistics confirm 
that some of the selected instruments are not relevant because they fail to reject the null 
hypothesis of unidentified models. Therefore, I performed the Angrist-Pischke (AP) 
under-identification test for each individual endogenous regressor at the end of each first 
stage regression. In these cases, the null hypothesis according to which that particular 
endogenous regressor is unidentified is always rejected. Hence, according to the Angrist-
Pischke (AP) under-identification tests, for each one of the endogenous variables referring 
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to labor market statuses, there is a relevant set of instrumentsxx. Lastly, the endogeneity 
tests always reject the null hypothesis according to which the specified endogenous 
regressor can actually be treated as exogenous. 
Once verified that the instruments are valid and relevant (at least according to Angrist-
Pischke statistics), I compared the results obtained with the IV approach with the ones 
discussed in section 2.3.  
The estimated coefficients reported under the column “Redistribution” partially confirms 
Model 1 in Table 2.2.  Indeed, freelancers’ and temporary workers’ preferences toward 
redistribution seem to be no more statistically different from those expressed by 
dependent workers hired with open-ended contracts. On the contrary, self-employed and 
unemployed individuals confirm their respective attitudes toward redistributive policies, 
which are expected to be negative for the formers and positive for the latest. However, it 
is important to stress that the IV model estimates much stronger effects for both self-
employed (β= -0.359 in the ordered logit and β= -2.593 in the IV model) and unemployed 
(β=0.119 in the ordered logit and β=0.866 in the IV model).  
Moving to individual attitudes toward the political process, the average marginal effects 
displayed in the columns “Non-voter”, “Non-partisan voter” and “Partisan voter” 
confirm the higher propensity of unemployed individuals to abstain in national elections 
with respect to standard workers (cfr. Table 3). Moreover, as already suggested by the 
CEM procedure (cfr. Table 5), temporary workers seem not to be as alienated from the 
political process as the unemployed are. On the contrary, being a temporary worker 
decreases the probability to abstain in national election. Once again, the IV approach 
displays a greater magnitude of the marginal effects for all the labor market status 
dummies.  
Finally, the estimated coefficients reported under the columns “RILE”, “Welfare” and 
“Corporatism” partially confirm the findings of Table 2.4. In particular, outsiders in the 
labor market, namely temporary workers and unemployed individuals, are expect to 
support more leftist parties, devoting to welfare issues a consistent share of their electoral 
manifestos. However, outsiders’ party choices seem not to be driven by the political 
parties’ attitude toward trade unions and entrepreneurial associations. Next section 
discusses the implications of these findings.  
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2.5 Conclusion and discussion 
Chapter II focuses on the first link of the ideal chain of responsiveness (Cfr. Chapter I, 
Figure 1.3). Indeed, it investigates whether and to what extent individuals’ redistributive 
preferences (i.e., the A terminal in Figure 1.3), largely given by their labor market status, 
are consistent with the social policy promises made by the parties to which the same 
individuals declare to feel closer to at the election time (i.e., the B terminal in Figure 1.3). 
Given the multitude of plausible causal mechanisms linking exposure to labor market risk, 
attitudes toward redistribution and individual party preferences, it tests the robustness of 
the competing explanatory hypotheses by choosing dependent and independent variables 
able to overcome the major shortcomings of the previous studies. 
The main contribution of this study is the choice to recode the political parties to which 
respondents feel closer to using parties’ positions on three different issues (i.e., RILE 
ideological index, welfare and corporatism). This choice allows to verify whether labor 
market status affects individual party preferences by establishing a clear linkage between 
respondent’s position in the labor market and the social policy profile of his/her preferred 
political party. Moreover, this operationalization avoids to recode the political party to 
which respondent feels closer to by its party family.  
Another contribution of this study relies in the main independent variable, referring to 
labor market status. Indeed, rather than focusing on a single category of outsiders in the 
labor market, I identify five labor market statuses (i.e. self-employed, free-lancer, 
temporary worker, unemployed and inactive) and contrast them with the arguably most 
integrated group (i.e., dependent worker with open-ended contracts).  
Notwithstanding the rigid alternative formulated by the insider-outsider literature, 
according to which temporary workers are expected to share the same social policy 
preferences and the same attitudes toward the political process of unemployed people, 
the findings suggest that there is a sort of graduation in labor market exclusion and its 
political effects.  
Particularly, temporary workers and unemployed individuals express a common positive 
attitude toward redistributive policies. This stronger redistributive demand clearly 
distinguishes these two categories of outsiders in the labor market from insiders (i.e. 
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dependent workers hired with open-ended contracts) and from self-employed and free-
lancer individuals. 
However, if temporary workers side with unemployed individuals concerning their social 
policy preferences, once I look at their individual involvement in the political process, the 
results tell a completely different story. In particular, the findings suggest that temporary 
workers do not share with unemployed individuals the tendency to abstain in national 
elections, behaving exactly as their permanents counterparts. Pre-processing the data with 
CEM, the impact of being a temporary worker on individual attitudes toward electoral 
politics is even more pronounced. It suggests that individuals exposed to temporary work 
tend to be more involved in the political process than individuals sharing the same pre-
treatment covariates, but holding different labor market statuses. The average marginal 
effect of being a temporary worker on the probability to abstain in national elections 
estimated by the IV approach suggests the same conclusion. This result is quite interesting 
because it seems to falsify one of the main arguments at the basis of the insider-outsider 
literature, according to which temporary workers and unemployed people should behave 
in the same way. Conversely, unemployment seems to have a stronger negative impact on 
individual political behavior than temporary employment, making the effected individuals 
more likely to be alienated from the political process.  
The results concerning temporary workers’ involvement in the political process raise new 
research questions and ask for a more detailed analysis. Indeed, temporary workers may 
display a higher degree of involvement than unemployed individuals in other forms of 
political participation. Future research, for example, may deal with their interest in 
national politics, their membership in political parties, trade unions and other kinds of 
association, their likelihood to directly contact politicians or government officials, to take 
part in public demonstrations, to make donations, etc. Moreover, once assessed that 
temporary workers are not alienated from the political arena, it would be interesting to 
shed light on the actual forms taken by their political involvement. Put it simply: do they 
act as insiders or do they use different instruments to manifest their interest toward 
politics? This topic may be addressed through quantitative comparative analyses across 
developed countries and in depth single country case-studies.    
Finally, results prove that, once temporary workers decide to take part in national 
elections, they behave differently both than unemployed people and than their permanent 
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counterparts. Particularly, temporary workers tend to feel closer to political parties that 
are more on the left than the one supported by insiders, but, according to the magnitude 
of the estimated coefficients, more on the right than those endorsed by unemployed 
individuals. The same happens for party position on the welfare dimension: temporary 
workers are expected to support pro-welfare parties more than insiders, but less than 
unemployed individuals.  
While previous studies suggested that temporary workers should be attracted by new-left 
parties because they combine pro-welfare attitudes with positions less biased toward trade 
unions than traditional left parties (Kitschelt, 1988; Müller-Rommel, 1985; Dalton, 2009), 
estimates rise doubts about this argument. Indeed, temporary workers and unemployed 
people behave exactly as their permanent counterparts when the dependent variable is the 
share of quasi-sentences devoted to corporatist issues in parties’ electoral programs. 
Assuming that the variable Corporatism provided by the CMP (CMP variable per405) is 
a good proxy of political parties’ proximity to trade unions, this finding is quite relevant. 
Indeed, it requires to scholars dealing with the relationship between exposure to labor 
market risk and party preferences to search for alternative explanations behind the 
stronger support expressed by outsiders toward green and left-libertarians parties 
(Hausermann, 2010; Marx & Picot, 2013; Marx, 2014). In particular, my results are 
consistent with the argument that outsiders in the labor market, and more significantly 
temporary workers, are more likely to support new-left parties because these parties are 
expected to promote welfare state expansion. However, my results seem to falsify the 
additional argument put forward by the previous studies, by demonstrating that outsiders 
are no more inclined to support non-corporatist parties than insiders do. Leaving aside 
corporatism, are there other issues able to make new-left parties appealing to the eyes of 
temporary workers and unemployed individuals? To be able to answer this question, 
further research has to recode individual party preferences with party positions on 
different issues, as provided by expert surveys and by quantitative analyses of parties’ 
manifestos. According to me, only this operationalization will be able to reveal differences 
in parties’ policy supplies that party families may hide.  
In conclusion, chapter II demonstrates that, in the social policy domain, the AB bond of 
the idea chain of responsiveness (Cfr. Chapter I, Figure 1.3) holds. Indeed, the social 
policy proposals formulated by parties in their electoral manifestos prove to be consistent 
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with the redistributive preferences expressed by their supporters. Moreover, this chapter 
adds that temporary workers can be clearly distinguished from both labor market insiders 
and unemployed people. In detail, temporary workers differ from insiders by their 
stronger support for redistributive policies and by their more left and pro-welfare lining 
political preferences. However, temporary workers are more integrated in the political 
process than unemployed individuals arexxi. Finally, the results show that temporary 
workers’ stronger support for left and pro-welfare parties is not combined with more 
pronounced non-corporatist attitudes. Consequently, these findings confirm the 
explanatory power of labor market status on individual social policy and political 
preferences, but suggest that research should to go beyond the simple notion of 
dualization between insiders and outsiders, highlighting differences between temporary 
work and unemployment.  
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Appendix 
Appendix Table 2.1: Descriptive statistics 
Variable Description and source Observations Mean Range 
Redistribution Government should reduce 
differences in income levels. 
“Disagree strongly” (1) to “Agree 
strongly” (5). ESS gincdif (recoded).  
117291 3.870 1-5 
Political 
involvement 
Degree of involvement in the political 
process. “Non-voter” (1); “Non-
partisan voter” (2), “Partisan voter” 
(3). ESS vote, clsprty (recoded). 
110513 2.340 1-3 
Right-left index Right-left index. CMP RILE. 51663 -6.979 -63.4 - 72.5 
Welfare Favorable mentions on welfare state 
expansion. CMP welfare. 
51663 14.737 -20.8 - 40.1 
Corporatism Favorable mentions on corporatism. 
CMP per405. 
51663 .284 0 - 7.9 
Self-employed Dummy equals to 1 if respondent is 
self-employed with dependent 
workers. ESS emplrel, emplno 
(recoded). 
119167 .040 0 – 1 
Self-employed 2 As self_empl, but with a stricter 
definition. ESS emplrel, emplno, 
pdwrk (recoded). 
119167 .026 0 - 1 
Freelancer Dummy equals to 1 if respondent is 
self-employed without dependent 
workers. ESS emplrel, emplno 
(recoded). 
119167 .064 0 - 1 
Freelancer 2 As free_lanc, but with a stricter 
definition. ESS emplrel, emplno, 
pdwrk (recoded). 
119167 .043 0 - 1 
Standard worker  Dummy equals to 1 if employed with 
unlimited contract. ESS emplrel, 
wrkctra (recoded). 
119167 .579 0 - 1 
Standard worker 2 As stnd_wrk, but with a stricter 
definition. ESS emplrel, wrkctra, 
pdwrk (recoded). 
119167 .344 0 - 1 
Temporary 
worker 
Dummy equals to 1 if employed with 
fixed-term contract. ESS emplrel, 
wrkctra (recoded). 
119167 .119 0 - 1 
Temp. worker 2 As temporary wrk, but with a stricter 
definition. ESS emplrel, wrkctra, 
pdwrk (recoded). 
119167 .056 0 - 1 
Unemployed Dummy equals to 1 if unemployed 
actively searching for job. ESS 
uempla (recoded). 
119167 .050 0 - 1 
Inactive Dummy equals to 1 if inactive. 
Residual category. 
119167 .076 0 - 1 
Temp. work. with 
an empl. partner 
Dummy equals to 1 if temporary 
worker with an employed partner. 
ESS emprelp (recoded). 
119167 .036 0 - 1 
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Temp. work. 
without an empl. 
partner 
Dummy equals to 1 if temporary 
worker without an employed partner. 
ESS emprelp (recoded). 
119167 .119 0 - 1 
Temp. work. with 
an empl.partner 2 
Dummy equals to 1 if temporary 
worker 2 with an employed partner. 
ESS emprelp (recoded). 
119167 .022 0 - 1 
Temp. work. 
without an empl. 
partner 2 
Dummy equals to 1 if temporary 
worker (restricted) without an 
employed partner. ESS emprelp 
(recoded). 
119167 .056 0 - 1 
Unempl. with an 
empl. partner 
Dummy equals to 1 if unemployed 
with an employed partner. ESS 
emprelp (recoded). 
119167 .014 0 - 1 
Unempl. without 
an empl. partner 
Dummy equals to 1 if unemployed 
without an employed partner. ESS 
emprelp (recoded). 
119167 .050 0 - 1 
Education low Dummy equals to 1 for ISCED levels 
1 and 2. ESS edulvla, edulvlb 
(recoded). 
119167 .327 0 - 1 
Education 
medium 
Dummy equals to 1 for ISCED levels 
3 and 4. 
ESS edulvla, edulvlb (recoded). 
119167 .410 0 - 1 
Education high Dummy equals to 1 for ISCED levels 
higher than 5. ESS edulvla, edulvlb 
(recoded). 
119167 .257 0 - 1 
Female Dummy equals to 1 if respondent is 
female. ESS gndr. 
119167 .532 0 - 1 
Migrant Dummy equals to 1 if not born in 
respective country. ESS brncntr. 
119167 .087 0 - 1 
Church 
attendance 
Dummy equals to 1 if attending 
church at least once a month. ESS 
rlgatnd. 
119167 .093 0 - 1 
Union member Dummy equals to 1 if member of 
union or similar organization. ESS 
mbtru. 
119167 .399 0 - 1 
Public sector Dummy equals to 1 if in public sector 
or state-owned enterprise. ESS 
tporgwk. 
119167 .285 0 - 1 
Income Deciles of the household income in 
the given country. ESS hinctnta. 
91919 5.315 1 - 10 
Environment Please listen to each description and 
tell me how much each person is or is 
not like you. She/he strongly believes 
that people should care for nature. 
“Not like me at all” (1), “Very much 
like me” (6). ESS impenv (recoded) 
116640 4.873 1 - 6 
Gay rights Gay men and lesbians should be free 
to live their own life as they wish. 
“Disagree strongly” (1), “Agree 
strongly” (5). ESS freehms (recoded). 
115310 3.850 1 - 5 
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Economy On the whole, how satisfied are you 
with the present state of the economy 
in your country? “Extremely 
dissatisfied” (0) to “Extremely 
satisfied” (10). ESS stfeco. 
117121 4.160603 0 - 10 
Eiscedm Level of education of respondent’s 
mother. Ordinal variable equals to 1 
for ISCED level I, 2 for ISCED level 
II, 3 for ISCED levels IIIa and IIIb, 4 
for ISCED level IV and 5 for ISCED 
levels V1 and V2. ESS eiscedm 
(recoded). 
98868 2.228173 1 - 5 
Eiscedf Level of education of respondent’s 
father. Ordinal variable equals to 1 
for ISCED level I, 2 for ISCED level 
II, 3 for ISCED levels IIIa and IIIb, 4 
for ISCED level IV and 5 for ISCED 
levels V1 and V2. ESS eiscedf 
(recoded). 
95684 2.441735 1 - 5 
Empl_m14 Dummy equals to 1 if respondent’s 
mother was a dependent worker 
when he/she was 14 years old. ESS 
emprm14 (recoded). 
119167 .4524994 0 - 1 
Self_empl_m14 Dummy equals to 1 if respondent’s 
mother was self-employer when 
he/she was 14 years old. ESS 
emprm14 (recoded). 
119167 .090562 0 – 1 
Empl_f14 Dummy equals to 1 if respondent’s 
father was a dependent worker when 
he/she was 14 years old. ESS 
emprf14 (recoded). 
119167 .6525884 0 – 1 
Self_empl_f14 Dummy equals to 1 if respondent’s 
father was self-employer when 
he/she was 14 years old. ESS 
emprf14 (recoded). 
119167 .2182483 0 - 1 
Children Dummy equals to 1 if respondent 
lives with children. 
ESS variable chldhm. 
119167 .3674004 0 - 1 
Notes: Information sets are the European Social Survey, waves 4, 5 and 6 and the CMP (MARPOR, 
2014). Some question wordings are slightly rephrased. 
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Appendix Table 2.2: Individual attitudes toward redistribution 
 M1b 
Labor market status:  
Standard worker (reference category)  
Self-employed -0.488*** 
 (0.105) 
Freelancer -0.215** 
 (0.0665) 
Temporary worker 0.130** 
 (0.0408) 
Unemployed 0.146*** 
 (0.0433) 
Inactive 0.0119 
 (0.0661) 
Age 0.0254*** 
 (0.00610) 
Age2 -0.000236*** 
 (0.0000511) 
Education:  
Low education (reference category)  
Medium education -0.0342 
 (0.0468) 
High education -0.379*** 
 (0.0827) 
Female 0.168*** 
 (0.0169) 
Migrant 0.0351 
 (0.0427) 
Church attendance -0.107 
 (0.0589) 
Union member 0.270*** 
 (0.0505) 
Public sector 0.0923** 
 (0.0287) 
Income -0.0841*** 
 (0.0159) 
N 0.043 
Pseudo R2 90833 
Notes: The models are ordered logistic regressions. The independent variables concerning labor market 
status are defined using the more restrictive definitions. Country and year dummies included in all 
models. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Population size and design weights applied. * p<0.05, ** 
p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
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Appendix Table 2.3: Individual attitudes toward the political process 
 Non-voter Non-partisan 
voter 
Partisan voter 
Labor market status:    
Standard worker (ref.)    
Self-employed -0.0148 -0.0142 0.0290 
 (0.0115) (0.0166) (0.0216) 
Freelancer -0.0323*** -0.0211** 0.0534*** 
 (0.00940) (0.00729) (0.0112) 
Temporary worker 0.00389 0.00361 -0.00750 
 (0.00653) (0.00752) (0.00885) 
Unemployed 0.0316* -0.0368* 0.00511 
 (0.0124) (0.0157) (0.0155) 
Inactive 0.00407 -0.0702*** 0.0661** 
 (0.0151) (0.0149) (0.0243) 
Age -0.00606*** 0.00952*** -0.00346* 
 (0.00163) (0.00179) (0.00171) 
Age2 0.0000324 -0.000103*** 0.0000707*** 
 (0.0000167) (0.0000172) (0.0000184) 
Education:    
Low education (ref.)    
Medium education -0.0291*** 0.0180* 0.0111 
 (0.00833) (0.00770) (0.0104) 
High education -0.0823*** -0.00805 0.0903*** 
 (0.00951) (0.00701) (0.0130) 
Female 0.0229*** 0.0582*** -0.0811*** 
 (0.00327) (0.00383) (0.00594) 
Migrant 0.0823*** -0.107*** 0.0252 
 (0.0146) (0.0275) (0.0240) 
Church attendance -0.0252 -0.00884 0.0341 
 (0.0163) (0.0102) (0.0210) 
Union member -0.0173 -0.0263 0.0436 
 (0.0103) (0.0164) (0.0232) 
Public sector -0.0305*** -0.00262 0.0331*** 
 (0.00344) (0.00727) (0.00750) 
Income -0.0104*** -0.00207 0.0125*** 
 (0.00149) (0.00129) (0.00221) 
N 0.069 0.069 0.069 
Pseudo R2 86584 86584 86584 
Notes: The models are multinomial logistic regressions (average marginal effects). The independent 
variables concerning labor market status are defined using the more restrictive definitions. Country and 
year dummies included in all models. For dummy variables, the indicated effects report the change in 
probability to be a non-voter, a non-partisan voter or a partisan voter if the condition applies as opposed 
to the base category. For continuous variables the reported effects are based on a marginal change in the 
variable. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Population size and design weights applied. * p<0.05, 
** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
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Appendix Table 2.4: Individual preferences toward political parties 
 Left-right 
1 
Left-right 
2 
Welfare 1 Welfare 2 Corporatis
m 1 
Corporatis
m 2 
Labor:       
Stand. (ref.)       
Self-empl. 3.514** 3.757** -1.377*** -1.396*** -0.103* -0.104* 
 (1.097) (0.998) (0.339) (0.334) (0.0445) (0.0447) 
Freelancer 0.536 0.665 -0.309 -0.346 -0.0864 -0.0893 
 (0.600) (0.576) (0.304) (0.283) (0.0527) (0.0535) 
Temp. w. -1.363* -1.418* 0.320* 0.324* -0.0219 -0.0201 
 (0.499) (0.521) (0.152) (0.152) (0.0172) (0.0169) 
Unemployed -2.593* -2.485** 0.671** 0.660** 0.00563 0.00437 
 (0.974) (0.839) (0.190) (0.198) (0.0141) (0.0162) 
Inactive -0.312 -0.546 0.0663 0.146 -0.0293 -0.0271 
 (0.373) (0.343) (0.120) (0.116) (0.0234) (0.0202) 
Age -0.118*** -0.0906*** 0.0521*** 0.0432*** 0.00684* 0.00698* 
 (0.0251) (0.0170) (0.0119) (0.00896) (0.00324) (0.00297) 
Age2 0.0016*** 0.0012*** -0.00065*** -0.00054*** -0.0000643 -0.0000632* 
 (0.000261) (0.000214) (0.000155) (0.000126) (0.0000318) (0.0000284) 
Education:       
Low ed. (ref.)       
Medium ed. 0.100 0.425 -0.193 -0.279 -0.00829 -0.0101 
 (0.329) (0.322) (0.130) (0.136) (0.0116) (0.0132) 
High ed. -0.516 0.00767 -0.0993 -0.239 -0.0301* -0.0350* 
 (0.612) (0.564) (0.167) (0.157) (0.0135) (0.0142) 
Female -0.228 0.152 0.156 0.0494 0.0127** 0.00897* 
 (0.210) (0.213) (0.0906) (0.0709) (0.00431) (0.00339) 
Migrant -2.422* -2.870** 0.677 0.785* 0.0578** 0.0657** 
 (0.949) (0.908) (0.331) (0.296) (0.0188) (0.0200) 
Church att. 1.510*** 1.274*** -0.650 -0.596 -0.0335 -0.0308 
 (0.394) (0.327) (0.323) (0.322) (0.0181) (0.0158) 
Union m. -2.403*** -2.354*** 1.045** 1.017** 0.0333 0.0326 
 (0.336) (0.356) (0.328) (0.333) (0.0211) (0.0215) 
Public sector -2.239*** -2.121*** 0.592*** 0.563*** 0.0288 0.0264 
 (0.485) (0.464) (0.132) (0.136) (0.0303) (0.0279) 
Income 0.450*** 0.456*** -0.109** -0.116** -0.00748** -0.00810*** 
 (0.0482) (0.0398) (0.0319) (0.0308) (0.00203) (0.00202) 
Gay rights  -1.556***  0.427***  0.0219 
  (0.279)  (0.108)  (0.0121) 
Environment  -0.569**  0.177  -0.00110 
  (0.151)  (0.0883)  (0.00538) 
N 42608 41232 42608 41232 42608 41232 
R2 0.298 0.309 0.403 0.399 0.152 0.152 
Notes: The models are OLS regressions. The independent variables concerning labour market status are 
defined using the more restrictive definitions. Country and year dummies included in all models. Robust 
standard errors in parentheses. Population size and design weights applied. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** 
p<0.001 
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Appendix Table 2.5: Matching summary 
 T=1 T=0 Matched obs. T=1 Matched obs. T=0 £1 
Labor market status:      
Self-employer 4,770 114,397 4731 87121 .44738672 
Freelancer 7,695 111,472 7643 94382 .36914765 
Temporary worker 14,235 104,932 14039 96889 .31749483 
Unemployed 6,034 113,133 85881 5929 .40091885 
Inactive 9,141 110,026 8964 80072 .30871964 
Notes: Treatment variables concerning labor market statuses are defined using the less restrictive 
definitions. 
 
i In this analysis, for example temporary workers and unemployed people are distinguished 
by their declared employment status. However, individuals, especially young people, tend 
to move from temporary jobs to unemployment quite frequently. Unfortunately, the 
cross-sectional structure of  the ESS does not allow me to control for the unemployment 
length and for the number of  temporary contracts an individual experienced in his/her 
life. 
ii This threshold has not be interpreted in a meaningful way because the absolute number 
of  actually observed temporary contracts in the three waves of  the European Social 
Survey is extremely small (Marx, 2014). 
iii All these countries are covered by both the three waves of  the European Social Survey 
and the CMP, with the exception of  Greece (which is missing in wave n. 6), Iceland (which 
is missing in waves nn. 4 and 5), Italy (which is missing in waves nn. 4 and 5) and Turkey 
(which is missing in wave n. 4). 
iv Specifically, there are 8816 individuals (3302 in wave 4, 2759 in wave 5, 2755 in wave 6) 
in the final sample declaring to feel close to a political party, but not to have voted in the 
last national elections. These individuals have been added to the group of  “Partisan 
voters” not to lose the information concerning the name of  the political party to which 
they declared to feel closer to. 
v I decided to recode the ESS variable clsprty, neglecting the variable vote. It may be 
questioned whether the variable clparty, referring to party identification, really differs from 
the variable vote, referring to retrospective vote choice. This question was first raised in an 
investigation of  British voting behaviour, which found out that British electors changed 
identifications along to voting choices (Butler & Stokes, 1969). Jacques Thomassen 
([1976] 2010) and Max Kaase ([1976] 2010) provided findings on German and Dutch 
panel data that revealed considerable instability in party identification over time. 
Thomassen interpreted such instability as demonstrating that, in the Netherlands at least, 
party identification was no more than an alternative way of  measuring vote choice. 
William P. Irvine ([1976] 2010), Ian Budge and Dennis Farlie ([1976] 2010) identified party 
identification’s relative merits in its simplicity of  measurement, its location in an internally 
consistent conceptual scheme and ultimate grounding in social psychology. In the present 
analysis, I decided to employ the variable referring to party identification because there 
can be a considerable time gap between the last national elections and data collection: 
since many temporary contracts have a short duration, there is no reliable information 
about respondents’ labor market status at the time of  the election (Marx, 2014). Moreover, 
retrospective vote choice is more likely to be bias by strategic voting or strategic behavior. 
However, the recognized lack of  theoretical and even temporal antecedence between 
party identification and voting decision suggests that results are expected to hold even 
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substituting the variable clparty with the variable vote.  
vi In particular, the position  of  every single party on the left-right (RILE) dimension is 
obtained by subtracting the value obtained by that party in 13 left categories (i.e., the CMP 
dimensions per103, per105, per106, per107, per403, per404, per406, per412, per413, 
per504, per506, per701 and per202) from the value obtained by the same party in 13 right 
categories (i.e., the CMP dimensions per104, per201, per203, per305, per401, per402, 
per407, per414, per505, per601, per603, per605 and per606). 
vii To test the robustness of  the findings, I generated a second dummy variable for self-
employed individuals, adding a further condition: having performed paid work in the 
reference week (ESS variable pdwrw). 
viii I generated a second dummy variable for freelancers, adding a further condition: having 
performed paid work in the reference week (ESS variable pdwrw). 
ix I generated a second dummy variable for dependent workers with open-ended contracts, 
adding a further condition: having performed paid work in the reference week (ESS 
variable pdwrw). 
x I generated a second dummy variable for dependent workers with temporary contracts, 
adding a further condition: having performed paid work in the reference week (ESS 
variable pdwrw). 
xi I estimated the same model specification substituting the five dummy variables referring 
to the employment status with the ones with the more restrictive definitions. Results are 
consistent with the one discussed and are reported by model M1b in Appendix Table 2.2.  
xii As for the first stage of  this empirical analysis, I estimated the same model specification 
substituting the five dummy variables referring to employment status with the ones with 
more restrictive definitions. With the exception of  self-employed individuals, results are 
consistent with the ones discussed and are reported in Appendix Table 2.3. 
xiii I substituted the dependent variable Welfare, measuring the share of  quasi-sentences 
devoted to welfare state expansion, with the variable Equality – Positive (CMD variable 
per503), referring to wide concept of  social justice. Results proved to hold. Estimates 
available on request.  
xiv Also in this last step of  the empirical analysis, I estimated the same model specifications 
substituting the five dummy variables referring to the employment status with the ones 
with more restrictive definitions. With the exception of  the two coefficients referring to 
the impact of  being a free-lancer rather than a standard worker on party attitudes toward 
corporatism, results are consistent with the ones discussed and are reported in Appendix 
Table 2.4.   
xv I adopted CEM because Iacus, King, and Porro (2007, 2009, 2011a, 2011b) show that 
CEM dominates commonly used existing matching methods in its ability to reduce 
imbalance, model dependence, estimation error, bias, variance, mean square error, and 
other criteria. The basic idea of  CEM is to coarsen each variable by recoding it so that 
substantively indistinguishable values are grouped and assigned the same numerical value. 
Then, the “exact matching” algorithm is applied to the coarsened data to determine the 
matches and to prune unmatched units. Finally, the coarsened data are discarded and the 
original values of  the matched data are retained. Moreover, CEM is considerably easier to 
use and faster in computational time. 
xvi In addition, this correlation may occur when the dependent variable causes at least one 
of  the covariates (reverse causation) and when the covariates are subject to measurement 
error. 
xvii Unfortunately, there is not a command to estimate ordinal and multinomial logistic 
regression through the instrumental variables approach in Stata. For this reason, I 
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performed this analysis manually, following a two stages procedure. As first, I re-estimated 
model M1 in Table 2.2 adding the instrumental variables to the model specification in 
order to informally test their validity. Then, I proceeded by estimating first stage logistic 
regressions in which each endogenous variables has been regressed on the exogenous 
ones plus the instruments. Finally, I re-estimated the ordered logistic regression 
corresponding to model M1 of  Table 2.2, substituting to the endogenous variables the 
fitted values obtained in the first stages. The same procedure has been followed to 
estimate the models reported under the columns “Non-voter”, “Non-partisan voter” and 
“Partisan voter”. In this case, however, the second stage consists in a multinomial logistic 
regression. 
xviii For brevity reasons, I did not report these estimates. They are available on request. 
xix For brevity reasons, I did not report these estimates. They are available on request. 
xx For brevity reasons, I did not report these estimates. They are available on request. 
xxi Taking into account the different operationalization of  the dependent variables 
referring to party preferences, this general pattern seems to be consistent with the one 
identified by Picot and Marx (2013) in the case of  Germany. In this sense, this analysis 
seems to confirm and to generalize their findings. 
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Chapter III 
Looking at the second link of the chain of responsiveness. 
From parties’ policy supply to declared government 
positions: Who affects the coalition agreement on the left-
right and on the welfare dimensions and why 
 
 
Abstract. A perennial question for students of parliamentary democracy concerns how 
do coalition governments build their policy proposals. On the one hand, McDonald and 
Budge (2005) found that declared left-right position of coalition governments better 
accords with the left-right position of the median party in parliament than with the 
weighted left-right position of the parties that compose them. On the other hand, 
Warwick (2001, 2011) revealed that declared left-right position of coalition governments 
responds to the weighted left-right position of cabinet parties and, where present, external 
support parties. This chapter explores the degree of correspondence between declared 
cabinet position and the weighted position of cabinet parties as expressed in their electoral 
manifestos on two separate issues: the traditionally employed left-right scale and a more 
policy based welfare scale. Indeed, I maintain that this additional policy-based dimension 
allows shedding light on the so far mixed results provided in literature on the roles played 
by different political actors in shaping coalition agreements. Results obtained through a 
time-series cross-section methodology suggest that “the owners of the agenda setting 
power” over the two scales are different. In particular, on the traditional left-right scale, 
declared cabinet position is strongly driven by the weighted position of cabinet parties 
and by that of the formateur party. Conversely, on the welfare scale, declared cabinet 
position is also affected by the position of the party holding the median legislator in 
Parliament and by those of the parties expressing the labor and social affairs ministers. In 
addition, declared cabinet position on the welfare dimension shows a marked tendency to 
drift rightward with adverse economic conditions. 
 
 
Introduction 
Chapter II demonstrated that the economic conditions experienced by individuals in their 
everyday life, namely their labor market statuses, affect their redistributive preferences. 
Moreover, it proves that individuals tend to feel closer to political parties formulating 
social policy supplies in their electoral manifestos consistent with their redistributive 
preferences at the election time.  
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According to these results, it could be asserted that the first link of the chain of 
responsiveness, namely the AB bond (Miller & Strokes, 1966) between individuals’ social 
policy preferences and parties’ social policy supplies, holds (Cfr. Chapter I, Figure 1.3). 
Political parties seem to be able to fulfil their expressive function (Mair, 2009; cfr. Chapter 
I, Section 1.2), giving space to the social policy preferences of their supporters in their 
electoral manifestos.  
As already underlined in chapter II (Cfr. Chapter II, Introduction and Section 2.5), by 
saying that the linkage between individuals’ redistributive preferences and parties’ social 
policy supply holds, I am not suggesting that parties are mere executors of voters’ policy 
preferences. As famously explained by Katz and Mair (1993), parties are “three faces” 
organizations, endowed by autonomous and heterogeneous policy preferences. Indeed, 
the policy preferences expressed by the so called party on the ground, party central-office 
and party in public offices are likely to differ both from one another and from those of 
the electorate. However, even acknowledging such multifaceted nature, chapter II 
maintained that individuals’ redistributive preferences, explained by the position the same 
occupy in the labor market, are likely to be reflected into political parties social policy 
promises at the election time. 
Once verified that voters’ redistributive preferences consistently relate to parties’ social 
policy supplies, chapter III explores the second link of the chain of responsiveness: 
namely, the BC bond between parties’ and government’s social policy preferences (Cfr. 
Chapter I, Figure 1.4). In detail, the aim of chapter III is to determine whether and to 
what extent declared cabinet position corresponds to the weighted mean position of 
coalescing parties, as derived from their electoral manifestos. Furthermore, if declared 
cabinet position is not simply a reflection of the policy stances staked out by governing 
parties at the election time, which additional political actors and external forces might be 
influencing it? 
From the late 1950s, students of parliamentary democracy devoted considerable attention 
to how do coalition governments build their policy proposals (Cfr. Section 3.1). Just to 
recall one of the most influential and well-known contribution, McDonald and Budge 
(2005) found that declared left-right position of coalition governments better accords with 
left-right position of the median party in parliament than with the weighted left-right 
position of the coalescing parties. Employing the same dataset, however, Warwick (2001, 
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2011) obtained different results: indeed, he revealed that declared left-right position of 
coalition governments responds to the weighted left-right position of cabinet parties and, 
where present, external support parties.  
This chapter intends to contribute to the existing literature by contrasting the degree of 
correspondence between declared cabinet position and the weighted mean position of 
cabinet parties as expressed in their electoral manifestos on two separate issues: the 
traditionally employed left-right scale and a genuinely policy based pro-anti welfare scale. 
Indeed, I maintain that if we want to verify whether multiparty governments are likely to 
distribute policy payoffs to their members according to a proportional criterion (Warwick, 
2001, 2011), exactly as they are expected to do for office payoffs (Gamson, 1961), it is 
important to focus on a policy based dimension, in order to reduce any possible 
ideological bias. Moreover, the comparison between the ideological left-right dimension 
and the welfare dimension allows checking whether “the owners of the agenda setting 
power” coincide. In particular, the distributive and redistributive nature of welfare 
policies, through which governments distribute societal wealth to specific groups, usually 
obtaining resources from other groups, suggests that the parliamentary parties and the 
competent ministers (i.e., labor and social affairs ministers) are likely to play crucial roles. 
Analogously, declared cabinet position on the welfare dimension is expected to be 
strongly affected by the economic conditions experienced by the coalescing parties when 
in office.   
Chapter III is structured as follows. The first section critically reviews theories advanced 
so far in literature concerning how multiparty governments in parliamentary democracies 
formulate their policy proposals. In particular, models recalled in the first section discuss 
whether declared cabinet policy position mirrors the weighted mean position of 
coalescing parties, as suggested by the extension of the Gamson’s law (Gamson, 1961) 
from office to policy payoffs (Warwick, 2001, 2011), or whether the same is influenced 
by other political actors and external forces. Among the political actors potentially able to 
affect declared cabinet policy position, I will focus on the median legislator (Budge & 
Laver, 1992b; McDonald & Budge, 2005), the formateur party (Baron, 1998; Diermeier 
& Feddersen, 1998) and the ministers (Laver & Shepsle, 1996) having jurisdiction on 
finance, labor and social affairs portfolios. Instead, as far as external forces are concerned, 
I will devote special attention to the expected effects of the electoral rule (Iversen & 
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Soskice, 2006; Persson & Tabellini, 2004), the length of time between the last 
parliamentary election and the government formation and adverse economic conditions 
(Warwick, 2001). Finally, the first section details the hypotheses to be tested in the 
subsequent empirical analysis (Cfr. Table 3.1). 
The second section introduces the dataset, it provides a brief description of dependent 
and independent variables and then it discusses the model specification.  
The third section develops the empirical analysis in three steps. As first, it tests whether 
declared cabinet position on the left-right dimension corresponds to the weighted mean 
position of coalescing parties on the same dimension or whether other political actors and 
external forces bias it away from the weighted mean (Cfr. Section 3.3.1). As second, the 
same analysis is performed for declared cabinet position on the welfare dimension to 
verify whether political actors and external forces behave in the same way (Cfr. Section 
3.3.2). Taking into account the small-N nature of the available dataset, these two steps of 
the empirical analysis will test the effect of each independent variable on declared cabinet 
position separately. However, in order to identify the net effect of each independent 
variable even when the other influences are controlled for, a third step is needed. In 
particular, section 3.3.3 displays four additional model specifications, in which declared 
cabinet positions on the left-right and on the welfare dimensions are regressed on the 
most important independent variables referring to both political actors and external 
constraints together.  
The last section discusses the main findings and indicates paths for future research. 
 
3.1 Hypotheses on how do coalition governments build their policy proposals  
At the beginning of the 1960s, William A. Gamson (1961) opened the debate on how 
government coalitions share out the rewards of office to their members. In particular, he 
advanced the hypothesis that each member of a government coalition will expect to 
receive a share of the office payoffs proportional to the amount of resources he provided 
(Gamson, 1961: 376). In multiparty governments, this formulation means that each 
coalition party will expect to receive a share of cabinet portfolios proportional to its share 
of seats in Parliament.  
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Gamson’s hypothesis has been empirically tested by subsequent studies, with striking 
results (Browne & Franklin, 1973; Carroll & Cox, 2007; Laver et al., 2011; Warwick & 
Druckman, 2006). Notably, Eric C. Browne and Mark N. Franklin (1973) found a nearly 
perfect one-to-one correspondence between the proportion of legislative seats hold by 
each coalition party and the share of ministerial portfolios it receives in West European 
parliamentary systems. The connection between seat and portfolio shares was so close 
that scholars started to call it “Gamson’s law” (e.g., Morelli, 1999).  
Nonetheless, some observers criticized the Gamson’s law, defining it as a mere empirical 
regularity with the need for sensible theoretical foundations (Warwick & Druckman 2006: 
660). Royce Carrol and Gary W. Cox (2007) tried to fill this gap by developing a theoretical 
argument that underpins the adoption of a proportionality criterion in portfolio allocation 
among the members of pre-electoral coalitions. In particular, the authors advanced that 
“[b]y agreeing ex ante to a more Gamsonian division of office spoils ex post, the coalition 
can motivate its members to campaign harder, thus conferring external benefits on all’ 
(Carroll & Cox 2007: 301). 
However, even with this theoretical refinement, coalition theorists focusing on “how the 
pie is divided among the winners” (Browne & Franklin, 1973: 453) examined only a single 
type of payoffs, namely the quantitative allocation of portfolios. The first systematic 
attempt to extend the Gamson’s law from the office dimension, namely the quantitative 
allocation of portfolios, to the policy one, namely the policy proposal of a coalition 
government, has been conducted by Paul V. Warwick in 2001 (see also Warwick, 2011). 
In particular, he took advantage of the Government Declarations data (Budge et al., 2001), 
which contains the coding of government declarations in 10 European countries from the 
end of the Second World War to the end of Nineties (Cfr. Appendix Table 3.1), and tested 
whether declared cabinet position on the left-right dimension corresponds to the 
weighted mean position of cabinet parties on the same scale. His results supported the 
Gamson’s prediction, demonstrating that declared cabinet position on the left-right 
dimension is directly influenced by the corresponding weighted mean position of cabinet 
parties. Moreover, Warwick shed light on the role played by other political actors, able to 
bias the declared cabinet position toward their ideal points: namely, the party holding the 
finance portfolio, the formateur party, the weighted mean position of parliamentary 
parties (2001) and that of external support parties (2011).  
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Beside the Gamson’s law, alternative hypotheses on the distribution of policy payoffs to 
the members of multiparty governments have been formulated.  
Perhaps the simplest and the oldest prediction is the well-known median voter theorem, 
advanced by the Scottish economist Duncan Black at the end of the Fifties (1957). He 
argued that the party controlling the median legislator, regardless of its majority status, 
will have a stronger bargaining power compared to the other coalescing parties since there 
are no other points in the ideological space that are preferred by a majority to the median 
legislator’s ideal point.  
Ian Budge and Michael Laver (1992b) empirically tested the median voter theorem at the 
beginning of the Nineties. Overall, these scholars found that the impact of political parties 
on declared cabinet position is quite modest (Budge & Laver, 1992b). In particular, 
declared cabinet position on the left-right dimension did not correspond consistently with 
the mean or weighted mean position of the parties in the coalition or in the legislature. 
Moreover, declared cabinet position on the left-right dimension did not mirror the 
positions of either the median party or the predominant party on the left-right dimension. 
Therefore, Budge and Laver were obliged to admit: “party policy, influential though it 
obviously is in coalition bargaining, still has less consistent and strong effects than those 
assumed by policy-based spatial models” (1992b: 429). 
A second attempt to test the median voter theorem has been done by Michael D. 
McDonald and Ian Budge in 2005. They found a reasonably strong (r = .49) relationship 
between the government’s left–right position, as derived from its declaration, and the 
left–right position of the party containing the median legislator. However, they also 
noticed that, once the left-right position of the median voter is added to the model 
specification, its relationship with the government’s left-right position is so strong (r = 
.53) that it will eliminate any significant role for both the median legislator’s position and 
cabinet parties’ position. They interpreted this result as a further evidence in support of 
their median mandate thesis of democratic governance, which sees governments as 
aligning their policy stances with the preferences of the median legislator and, ultimately, 
those of the median voter. 
However, as acknowledged by the authors themselves (McDonald & Budge, 2005: 147-
148), the finding that the median voter position displaces the role played by the median 
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legislator position in the regression analysis suggests that declared cabinet position may 
reflect other influences besides the preferences of the median legislator or voter (Warwick, 
2001, 2011). Among those influences, it is worth to take into account the policy position 
of the formateur party (i.e., the party that was assigned the task of putting the coalition 
together) and that of the ministers having jurisdictions in specific policy areas.    
At the end of Nineties, David P. Baron (1998), Daniel Diermeier and Thimothy J. 
Feddersen (1998) formulated their proposer model, suggesting that the formateur party 
should be able to extract a disproportionately large share of payoffs. In policy terms, this 
formulation means that the formateur party should be able to bias declared cabinet 
position toward its ideal point beyond its seat share.  
The portfolio allocation model put forward by Michael Laver and Kenneth A. Shepsle 
(1996) assumed that ministers are policy dictators in their jurisdictions. In policy terms, 
this model maintained that the policy preferences of the minister’s party will prevail in the 
specific policy area governed by that minister. This model has been tested by Warwick 
(2001), which demonstrated that the left-right position of the party holding the finance 
minister has a modest influence on the declared government’s left-right position. 
The median voter theorem, the proposer model and the portfolio allocation model 
discussed so far involve the potential influence of the policy preferences of various 
political actors. However, other types of influence are possible as well.  
A first effect to be considered is that of the electoral rule.  Indeed, throughout the last ten 
years, several empirical studies demonstrated that the electoral rule systematically shapes 
the size of government, fiscal policy outcomes and redistributive policies. In particular, 
democracies adopting proportional (PR) electoral systems tend to implement more 
generous social policies than those characterized by majoritarian (M) electoral systems 
(e.g., Iversen & Soskice, 2006; Persson & Tabellini, 2004). Scholars suggested at least three 
alternative causal mechanisms to explain this empirical regularity (Clark et. al., 2012).  
The first causal mechanism maintained that the electoral system plays a crucial role in 
explaining the variance in government redistribution because it shapes the partisan 
composition of governing coalitions, which, in turn, determine social expenditure. In 
particular, center-left governments are more frequent in countries adopting PR systems, 
whereas center-right governments dominate in M systems. Accordingly, social policies 
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tend to be more generous in PR systems than in M ones. At least two reasons may be 
provided to explain the difficulties encountered by left parties in M systems.  
On the one hand, Jonathan Rodden (2006, 2010) suggested that left wing parties are less 
likely to win majorities in M systems because they are strongly damaged by the 
geographical distribution of political preferences across electoral districts. Indeed, in 
advanced democracies, from the early post-war period until now, left wing voters tend to 
concentrate in urban areas, while right wing ones are more spread over the national 
territory.  
On the other hand, Torben Iversen and David Soskice (2006) explained why, in M 
systems, left wing parties are less likely to enter the governing coalition and, therefore, to 
adopt redistributive policies, by developing a game-theoretic model based on the 
distribution of coalition bargaining power. In detail, they demonstrated that in a PR 
system, the center-party has an incentive to pick the left wing party as a coalition partner 
because he knows that the left wing party can never be entirely shut out from sharing in 
redistributive spending, even when it is not in the coalition. Therefore, in a center-right 
coalition, the center party has to share with both the left wing party and the right wing 
party, whereas, in a center-left coalition, the center party only has to share with the left 
wing party. Conversely, in a M system, the main concern of the center party will be to 
avoid being soaked by the poor. Accordingly, in a M system, the center party has an 
incentive to pick the right wing party as a coalition partner (Iversen & Soskice, 2006: 171). 
The second causal mechanism linking PR systems and generous social policies focused 
on the different size of electoral districts between PR and M systems (Persson & Tabellini, 
1999, 2000, 2004). In particular, in PR systems, the electoral competition between parties 
is more diffuse, giving to office seeking parties strong incentives to seek electoral support 
from broad coalitions in the population through general public goods or universalistic 
redistributive programs (e.g., public pensions or other welfare programs). In contrast, in 
M systems, office seeking parties have strong incentives to disregard the electoral districts 
in which they are sure to win, so that they can concentrate their efforts in swing districts. 
Accordingly, M systems increase the propensity to target benefits to narrow 
constituencies in swing districts, at the expense of broad and universalistic programs and 
general public goods. 
LOOKING AT THE SECOND LINK OF THE CHAIN OF RESPONSIVENESS 
100 
Finally, the third causal mechanism claimed that PR systems favor more generous 
redistributive policies because they determine a higher number of governing parties, 
which, in turn, makes more difficult to control public expenditure (Hallerberg, 2004; 
Bawn, & Rosenbluth, 2006; Persson et alia , 2007).   
Beside the electoral rule, a second effect to be considered concerns the tendency for 
government declarations to be more right wing than the mean positions of the parties 
composing them. This tendency has been firstly noticed by Budge and Laver (1992b: 411), 
which attributed it to a greater focus in government declarations on administrative 
concerns and areas of ongoing matters of government activity, such as defense and 
foreign affairs. However, alternative hypotheses may be advanced to explain this 
rightward drift in declared cabinet positions.  
For example, popular sense would suggest that government declarations pronounced 
immediately after elections are likely to mirror the positions of the parties in the governing 
coalition relatively well since the promises made by the same parties to voters are recent. 
As time passed, however, cabinets have to face the burden of the socioeconomic reality, 
abandoning their unrealistic commitments in favor of more workable policies in terms of 
budgetary constraints (Przeworski & Sprague, 1986; Kitschelt, 1994). Even if not 
explained in theoretical terms, a positive correlation between the rightward bias in 
government policy and the time elapsed between the last election and the formation of 
the government has been empirically identified (Warwick, 2001, 2011). 
Another possibility is that declared cabinet position deviates from the electoral manifestos 
of the coalescing parties in response to adverse economic conditions. Indeed, policy 
promises stated in the electoral manifestos are likely to be based on a more favorable 
interpretation of current and expected economic conditions than the ones that governing 
parties are forced to face when they take office. In particular, rising inflation and 
unemployment rates may force governments into pronouncing less interventionist and 
less expansionary declarations than they might otherwise have done. Even if reasonable, 
this expectation did not find empirical support until now (Warwick, 2001, 2011). 
Table 3.1 summarizes the hypotheses reviewed so far, that will be empirically tested in 
this chapter.  
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Table 3.1: Hypotheses to be tested 
Left-right dimension  Social policy dimension 
Main hypothesis on the formulation of declared cabinet position 
H1: The cabinet’s left-right (RILE) 
position corresponds to the weighted 
mean of the RILE positions of the 
coalescing parties, with the parties’ seat 
shares in the lower chamber constituting 
the weights.  
H1b: The cabinet’s social policy position 
corresponds to the weighted mean of the 
social policy positions of the coalescing 
parties, with the parties’ seat shares in the 
lower chamber constituting the weights.  
Additional hypotheses on the formulation of declared cabinet position 
The cabinet’s RILE position is biased away 
from the cabinet weighted mean toward 
the RILE position: 
.  
The cabinet’s social policy position is 
biased away from the cabinet weighted 
mean toward the social policy position:  
 H2: of the parliamentary median 
party.  
 H3: of the formateur party.  
 H4: of the party that holds the 
finance portfolio. 
 H2b: of the parliamentary median 
party.  
 H3b: of the formateur party.  
 H4b: of the parties that hold the 
labor and social affairs portfolios. 
Additional hypotheses regarding exogenous determinants 
H5: As the average district magnitude 
increases, the cabinet’s RILE position 
moves to the left. 
H5b: As the average district magnitude 
increases, the cabinet’s social policy 
position becomes more expansionary.   
H6: As the length of time between the last 
election and the formation of the 
government increases, the cabinet’s RILE 
position moves to the right.  
H6b: As the length of time between the 
last election and the formation of the 
government increases, the cabinet’s social 
policy position becomes more restrictive. 
H7: Adverse economic conditions at the 
time the government is formed moves the 
cabinet’s RILE position to the right. 
H7b: Adverse economic conditions at the 
time the government is formed makes 
cabinet’s social policy position more 
restrictive.  
As highlighted by this brief literature review, the dimension that is usually employed to 
test the validity of these hypotheses is the ideological left-right scale. In this chapter, 
however, two parallel analyses will be conducted: the first one concerns the determinants 
of the cabinet position on the left-right dimension, the second one regards the 
determinants of a genuinely policy based scale, namely the pro-anti welfare state 
expansion dimension. Indeed, the comparison between these two dimensions will allow 
verifying whether “the owners of the agenda setting power” coincide.   
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Following Robert Dahl’s (1961) pluralistic approach to politics, I maintain that several 
actors shape the outcomes of policy-making processes in contemporary democracies. In 
detail, in his influential book, Who Governs? Democracy and Power in an American City, he 
analyzed decision-making processes in the city of New Haven (Connecticut) in the 1950s, 
showing that the actors involved in policy subsystems, the policy positions they endorsed, 
the resources they owned (i.e., political, economical, legal and cognitive resources; cfr. 
Dente, 2011: 63) and the ways in which they related to each other affected policies in 
different fields. In a sentence: politics, namely the plurality of actors involved in policy 
subsystems, determines policies, defined as the final choices of these networks.  
Ten years later, Theodore Lowi reversed this sentence saying that: “Policies determine 
politics”. Indeed, in his off cited paper “Four Systems of Policy, Politics and Choice” 
(1972), he developed a policy taxonomy based on two dimensions. The vertical dimension 
refers to the likelihood to employ coercion to implement public policies, which could be 
remote or immediate. The horizontal dimension concerns the applicability of coercion. 
In detail, it can work through the individual conduct or through the environment of 
conduct. For example, Lowi distinguished between a general rule covering all fraudulent 
advertising, which is applicable only through the conduct of individual advertisers, and a 
minor change in the Federal Reserve discount rate, which can have a major impact on my 
propensity to invest, yet no official need know of my existence.  
Cross-tabulation between these two dimensions produces four types of policies: namely 
distributive, redistributive, regulatory and constituent policies. Distributive policies 
extend opportunities, goods and services among different sections of society as well as 
distributing the costs among all the members of society. Examples include welfare 
spending, public education, highways and public safety. Redistributive policies shift 
resources or benefits from one societal segment to one another. Regulatory policies 
compel certain types of behavior through fines or sanctions. Constituent policies create 
executive power entities or deal with laws (Dente, 2011: 102).  
Lowi applied this policy taxonomy to the American presidential politics from Franklin D. 
Roosevelt to Lindon Johnson, showing that, as the type of policy changed, the actors 
involved in decision-making processes did the same. In particular, he demonstrated that 
the Congress played a major role in distributive and regulatory policies, while the executive 
power was stronger in shaping redistributive policies.  
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Even if extremely influential in policy studies, it is worth to recognize that it is hard to 
apply Lowi’s taxonomy to actual decision making processes, which usually mix different 
kind of policies in a single legislative outcome. However, Lowi’s work is here to remind 
us that the issue at stake is likely to affect the relative weight of the actors involved in the 
policy subsystems. 
Trying to adapt this theoretical claim to the present analysis, the actors able to shape 
declared cabinet’s positions on the RILE and on the welfare dimensions are expected to 
differ. In detail, on the ideological RILE dimension the executive power is expected to 
play the major role. Instead, on the social policy dimension, which typically involves 
distributive e redistributive policies, the legislative assembly (i.e., for distributive policies) 
and the competent ministers (i.e. for redistributive ones) inside the cabinet are likely to 
exert a significant influence on the formulation of the coalition agreement (Howlett & 
Ramesh, 1995: 58-61). Analogously, declared cabinet position on the social policy 
dimension is likely to be strongly affected by the economic conditions experienced by the 
coalescing parties when in office.    
 
3.2 Data description and model specification 
The key ingredient to test the hypotheses listed in the previous section (Cfr. Table 3.1) 
has been provided by the Government Declarations Data (Budge et al., 2001). This dataset 
contains the coding of government declarations in 10 European countries (Belgium, 
Denmark, France, Ireland, Italy, Germany, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway and 
Sweden) from the end of the Second World War to the end of Nineties (Cfr. Appendix 
Table 3.1). Even if the dataset contains some instances of single-party governments, these 
declarations typically announce the results of coalition government negotiations and are 
given by the Head of State on behalf of a recently formed government or by the prime 
minister at the investiture time (Laver & Budge, 1992). This dataset will be used to build 
the dependent variables employed in this analysis.  
The first dependent variable, namely declared cabinet position on the RILE dimension, is 
operationalized through the well-known method proposed by Budge and Laver (1992a). 
In particular, the position held by each government on the RILE dimension is equal to 
the difference between the proportion of each document devoted to 13 categories 
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identified as right wing and the proportion devoted to 13 left wing ones. The theoretical 
range of the RILE scale is -100 (extreme left) to +100 (extreme right), although in practice 
the variable declared cabinet position on the RILE dimension is comprised between -45.08 and 
+55.1 (Cfr. Appendix Tables 3.2 and 3.3)i.  
 
Figure 3.1 displays the temporal evolution of this first dependent variable in the countries 
included in the analysis. In detail, the within variance (i.e., 14.454, cfr. Appendix Table 
3.3) is higher than the between one (i.e., 10.359, cfr. Appendix Table 3.3), proving that 
the longitudinal variation in each country over time is higher than the cross-country 
variation at the same time. Indeed, the variable declared cabinet position on the RILE dimension 
oscillates around the mean value of -0.22, with significant remarkable of ±17 points. 
The second dependent variable, namely declared cabinet position on the welfare dimension, is 
calculated by subtracting the proportion of each government declaration devoted to 
welfare state expansion (CMP variables per503 and per504) from the proportion devoted 
to welfare state retrenchment (CMP variable per505). Even if the theoretical range of this 
welfare scale is -100 (extreme welfare state expansion) to +100 (extreme welfare state 
retrenchment), in this dataset the variable ranges from -40.9 and +3.2 (Cfr. Appendix 
Tables 3.2 and 3.3)ii. 
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Figure 3.2 displays the temporal evolution of declared cabinet position on the welfare dimension. 
As for the first dependent variable, the within variance (i.e., 4.813, cfr. Appendix Table 
3.3) is higher than the between one (i.e., 3.362, cfr. Appendix Table 3.3). However, 
cabinets’ declarations on the welfare dimension prove to be more left lining than those 
on the RILE dimension: indeed, all the cabinets in the sample oscillate around the mean 
value of -7.146, with deviations of ±6 pointsiii. 
 
As already anticipated, two separate analyses will be performed by contrasting declared 
cabinet position on the RILE dimension with that on the welfare dimension. Indeed, this 
second genuinely policy based scale will allow verifying whether “the owners of the 
agenda setting power” coincide with those on the RILE dimension. However, the CMP 
variables employed to build the welfare scale (i.e., CMP variables per505, per504 and 
per503) are included in the formula used to estimate the RILE scale (Cfr. Appendix Table 
3.2). To what extent do cabinets’ welfare positions resemble those on the RILE 
dimension? To answer this question, I estimated the pairwise correlation coefficient 
between these two dependent variables (Cfr. Figure 3.3). The variable declared cabinet 
position on the welfare dimension is positively correlated with that on the RILE dimension (i.e., 
0.565 at 99% confidence interval; cfr. Appendix Table 3.4). This coefficient suggests that 
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these two dependent variables, even if similar, do not describe exactly the same 
phenomenon, giving reasons to test if they are affected by the same political actors and 
external constraintsiv. 
 
Once described the operationalization of the dependent variables, I move to the 
independent ones. In particular, the CMP’s coding of the electoral manifestos of political 
parties (MARPOR, 2014) is used to measure the weighted mean position of governing 
parties, the position of the median party in parliament, that of the formateur party and, 
finally, that of the parties holding the finance, the labor and the social affairs portfolios.  
Thanks to Seki and Williams (2014), the CMP dataset (MARPOR, 2014) has been easily 
merged with the information on governments’ compositions provided by Woldendorp, 
Keman and Budge (2000). The cabinet weighted mean on the RILE dimension corresponds to 
the mean of the RILE positions of cabinet parties, weighted by their seats share in the 
lower chamber (Powell, 2009). As for the declared cabinet position on the RILE dimension, the 
theoretical range of this variable is -100 (extreme left) to +100 (extreme right), although 
in practice it ranges from -61.4 and +45.8 (Cfr. Appendix Tables 3.2 and 3.3). Appendix 
Table 3.4 shows that the cabinet weighted mean on the RILE dimension  is positively correlated 
with the declared cabinet position on the same dimension (i.e., 0.4459 at 99% confidence 
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interval). This correlation coefficient, however, is far from being one, suggesting that there 
are other forces able to affect declared cabinet position on this ideological dimension. 
Similarly, the cabinet weighted mean on the welfare dimension has been calculated as the mean of 
the welfare positions of cabinet parties, weighted by their seats share in the lower 
chamber. Once again, the theoretical range of this variable is -100 (extreme welfare state 
expansion) to +100 (extreme welfare state retrenchment), although in practice it goes 
from -46.2 to 0 (Cfr. Appendix Tables 3.2 and 3.3)v. Appendix Table 3.4 shows that, even 
if the cabinet weighted mean on the welfare dimension  is positively correlated with the declared 
cabinet position on the same dimension, the correlation coefficient is far from being one 
(i.e., 0.401 at 99% confidence interval), making the case for other actor to affect cabinet 
position on the welfare dimensionvi.  
The CMP applied the same coding scheme to both government declarations (Budge et al., 
2001) and party manifestos (MARPOR, 2014), allowing a direct comparison of 
government position estimates derived from these two sources, both on the RILE and 
on the welfare dimensions (Cfr. Table 3.1, hypotheses H1 and H1b)
vii. 
Other two information emerge directly from the CMP dataset (MARPOR, 2014): the 
positions of the median legislator on the RILE and on the welfare dimensions. They are 
calculated by assuming that legislators’ positions can be represented by the positions of 
the parties to which they belong. To identify the party containing the median legislator on 
the RILE dimension, parliamentary parties have to be arrayed in a left-right order. To do 
the same on the welfare dimension, they have to be ranked over the scores they totalized 
on the welfare issue. Hypotheses H2 and H2b suggest that the positions of the median 
legislator influence the declared cabinet positions on these two dimensions above and 
beyond their contribution to the weighted means (Cfr. Table 3.1). These types of effects 
are captured by two variables, that record, respectively, the median party’s deviation from 
the cabinet weighted mean on the RILE and on the welfare dimensions. The first variable 
is called median party – cabinet distance on the RILE dimension and corresponds to the median 
party’s RILE position minus the cabinet weighted mean on the same dimension. The 
second variable is called median party – cabinet distance on the welfare dimension and measures 
the difference between the median party’s welfare position and the cabinet weighted mean 
on the same dimension (Cfr. Appendix Tables 3.2 and 3.3)viii. 
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As highlighted in section 3.1, however, other factors may mask the connection between 
government position on the RILE and on the welfare dimensions obtained through 
government declarations (Budge et al., 2001) and by governing party manifestos 
(MARPOR, 2014). Among those factors, there is the position of the formateur party (Cfr. 
Table 3.1, hypotheses H3 and H3b). This party has been identified through the 
Woldendorp, Keman and Budge’s (2000) dataset. As for the position of the median 
legislator, the variables formateur - cabinet distance on the RILE dimension and formateur - cabinet 
distance on the welfare dimension record the formateur party’s deviation from the cabinet 
weighted mean on these two issues (Cfr. Appendix Tables 3.2 and 3.3)ix. 
The last political actors that are potentially able to effect declared cabinet positions are 
ministers (Cfr. Table 3.1, hypotheses H4 and H4b). Of course, Laver and Shepsle’s 
portfolio allocation model (1996) is less easily tested with the data at hand because both 
the RILE and the welfare scales appear to be too encompassing to be under the exclusive 
control of any one minister. However, I will follow Warwick (2011) to assert whether 
declared cabinet position on the RILE dimension is heavily influenced by the preferences of the 
party holding the finance ministry and whether declared cabinet position on the welfare dimension 
is heavily influenced by the preferences of the parties holding the labor and social affairs 
portfolios. These effects can be verified by determining whether the deviations of the 
positions of these ministers from the cabinet weighted mean on the corresponding issues 
(i.e., finance minister - cabinet distance on the RILE dimension and labor/social affairs ministers – 
cabinet distance on the welfare dimensionx) exert any independent influence on declared cabinet 
position on the corresponding issue (Cfr. Appendix Tables 3.2 and 3.3).  
Once described the independent variables related to parliamentary or cabinet parties’ 
positions, there are potential external determinants of declared cabinet position deserving 
a better investigation.  
As far as the electoral rule is concerned, electoral specialists agree that the crucial 
determinant of an electoral system's ability to translate votes cast into seats won 
proportionally is the district magnitude (Lijphart, 1999; Sartori, 1986; Taagepera & 
Shugart, 1989), which Douglas W. Rae defines as “the number of seats assigned to the 
district” (Rae, 1967: 19-20). Indeed, in both PR and M systems, the choice of district 
magnitude shapes the distribution of power between small and large parties. On the one 
hand, high district magnitude guarantees the greatest degree of proportionality because it 
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ensures small parties to be represented in the legislature; on the other hand, small district 
magnitude imposes parties to reach a higher effective threshold to gain representatives in 
the legislature. To test the hypotheses H7 and H7b (Cfr. Table 3.1), the variable average 
district magnitude is equal to the total number of seats allocated in the first electoral tier 
divided by the total number of districts in that tier (Cfr. Appendix Tables 3.2 and 3.3). 
Data are provided by Matt Golder (2005). 
Hypotheses H6 and H6b extend Warwick’s argument according to which declared cabinet 
position is expected to drift to the right as the length of time between the election and 
government formation increases (2001, 2011) from the RILE dimension to the welfare 
one. (Cfr. Table 3.1). To test these two hypotheses, the variable elapsed time records the 
number of days passed between the last parliamentary election and government formation 
(Cfr. Appendix Tables 3.2 and 3.3). This information has been gathered from 
Woldendorp, Keman and Budge’s (2000) dataset. 
Finally, to operationalize the idea that adverse economic circumstances are likely to 
generate a rightward bias in declared cabinet position (Cfr. Table 3.1,  hypotheses H7 and 
H7b), inflation rates, unemployment rates and GDP growth have been taken into account. 
In particular, the variable change in inflation rate records the difference between the inflation 
rate at the beginning of the government mandate and those at the end of the mandate of 
the preceding government. Similarly, the variable change in unemployment rate registers to the 
corresponding difference for the unemployment rate. The same for the variable change in 
GDP. Data have been provided by Strøm, Müller and Bergman (2008) (Cfr. Appendix 
Tables 3.2 and 3.3). 
Appendix table 3.2 contains a detailed description of the operationalization and of the 
data sources of the dependent and independent variables listed so far, while appendix 
table 3.3 provides descriptive statistics.   
Concerning the choice of the functional form, it is worth to take into account the 
possibility that the 157 cases under investigation, that are sequences of governments in 
10 European countries, may not be totally independent of one another. In particular, it 
may be the case that the declared cabinet position will be influenced by the position of its 
predecessor (i.e., serial correlation) and that declared cabinet position in one country may 
be systematically different from those in another country (i.e., panel heteroscedasticity). 
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To take into account these two possibilities, I will include in every model specification a 
first-order lag of the dependent variable and I will estimate panel-corrected standard 
errors (Beck & Katz, 1995). The lagged dependent variables in this analysis are the declared 
cabinet positions on the RILE and on the welfare dimensions of the immediately preceding 
government (Cfr. Appendix Tables 3.2 and 3.3)xi. Indeed, whatever policy position a 
coalition government agrees on, it may be necessary or expedient to move policy to that 
position only gradually. Policy inertia might occur because the new government believes 
that policies cannot be changed quickly without causing undue disruption waste or 
because it does not wish to frighten voters or markets by appearing too radical or 
iconoclastic (Warwick, 2001, 2011). Moreover, to control for cross-country differences in 
levels of the dependent variable, I will include a set of country dummies (Wilson & Butler, 
2007).  
As suggested by Warwick (2001, 2011), the testing procedure will be guided by the notion 
that, absent any other influences, declared cabinet position should reflect the weighted 
mean position of the cabinet parties. The other hypotheses, indeed, involve it as a 
reference point. For instance, to test their median mandate theory, McDonald and Budge 
(2005) do not substitute the position of the parliamentary median party to the cabinet 
weighted mean. Conversely, they add the position of the median legislator to the cabinet 
weighted mean in the same model specification. Similarly, the proposer model does not 
suggests that the formateur party alone determines declared cabinet position. Instead, this 
hypothesis maintains that the formateur party is able to pull government policy away from 
the cabinet weighted mean toward its own ideal point (Baron, 1998; Diermeier & 
Feddersen, 1998).  
Following this reasoning, twelve model specifications are estimated: six referring to the 
RILE dimension (Cfr. Section 3.3.1; Table 3.2), six to the welfare dimension (Cfr. Section 
3.3.2; Table 3.3). In every model specification, the declared cabinet position is regressed 
on its lagged value, the cabinet weighted mean and country dummies. However, three 
model specifications will respectively add the distances between the position of the 
median party (Cfr. Table 3.2, M1 and Table 3.3, M7), that of the formateur party (Cfr. 
Table 3.2, M2 and Table 3.3, M8) or that of the minister party (Cfr. Table 3.2, M3 and Table 
3.3, M9) and the weighted cabinet position. Instead, the last three model specifications 
will incorporate the average district magnitude (Cfr. Table 3.2, M4 and Table 3.3, M10), the 
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elapsed time from parliamentary elections to government formation (Cfr. Table 3.2, M5 
and Table 3.3, M11) and the changes in the economic conditions
xii (Cfr. Table 3.2, M6 and 
Table 3.3, M12).  
Since the dataset provides complete information on just 157 governments in 10 countries, 
while the hypotheses to be tested are 7 on each dimension (without taking into account 
the lagged dependent variable, the constant and the country dummies), the potential effect 
of each independent variable on declared cabinet position on the RILE and on the welfare 
dimensions have to be estimated one by one.   
However, acknowledging the importance to identify the net effect of each independent 
variable when all other influences are controlled for, four additional model specification 
are estimated (Cfr. Section 3.3.3; Table 3.4), in which declared cabinet positions on the 
RILE and on the welfare dimensions are regressed on the most important independent 
variables referring both to political actors and economic conditions. As will be discussed 
in the next section (Cfr. Section 3.3.3), results obtained through this second procedure 
will help to shed light on the ones estimated taking into account each independent variable 
separately. 
While temporal dependence manifested by time-series cross-section (TSCS) data will be 
taken into account by using temporal lags, all the models discussed in the next section do 
not address the statistical concept of (positive) spatial autocorrelation (Franzese, 2008). 
Forty years ago, the geographer and statistician Waldo Tobler summarized this concept 
with these words: “Everything is related to everything else, but near things are more 
related than distant things” (1970: 234). In the context of the present study, it means that 
declared government positions on the RILE and on the welfare dimensions in countries 
that are spatially close are likely to be more similar to each other than in spatially distant 
countries. In this chapter, partially because of data scarcity (i.e., N=157), I did not model 
spatial dependence, making my findings directly comparable with those obtained by 
previous influential studies using similar models (McDonald &Budge, 2005; Warwick 
2001, 2011). However, I hope to postpone this improvement to subsequent studies with 
more than 157 units of analysis. 
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3.3 Results 
Section 3.3.1 investigates the determinants of declared cabinet position on the RILE 
dimension; section 3.3.2 the determinants of declared cabinet position on the welfare 
dimensionxiii. In detail, these two sub-sections test the potential roles played by the 
political actors listed in section 3.1 one by one (i.e., the governing parties, the median 
parliamentary party, the formateur party, the party holding the finance or the labor/social 
affairs minister). Finally, section 3.3.3 tries to identify the net effect of each independent 
variable (i.e., referring both to political actors and economic conditions) on declared 
cabinet position on the RILE and welfare dimensions when all other influences are 
controlled for.  
 
3.3.1 Influences on declared cabinet position on the RILE dimension 
Starting from the RILE dimension (Cfr. Table 3.2), models M1 to M6 prove that declared 
cabinet position is strongly affected by the declared position of its predecessor and by the 
weighted mean position of the parties in government. In detail, the coefficients referring 
to the cabinet weighted mean are highly statistically significant and positive across all the 
six models, demonstrating that if the cabinet weighted mean on the RILE dimension 
moves one point to the right, the position staked out by the government in its declaration 
is likely to increase of about 0.3 points. 
However, this result does not exactly support hypothesis H1, which states that declared 
cabinet position on the RILE dimension has to mirror the weighted mean position of 
government parties (Cfr. Table 3.1). Indeed, betas are positive and significant, but are far 
from being equal to one. This evidence suggests that it is important to look for additional 
political actors and external forces able to influence the declared cabinet position on the 
RILE dimensionxiv. 
M1 does not support the hypothesis H2, according to which governments respond to the 
RILE position of the median parliamentary party (Cfr. Table 3.1). Indeed, the variable 
median party – cabinet distance does not reach statistical significance.  
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Models M2 and M3 lead to the same conclusions for the hypotheses H3 and H4, according 
to which the formateur party and the party holding the finance minister are likely to bias 
the declared cabinet position on the RILE dimension toward their ideal points (Cfr. Table 
3.1). Indeed, both the variables capturing the distances between the formateur’s and the 
finance minister’s parties and the cabinet weighted mean appear to have no influence on 
declared cabinet position. However, the variable formateur – cabinet distance is quite near 
to conventional levels of statistical significance (p= 0.125)xv, suggesting that hypothesis 
H4 deserves a deeper investigation. 
As far as the electoral rule is concerned, M4 provides support for the hypothesis H5. 
Indeed, if the average district magnitude increases by one unit, declared cabinet position 
Table 3.2: Influences on declared cabinet position on the RILE dimension 
 M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6 
Declared cabinet 
position lagged 
0.186* 0.181* 0.197* 0.174† 0.227** 0.175† 
(0.0932) (0.0913) (0.0926) (0.0916) (0.0822) (0.0934) 
Cabinet weighted mean 0.239* 0.315*** 0.325*** 0.321*** 0.429*** 0.309*** 
 (0.113) (0.0866) (0.0871) (0.0867) (0.0818) (0.0916) 
Median party – cabinet 
distance 
-0.168      
(0.146)      
Formateur – cabinet  
distance 
 0.394     
 (0.257)     
Finance minister -  
cabinet distance 
  0.190    
  (0.170)    
Average district  
magnitude 
   -0.485**   
   (0.183)   
Postelection time     0.0101***  
     (0.00231)  
Cabinet weighted mean x 
Postelection time 
    -0.0006***  
    (0.000)  
Change in inflation  
rate 
     0.321 
     (0.852) 
Change in  
unemployment rate 
     -0.211 
     (1.400) 
Change in GDP      -0.855 
      (1.037) 
Constant -0.332 1.860 1.860 5.927 -0.652 0.950 
 (4.757) (4.513) (4.514) (4.709) (3.622) (4.573) 
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.362 0.370 0.362 0.367 0.482 0.360 
N 147 145 147 147 147 147 
Notes: OLS estimations with panel corrected standard errors in parentheses. The dependent variable is 
declared cabinet position on the RILE dimension (CMP variable RILE). † p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, 
*** p<0.001.   
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on the RILE dimension is expected to move about half a point to the left, proving that 
PR systems are associated with more leftist cabinet positions. 
Results discussed so far demonstrate that, even taking into account the RILE positions 
of the median parliamentary party, the formateur party, the finance minister and the 
electoral rule, substantial differences still remain between declared cabinet position and 
cabinet weighted mean on the RILE dimension. Indeed, these two variables differ 
systematically from each other in their long-term country-level equilibria, corresponding 
to the country means. In particular, as already noticed by McDonald and Budge (2005) 
and by Warwick (2001, 2011), the country means for the declared cabinet position tend 
to be noticeably to the right of the country means for the cabinet weighted mean. Across 
the pooled dataset, they average -0.22 and -7.97, respectively (Cfr. Appendix Table 3.3). 
This tendency holds not just across the pooled dataset, but within every country but two 
(France and Ireland are the exceptions). It seems that governments’ declarations contain 
stances that are substantially more right wing than those that cabinet parties would have 
preferred, judging from their own electoral manifestos. 
Beside this neoliberal convergence, does the economic condition experienced by the 
government play a role as well? M6 adds three variables referring to the dynamics in 
inflation rate, unemployment rate and GDP growth to the model specification. Results 
are very clear: declared cabinet position on the RILE dimension appears to be insensitive 
to changes in inflation rate, unemployment rate and GDP since the end of the preceding 
government mandate. Therefore, hypothesis H7 is not confirmed (Cfr. Table 3.1). 
According to Warwick (2011: 1691), “this right shift remains a mystery”. However, a 
previous finding of this author may help to shed light on this empirical regularity: the 
greater the length of time since the last election, the more right wing the government’s 
declared policy position (Warwick, 2001, 2011). This relationship appears in M5 of the 
present analysis as well. The variable postelection time, which registers the number of 
days elapsed between the last parliamentary election and the formation of the 
government, has a very pronounced effect: for each month increase in elapsed time (i.e., 
30 days), declared cabinet position is situated about half of a point to the right. 
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Figure 3.4 displays that the effect of time on declared cabinet position on the RILE 
dimension diminishes as the cabinet weighted mean moves rightward. This figure suggests 
also that cabinets formed by parties expressing extreme right stances in their electoral 
manifestos (i.e., cabinets having a weighted mean on the RILE dimension equal or higher 
than 30) are expected to moderate their declarations on the same ideological scale as the 
time between the last parliamentary election and government formation increases. In the 
sample, however, only four governments are characterized by a cabinet weighted mean 
on the RILE dimension equal or higher than 30 (i.e., Hartling and Schlüter I in Denmark; 
Couve de Murville in France and Adenauer V in Germany). Therefore, this additional 
regularity deserves better data and a deeper investigation.  
Overall, it is possible to explain this finding claiming that the right shift in declared cabinet 
positions involves a greater willingness to support less interventionist and more market-
friendly policies, issues that probably already loom large in the declarations of right wing 
governments (Warwick, 2011). In other words, hypothesis H6 is confirmed: as the passage 
of time makes electoral commitments easier to modify, declared cabinet position on the 
RILE dimension shows some evidence of neoliberal convergence (Cfr. Table 3.1).  
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To sum up, models M1 to M6 displayed in Table 3.2 prove that declared cabinet position 
on the RILE dimension is strongly affected by the declared position of the preceding 
government and, more interestingly, by the weighted mean position of cabinet parties. 
Moreover, the electoral rule and the length of time passed between the last parliamentary 
election and government formation seem to play a role. In particular, as the average 
district magnitude increases, declared cabinet position moves to the left. On the contrary, 
as the length of time from the last parliamentary election increases, cabinet position on 
the RILE dimension moves to the right. Finally, some doubts remain on the role played 
by the formateur party. 
 
3.3.2 Influences on declared cabinet position on the welfare dimension 
What does it happen when the RILE dimension is substituted with the welfare one? Do 
the political actors and external forces that affected declared cabinet position on the RILE 
dimension behave in the same way on the welfare dimension? Table 3.3 answers this 
question. 
Overall, models M7 to M12 prove that the cabinet weighted mean on the welfare dimension 
is a strong determinant of the declared cabinet position on the same topic. Indeed, this 
variable displays a positive and statistically significant effect across all the six models, 
demonstrating that if the cabinet weighted mean moves one point toward a more 
contractionary attitude, the position staked out by the government in its declaration is 
likely to move in the same direction of about 0.3 points.  
However, as for the RILE dimension (Cfr. Table 3.2), this result does not exactly support 
hypothesis H1b, according to which declared cabinet position on the welfare dimension 
has to match the weighted mean position of government parties (Cfr. Table 3.1). Also on 
this dimension, indeed, betas are positive and significant, but are far from being one. 
However, the independent variables added to the model specification to look for political 
actors and external forces able to influence the declared cabinet position on the welfare 
dimension tell a different story from the one presented on the RILE dimension. 
The parliamentary median party proves to play a crucial role, being able to bias the 
declared cabinet position on the welfare dimension toward his ideal point. Models M7 to 
M12 show that a unitary increase in the distance between the welfare position of the party 
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embedding the median parliamentarian and the cabinet weighted mean moves the 
declared cabinet position of about 0.3 points toward a more contractionary attitude. 
Therefore, hypothesis H2b is confirmed (Cfr. Table 3.1). 
M8 proves that the welfare position of the formateur party is unable to affect the declared 
cabinet position on the same issue (Cfr. Table 3.1, hypothesis H3b). Indeed, the formateur 
party – cabinet distance fails to reach statistical significance.  
Table 3.3: Influences on declared cabinet position on the welfare dimension 
 M7 M8 M9 M10 M11 M12 
Declared cabinet  
position lagged 
0.0536 0.0583 0.0480 0.0559 0.0620 0.0605 
(0.0855) (0.0862) (0.0854) (0.0855) (0.0844) (0.0843) 
Cabinet weighted  mean   0.313** 0.322** 0.324** 0.316** 0.304** 0.317** 
 (0.103) (0.104) (0.103) (0.103) (0.0994) (0.103) 
Median party – cabinet 
distance 
0.272* 0.286* 0.286* 0.269* 0.277* 0.281* 
(0.125) (0.127) (0.125) (0.125) (0.121) (0.123) 
Formateur – cabinet 
distance 
 0.0859     
 (0.221)     
Labor/social affairs 
minister –  
cabinet distance 
  0.00800†    
  (0.00431)    
Average district  
magnitude 
   -0.0765†   
   (0.0453)   
Postelection time     0.00200*  
     (0.000860)  
Change in inflation  
rate 
     0.461* 
     (0.227) 
Change in  
unemployment rate 
     0.412 
     (0.347) 
Change in GDP      -0.0747 
      (0.242) 
Constant -3.535 -3.277 -3.379 -2.694 -4.082† -3.394 
 (2.492) (2.498) (2.491) (2.538) (2.405) (2.487) 
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.343 0.346 0.351 0.347 0.364 0.362 
N 147 145 147 147 147 147 
Notes: OLS estimations with panel corrected standard errors in parentheses. The dependent variable is 
declared cabinet position on the welfare dimension. It is operationalized as the difference between the 
percentage of quasi sentences referring to welfare state retrenchment (CMP variable per505) and those 
referring to welfare state expansion (CMP variables per503 and per504).  † p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, 
*** p<0.001.   
Things are slightly different for the welfare position of the party holding the labor and the 
social affairs ministers. Indeed, as displayed by M9, this party is likely to bias the declared 
cabinet position toward its preferred welfare position of about 0.01 points (Cfr. Table 3.1, 
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hypothesis H4b). However, the magnitude of this effect and the level of statistical 
significance, which is above conventional standards, cast some doubts on the acceptance 
of the hypothesis H4b, which deserves a deeper investigation. 
M10 provides support for the hypothesis H5b: in particular, if the average district magnitude 
increases by one unit, declared cabinet position on the welfare dimension is expected to 
move 0.08 points toward a more expansionary attitude. Even if this result is consistent 
with the one obtained on the RILE dimension, the magnitude of this effect is less 
pronounced and the level of statistical significance is above conventional standards. 
The systematic rightward shift registered between declared cabinet position and cabinet 
weighted mean on the RILE dimension appears on the welfare dimension as well. Across 
the pooled dataset, the country means for declared cabinet position is equal to -7.146, 
while that of the cabinet weighted mean is equal to -11.719 (Cfr. Appendix Table 3.3).  
As for the RILE dimension, models M11 and M12 test whether this rightward shift can be 
explained by the time elapsed between the last parliamentary election and the formation 
of the government and by economic conditions, respectively.  
As for the RILE dimension, the hypothesis H6b is confirmed: the variable postelection 
time has a positive effect on the declared cabinet position on the welfare dimension. This 
effect, however, is less pronounced than that on the RILE dimension: for each month 
increase in elapsed time (i.e., 30 days), declared cabinet position is situated about 0.06 
points to the right. 
Finally, M12 adds the three variables referring to the economic conditions. As expected, 
declared cabinet position on the welfare dimension appears to be strongly affected by 
changes in the inflation rate since the end of the preceding government mandate. In 
particular, a unitary increase in this variable makes the declared cabinet position moving 
toward a welfare a state retrenchment attitude of about half of a point. Therefore, 
hypothesis H7b is confirmed (Cfr. Table 3.1). 
In summary, models M7 to M12 displayed in Table 3.3 prove that declared cabinet position 
on the welfare dimension is strongly affected by the weighted mean position of cabinet 
parties. Moreover, it is strongly biased by the welfare position of the median party in 
parliament. However, there are additional forces that are likely to play a role. As for the 
RILE dimension, as the average district magnitude increases, declared cabinet position on 
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the welfare dimension moves toward a more expansionary attitude. Analogously, as the 
length of time passed between the last parliamentary election and government formation 
increases, the declared cabinet position on the welfare dimension becomes less 
expansionary. Differently from the RILE dimension, changes in the inflation rate since 
the end of the preceding government mandate strongly affect declared cabinet position, 
moving it to toward a more welfare state retrenchment attitude. Finally, some doubts 
remain on the role played by the party holding labor and social affairs portfolios, which 
is likely to affect declared cabinet position on the welfare dimensionxvi. 
 
3.3.3 Simultaneous influences on declared cabinet position on the RILE and welfare dimensions 
So far, the potential effects of each political actor (i.e., the median parliamentary party, 
the formateur party, the party holding the finance or the labor/social affairs minister) on 
declared cabinet position on the RILE and on the welfare dimensions have been estimated 
one by one. This procedure has been chosen because the dataset provides complete 
information on just 157 governments in 10 countries, while the betas to be estimated for 
the independent variables are 10, without taking into account the constant and the nine 
country dummies.  
However, acknowledging the limitations related to the small-N nature of this dataset, 
Table 3.4 displays four additional models in which declared cabinet positions on the RILE 
and on the welfare dimensions are regressed on the most important independent variables 
referring both to political actors and economic conditions. In particular, the dependent 
variable of M13 and M14 is declared cabinet position on the RILE dimension. These two 
models differ in that M13 does not embed the median party – cabinet distance on the RILE 
dimension among its regressors. Instead, both the dependent variables of M15 and M16 
concern the welfare issue. The dependent variable of M15 is the declared cabinet position 
on the welfare dimension (which subtracts the CMP variables per503 and 504 to the CMP 
variable per505; cfr. Appendix Table 3.2 and 3.3). The dependent variable of M16 is the 
declared cabinet position on welfare state expansion only (which is equal to the sum of 
the CMP variables per503 and per504; cfr. Appendix Tables 3.2 and 3.3). The aim of these 
additional models is to identify the net effect of each independent variable, when all other 
influences are controlled for. 
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Overall, results displayed in Table 3.4 are consistent with those discussed so far. As first, 
the cabinet weighted mean proves to be a strong determinant of the declared cabinet 
position, both on the RILE and on the welfare dimensions. As second, the parliamentary 
median party confirms its inability to bias the declared cabinet position toward its ideal 
point on the RILE dimension, while it proves to be crucial on the welfare dimension.  
As third, these additional models provide additional elements to shed light on hypotheses 
H3, H3b, H4 and H4b (Cfr. Table 3.1). In particular, results suggest that the formateur party 
is able to bias declared cabinet position toward its ideal point on the RILE dimension, 
but not on the welfare dimension. Conversely, the position of the party holding the 
finance portfolio is unable to affect the declared cabinet position on the RILE dimension, 
while that of the party holding the labor and the social affairs portfolios has a positive and 
statistically significant effect on the declared cabinet position on the welfare dimension.  
Table 3.4: Simultaneous influences on declared cabinet position on the RILE and welfare 
dimensions 
 M13 M14 M15 M16 
 Y= Cabinet 
RILE 
position 
Y= Cabinet 
RILE 
position 
Y= Cabinet 
welfare 
position 
Y= Cabinet 
position 
on welfare state 
expansion 
Declared cabinet  
position lagged 
0.209* 0.214* 0.0446 0.147† 
(0.0913) (0.0918) (0.0852) (0.0816) 
Cabinet weighted  mean   0.313*** 0.261* 0.329** 0.434*** 
 (0.0860) (0.113) (0.103) (0.105) 
Median party – cabinet 
distance 
 -0.102 0.310* 0.454*** 
 (0.150) (0.126) (0.126) 
Formateur – cabinet 
distance 
0.450† 0.443† -0.0430 -0.0993 
(0.259) (0.260) (0.227) (0.222) 
Minister – cabinet 
distance 
0.271 0.252 0.0457† 0.397** 
(0.175) (0.179) (0.0276) (0.135) 
Change in inflation  
rate 
0.387 0.253 0.367† -0.462* 
(0.756) (0.773) (0.202) (0.200) 
Constant 2.598 1.498 -3.324 0.140 
 (4.516) (4.783) (2.493) (2.479) 
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.384 0.386 0.370 0.406 
N 145 145 145 145 
Notes: OLS estimations with panel corrected standard errors in parentheses. † p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** 
p<0.01, *** p<0.001. 
Finally, results in Table 3.4 confirm those of Tables 3.2 and 3.3 regarding the role of 
adverse economic conditions. In particular, rising inflation rate from the end of the 
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previous cabinet does not affect declared cabinet position on the RILE dimension, but 
has a statistical significant effect on the declared cabinet position on the welfare 
dimension (Note that the coefficient of M16 is negative because the dependent variable 
refers to welfare state expansion only; cfr. Appendix Tables 3.2 and 3.3). Overall, rising 
inflation makes declared cabinet position on the welfare issue move toward a more 
contractionary attitude (Cfr. Table 3.1, hypotheses H7, H7b)
xvii.  
 
3.4 Discussion and conclusion 
This chapter sheds light on the second link of the chain of responsiveness: namely, the 
BC bond between parties’ and government’s social policy preferences (Cfr. Chapter I, 
Figure 1.4). In particular, it investigates several hypotheses (Cfr. Table 3.1) concerning the 
main determinants of the positions adopted by coalition governments in West European 
parliamentary democracies on two dimensions: the traditionally employed ideological 
RILE scale and the more genuinely policy-based welfare scale.  
As summarized in section 3.1, previous influential studies, based on the CMP’s coding of 
coalition government declarations (Budge et al., 2001) and party manifestos (MARPOR, 
2014), provided inconsistent results. On the one hand, Budge and Laver (1992b) and 
McDonald and Budge (2005) found that the linkage between the RILE positions of 
coalition governments and the weighted mean positions of coalescing parties is extremely 
weak. On the other hand, Warwick (2001, 2011) revealed a much closer correspondence 
between these two measures. 
This chapter contributes to the existing literature by adding a genuinely policy based pro-
anti welfare scale to the ideological RILE scale, which is the dimension traditionally 
employed in literature to measure the degree of correspondence between declared cabinet 
positions and the weighted mean positions of cabinet parties. Indeed, I maintain that this 
additional policy based dimension allows controlling for any possible ideological bias 
when verifying whether multiparty governments are likely to distribute policy payoffs to 
their members according to a proportional criterion, exactly as they are expected to do 
for office payoffs (Gamson, 1961). Moreover, the comparison between the ideological 
RILE dimension and the policy based welfare dimension allows checking whether “the 
owners of the agenda setting power” coincide.  
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Table 3.5 lists the hypotheses tested in section 3.3 and highlights the ones that have been 
confirmed.  
Table 3.5: Confirmed () and not-confirmed () hypotheses  
Left-right dimension  Social policy dimension 
Main hypothesis on the formulation of declared cabinet position 
 H1: The cabinet’s left-right (RILE) 
position corresponds to the 
weighted mean of the RILE 
positions of the coalescing parties, 
with the parties’ seat shares in the 
lower chamber constituting the 
weights.  
 H1b: The cabinet’s social policy 
position corresponds to the 
weighted mean of the social policy 
positions of the coalescing parties, 
with the parties’ seat shares in the 
lower chamber constituting the 
weights.  
Additional hypotheses on the formulation of declared cabinet position 
The cabinet’s RILE position is biased away 
from the cabinet weighted mean toward 
the RILE position: 
The cabinet’s social policy position is 
biased away from the cabinet weighted 
mean toward the social policy position:  
 H2: of the parliamentary median 
party.  
 H2b: of the parliamentary median 
party.  
 H3: of the formateur party.   H3b: of the formateur party.  
 H4: of the party that holds the 
finance portfolio. 
 H4b: of the parties that hold the 
labor and social affairs portfolios. 
Additional hypotheses regarding exogenous determinants 
 H5: As the average district 
magnitude increases, the cabinet’s 
RILE position moves to the left. 
 H5b: As the average district 
magnitude increases, the cabinet’s 
social policy position becomes 
more expansionary.   
 H6: As the length of time between 
the last election and the formation 
of the government increases, the 
cabinet’s RILE position moves to 
the right.  
 H6b: As the length of time 
between the last election and the 
formation of the government 
increases, the cabinet’s social 
policy position becomes more 
restrictive. 
 H7: Adverse economic conditions 
at the time the government is 
formed moves the cabinet’s RILE 
position to the right. 
 H7b: Adverse economic 
conditions at the time the 
government is formed makes 
cabinet’s social policy position 
more restrictive.  
The most important finding that emerges from the preceding analysis (Cfr. Section 3.3) 
and from the schematic rendering of Table 3.5 is that there is a connection between 
governments’ declared policy stances and the weighted mean positions of cabinet parties 
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both on the RILE and on the welfare dimensions. This connection appears in every model 
estimated in Section 3.3, making the lack of fit between government and party policies 
lamented by Budge and Laver (1992b) as well as by McDonald & Budge (2005) appearing 
overly pessimistic. 
However, the estimated magnitude of the relationship between declared cabinet positions 
and the weighted mean  positions of cabinet parties is far from the one-to-one 
correspondence needed to affirm that Gamson’s rule (1961) applies to policy payoffs as 
well as to portfolio allocations, making Warwick’s claims appearing overly optimistic as 
well (2001, 2011).  
In detail, results prove that declared cabinet positions on the RILE and on the welfare 
dimensions are affected by the weighted mean positions of the coalescing parties on the 
same issues (Cfr. Table 3.5, hypotheses H1 and H1b). However, other political actors and 
external forces are able to bias declared cabinet positions away from the weighted means. 
Notably, such political actors and external forces do not behave in the same way on the 
RILE and on the welfare dimensions.  
Starting from the RILE dimension, M13 and M14 suggest that the only political actor able 
to exploit its position to extract more than its proportional share of the policy payoff is 
the formateur party (Cfr. Table 3.5, hypothesis H3). Although this finding seem to be 
consistent with the central requirement of proposer models (Cfr. Section 3.1), the 
estimated effect is quite weak. Accordingly, proposer models receive little comfort from 
this result, leading to the same conclusion of Warwick’s analysis (2001). 
Among the external forces able to bias declared cabinet position on the RILE dimension 
away from the weighted mean, the electoral rule and the length of time passed between 
the last parliamentary election and government formation play a role (Cfr. Table 3.5, 
hypotheses H5 and H6).  
In particular, M4 demonstrates that as the average district magnitude increases, declared 
cabinet RILE position moves to the left. This finding is consistent with the tendency for 
democracies adopting proportional (PR) electoral systems to implement more generous 
social policies than those characterized by majoritarian (M) electoral systems (e.g., Iversen 
& Soskice, 2006; Persson & Tabellini, 2004; cfr. Section 3.1). 
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M5, instead, suggests that as the length of time from the last parliamentary election 
increases, cabinet RILE position moves to the right. This model shows that the rightward 
bias in declared cabinet positions noted by Budge and Laver (1992b) is a function of the 
time elapsed since the last parliamentary election: coalescing parties increasingly disengage 
from electoral commitments and move policy rightward as those commitments become 
more distant.  
This behavior could be explained both with an effort of cabinet parties to abandon their 
unrealistic commitments in favor of more workable policies in terms of budgetary 
constraints or with an overall neoliberal convergence (Przeworski & Sprague, 1986; 
Kitschelt, 1994). 
Moving from the RILE to the welfare dimension, models estimated in section 3.3.2 tell a 
different story. In particular, beside the weighted mean position of coalescing parties, 
which continues to be a strong determinant of declared cabinet positions (Cfr. Table 3.5, 
hypothesis H1b), the parliamentary median party (Cfr. Table 3.5, hypothesis H2b) and the 
competent ministers (Cfr. Table 3.5, hypothesis H4b) prove to be crucial.  As expected, 
the distributive and redistributive nature of the programs included in the welfare 
dimension, which usually see economic resources to be provided to specific societal 
segments, determines a higher engagement of parliamentary parties and of the labor and 
social affairs ministers in decision-making processes.  
The finding of a significant effect emanating from the position of the labor and social 
affairs ministers’ parties (Cfr. M9, M15, M16) seem to support the ministerial autonomy 
assumption that underpins Laver and Shepsle’s (1996) portfolio allocation model. 
However, here too the evidence is not totally clear-cut. Indeed, on the one hand, declared 
government policy on the welfare  dimension does not coincide exactly with the policy 
position of the labor and social affairs ministers parties, reflecting more closely the entire 
cabinet’s preferences. On the other hand, this result is not decisive evidence against the 
portfolio allocation model. The most that can be concluded is that, net of other factors, 
the parties holding the labor and social affairs ministers do wield some degree of influence 
over declared cabinet position on the welfare dimension beyond that to which their size 
alone would entitle them. 
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As far as external forces are concerned, next to the electoral rule and the length of time 
since last parliamentary elections, which behave exactly as they did on the RILE 
dimension (Cfr. Table 3.5, hypotheses H5b and H6b), declared cabinet position on the 
welfare dimension is strongly affected by the economic conditions experienced by 
coalescing parties when in office (Cfr. Table 3.5, hypothesis H7b, cfr. M12, M15, M16). This 
results prove once again that the genuinely policy based nature of the welfare dimension 
allows capturing the effect of adverse economic conditions on declared cabinet positions 
better than the ideological nature of the RILE dimension permits. 
Finally, it is worth to recognize the most important limitation affecting the analysis here 
performed: namely, data scarcity on the explanandum. Indeed, the Manifesto Research 
Group coded government declarations in 10 European countries and Israel from the end 
of the Second World War until the mid- to late 1980s (Cfr. Appendix Table 1.1; Budge et 
al., 2001; Laver & Budge, 1992). Unfortunately, data collection on government 
declarations has been abandoned in favor of party electoral manifestos, making it hard to 
compare government positions as derived from their declarations to those obtained by 
the weighted mean positions of governing parties. However, as highlighted by this chapter 
and by influential previous studies (Cfr. Section 3.1), declared cabinet positions and the 
weighted mean positions of cabinet parties do not describe exactly the same phenomenon: 
namely, government declarations “should certainly be taken as better indicators of 
eventual policy than simple party electoral program intentions. They have the advantage 
of outlining a whole range of plans, for legislation and administration as well as spending” 
(McDonald & Budge, 2005: 141). Accordingly, to carry on the coding procedure of 
government declarations from the late 1980s until now seems promising.  
Overall, the results here discussed suggest that Lowi’s motto, according to which “Policies 
determine politics” (1972), is partially true: the political actors holding “the agenda setting 
power” over the RILE and the welfare dimensions do not coincide. However, I have still 
to demonstrate the reverse, namely that politics determines policies. Indeed, this chapter 
takes into account policy statements governments declare they will implement rather than 
what they actually do. However, it says nothing about the ability of political parties to 
shape social policies according to their preferences when they are charged with 
government responsibilities. This is what the last link of the chain of responsiveness is 
about, which will be the object of chapters IV and V.  
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Appendix Table 3.1: The coverage of the CMP government declarations data 
Country Range of 
governments with 
coded declarations 
Number of coded 
declarations 
Total number of 
governments in 
range 
Belgium 1946-1981 23 29 
Denmark 1947-1987 15 23 
France V Republic 1959-1984 14 18 
(West) Germany  1949-2002 18 27 
Ireland 1981-1987 2 3 
Italy 1948-1983 38 39 
Luxembourg 1945-1984 9 13 
Netherlands 1946-1994 7 20 
Norway 1945-1989 11 21 
Sweden 1948-1990 20 20 
This table shows the range of governments included in the present analysis whose declarations came 
from the 2001 release of the Comparative Manifestos Project (CMP) data (Budge et al., 2001). Each 
range starts no earlier than the year of formation of the first government after the initial post-war 
elections, which means that a few very early governments with coded declarations are excluded, and 
runs to the end of the final government whose declaration was coded. To assess inclusiveness, the total 
number of governments that were formed in each range is also shown. 
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Appendix Table 3.2: Variables’ description 
Name  Description Source 
Dependent variables 
Declared cabinet 
position  
on the RILE 
dimension 
Right-left position of 
governments as given in their 
declarations. It is operationalized 
as in Laver & Budge (1992). 
Laver, M. & Budge, I. (1992). Party Policy and 
Government Coalitions. Houndmills, 
Basingstoke, Hampshire: 
The MacMillan Press. 
Declared cabinet 
position  
on the welfare 
dimension 
Welfare position of governments 
as given in their declarations. 
(per505)-(per503+per504) 
Declared cabinet 
position  
on welfare state 
expansion 
Governments’ position on 
welfare state expansion as given 
in their declarations. 
per503+per504 
Main independent variables 
Cabinet weighted  
mean  on the 
RILE dimension 
Weighted (parliamentary seats) 
mean of governing parties’ RILE 
positions as given in their 
electoral manifestos. 
Woldendorp, J., Keman, H. & Budge, I. 
(2000). Party Government in 20 Democracies, 
1945-1998. Dordrecht, Boston and London: 
Kluwer Academic Publishers.  
Seki, K. &. Williams, L. K. (2014). “Updating 
the Party Government Data Set”. Electoral 
Studies 34: 270-279.  
Budge, I., Klingemann, H. D., Volkens, A., 
Bara, J. & Tanenbaum, E. (2001). Mapping 
Policy Preferences. Estimates for Parties, Electors, 
and Governments 1945-1998. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
Volkens, A., Lehmann, P., Merz, N., Regel, 
S., Werner, A. & Schultze, H. (2014): The 
Manifesto Data Collection. Manifesto Project 
(MRG/CMP/MARPOR). Version 2014b. 
Berlin: Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für 
Sozialforschung (WZB). 
Cabinet weighted  
mean on the 
welfare dimension 
Weighted (parliamentary seats) 
mean of governing parties’ 
welfare positions as given in their 
electoral manifestos. 
Partyi position: (per505)-
(per503+per504) 
Cabinet weighted  
mean on welfare 
state expansion 
Weighted (parliamentary seats) 
mean of governing parties’ 
positions on welfare state 
expansion as given in their 
electoral manifestos. 
Partyi position: per503+per504 
Median party – 
cabinet distance  
on the RILE 
dimension 
Distance between the 
parliamentary median party’s 
position and the cabinet 
weighted mean on the RILE 
dimension. 
Budge, I., Klingemann, H. D., Volkens, A., 
Bara, J. & Tanenbaum, E. (2001). Mapping 
Policy Preferences. Estimates for Parties, Electors, 
and Governments 1945-1998. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
Volkens, A., Lehmann, P., Merz, N., Regel, 
S., Werner, A. & Schultze, H. (2014): The 
Manifesto Data Collection. Manifesto Project 
(MRG/CMP/MARPOR). Version 2014b. 
Berlin: Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für 
Sozialforschung (WZB). 
Median party – 
cabinet distance  
on the welfare 
dimension 
Distance between the 
parliamentary median party’s 
position and the cabinet 
weighted mean on the welfare 
dimension. 
Median party – 
cabinet distance  
on welfare state 
expansion 
Distance between the 
parliamentary median party’s 
position and the cabinet 
weighted mean on welfare state 
expansion. 
Formateur – 
cabinet distance  
on the RILE 
dimension 
Distance between the formateur 
party’s position and the cabinet 
weighted mean on the RILE 
dimension. 
Woldendorp, J., Keman, H. & Budge, I. 
(2000). Party Government in 20 Democracies, 
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Formateur – 
cabinet distance  
on the welfare 
dimension 
Distance between the formateur 
party’s position and the cabinet 
weighted mean on the welfare 
dimension. 
1945-1998. Dordrecht, Boston and London: 
Kluwer Academic Publishers.  
Seki, K. &. Williams, L. K. (2014). “Updating 
the Party Government Data Set”. Electoral 
Studies 34: 270-279.  
Budge, I., Klingemann, H. D., Volkens, A., 
Bara, J. & Tanenbaum, E. (2001). Mapping 
Policy Preferences. Estimates for Parties, Electors, 
and Governments 1945-1998. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
Volkens, A., Lehmann, P., Merz, N., Regel, 
S., Werner, A. & Schultze, H. (2014): The 
Manifesto Data Collection. Manifesto Project 
(MRG/CMP/MARPOR). Version 2014b. 
Berlin: Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für 
Sozialforschung (WZB). 
Missing cases concerning portfolios 
allocations have been filled in using 
information available online. 
Formateur – 
cabinet distance  
on welfare state 
expansion 
Distance between the formateur 
party’s position and the cabinet 
weighted mean on welfare state 
expansion. 
Finance minister –  
cabinet distance  
on the RILE 
dimension 
Distance between the position of 
the finance minister’s party and 
the cabinet weighted mean on 
the RILE dimension. 
Labor/social 
affairs minister –  
cabinet  
distance on the 
welfare dimension 
Distance between the position of 
the labor and social affairs 
ministers’ parties and the cabinet 
weighted mean on the welfare 
dimension. 
Labor/social 
affairs minister –  
cabinet 
distance on 
welfare state 
expansion 
Distance between the position of 
the labor and social affairs 
ministers’ parties and the cabinet 
weighted mean on welfare state 
expansion. 
Control variables 
Average district 
magnitude 
Average district magnitude in the 
first electoral tier. It is 
operationalized as the total 
number of seats allocated in the 
first electoral tier divided by the 
total number of districts in that 
tier. 
Golder, M. (2005). “Democratic electoral 
Systems Around the World, 1946-2000”. 
Electoral Studies 24: 103-121. 
Postelection time Number of days elapsed between 
the last parliamentary election 
and government formation. 
Woldendorp, J., Keman, H. & Budge, I. 
(2000). Party Government in 20 Democracies, 
1945-1998. Dordrecht, Boston and London: 
Kluwer Academic Publishers.  
Seki, K. &. Williams, L. K. (2014). “Updating 
the Party Government Data Set”. Electoral 
Studies 34: 270-279.  
Change in 
inflation rate 
Difference between the inflation 
rate at the beginning of the 
government mandate and those 
at the end of the mandate of the 
preceding government. 
Strøm, K., Müller, W. C. & Bergman, T., eds. 
(2008). Cabinets and Coalition Bargaining: The 
Democratic Life Cycle in Western Europe. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. 
Change in  
unemployment 
rate 
Difference between the 
unemployment rate at the 
beginning of the government 
mandate and those at the end of 
the mandate of the preceding 
government. 
Change in GDP  Difference between the GDP 
growth at the beginning of the 
government mandate and those 
at the end of the mandate of the 
preceding government. 
  
CHAPTER III 
 
135 
Appendix Table 3.3: Descriptive statistics 
Variable                   Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Min. Max. Observations 
Declared cabinet position  
on the RILE dimension 
overall -.2210828 16.79248 -45.08 55.1 N = 157 
between  10.35996 -21.06 10.61556 n = 10 
within  14.45361 -35.29065 50.70114 T-bar = 15.7 
Declared cabinet position  
on the welfare dimension 
overall -7.145669 5.674596 -40.91 3.2 N = 157 
between  3.361886 -13.77333 -4.24 n = 10 
within  4.813059 -35.75021 6.627665 T-bar = 15.7 
Declared cabinet position  
on welfare state expansion 
overall 7.476369 5.428303 0 40.91 N = 157 
between  3.072153 4.813333 13.77333 n = 10 
within  4.637999 -6.296964 36.02182 T-bar = 15.7 
Cabinet weighted  mean   
on the RILE dimension 
overall -7.975817 16.93336 -61.4 45.85366 N = 157 
between  12.38427 -28.41561 7.413058 n = 10 
within  12.92554 -43.81106 36.37684 T-bar = 15.7 
Cabinet weighted  mean  
on the welfare dimension 
overall -11.71912 7.72013 -46.2 .0075756 N = 157 
between  5.210502 -24.36131 -6.427282 n = 10 
within  5.162739 -33.5578 9.142196 T-bar = 15.7 
Cabinet weighted  mean   
on welfare state expansion 
overall 11.87273 7.578973 1.5 46.2 N = 157 
between  5.152975 6.427282 24.45443 n = 10 
within  4.962045 -9.081696 33.6183 T-bar = 15.7 
Median party – cabinet distance  
on the RILE dimension 
overall .5420557 11.84749 -39.54546 37.90698 N = 157 
between  7.717538 -20.83633 6.753154 n = 10 
within  10.96997 -32.45929 31.69588 T-bar = 15.7 
Median party – cabinet distance  
on the welfare dimension 
overall 1.177389 4.689054 -12.2 26.9 N = 157 
between  1.437093 -.13779 3.863109 n = 10 
within  4.513819 -13.70665 25.39335 T-bar = 15.7 
Median party – cabinet distance  
on welfare state expansion 
overall -1.190114 4.444875 -25.7 12.2 N = 157 
between  1.468121 -3.122611 1.154476 n = 10 
within  4.261266 -23.7675 14.1325 T-bar = 15.7 
Formateur – cabinet distance  
on the RILE dimension 
overall .2359251 5.937638 -17.9551 28.93681 N = 155 
between  3.869766 -4.389907 7.965986 n = 10 
within  5.304469 -15.6672 21.20675 T-bar = 15.5 
Formateur – cabinet distance  
on the welfare dimension 
overall -.0026909 1.80514 -6.360001 6.592424 N = 155 
between  1.231767 -.9465427 2.536329 n = 10 
within  1.629292 -5.983097 6.774393 T-bar = 15.5 
Formateur – cabinet distance  
on welfare state expansion 
overall .0441339 1.676637 -5.430198 6.360001 N = 155 
between  1.224636 -2.536329 .7424545 n = 10 
within  1.488347 -3.526165 6.035837 T-bar = 15.5 
Finance minister –  cabinet 
distance  
on the RILE dimension 
overall 6.566788 80.77861 -21.02125 1006.807 N = 157 
between  15.98221 -4.432764 49.33609 n = 10 
within  78.77122 -53.14878 964.0377 T-bar = 15.7 
Labor/social affairs minister –  
cabinet  
distance on the welfare dimension 
overall 7.853464 59.5126 -34.49903 514.5545 N = 157 
between  26.50006 -16.16443 78.65386 n = 10 
within  54.72304 -92.15168 443.7541 T-bar = 15.7 
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Labor/social affairs minister –  
cabinet distance on welfare state 
expansion 
overall .3028146 3.276412 -12.6 19.56751 N = 157 
between  3.482171 -.7771567 11.03376 n = 10 
within  2.948658 -11.52003 11.61141 T-bar = 15.7 
Average district magnitude overall 15.19006 27.33868 1 150 N = 157 
between  40.85487 1 135.7143 n = 10 
within  4.84009 -20.52422 29.47578 T-bar = 15.7 
Postelection time overall 318.0573 413.276 0 1487 N = 157 
between  188.5273 19.5 589.4737 n = 10 
within  364.5249 -237.0855 1240.914 T-bar = 15.7 
Change in inflation rate 
 
overall .1931973 1.646901 -5 8.2 N = 147 
between  .8519081 -.6772727 2.533333 n = 10 
within  1.525788 -4.631802 5.859864 T-bar = 14.7 
Change in  unemployment rate overall .0414966 .9999208 -2.6 7.5 N = 147 
between  .3932462 -.1846154 1.166667 n = 10 
within  .9606991 -3.02517 6.550588 T-bar = 14.7 
Change in GDP  overall .1517007 1.603094 -8.9 6.5 N = 147 
between  1.410501 -1.5 3.8 n = 10 
within  1.245259 -7.248299 3.8517 T-bar = 14.7 
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Appendix Table 3.4: Pairwise correlations among declared cabinet position and cabinet 
weighted mean on the RILE and on the welfare dimensions 
 Declared cabinet 
position on the 
RILE dimension 
Declared cabinet 
position on the 
welfare dimension 
Cabinet weighted  
mean  on the 
RILE dimension 
Cabinet weighted  
mean  on the 
welfare dimension 
Declared cabinet 
position on the 
RILE dimension 
1.0000    
Declared cabinet 
position on the 
welfare dimension 
0.5658* 1.0000   
Cabinet weighted  
mean  on the 
RILE dimension 
0.4459* 0.4359* 1.0000  
Cabinet weighted  
mean  on the 
welfare dimension 
0.3124* 0.4014* 0.6291* 1.0000 
Notes: * p<0.001 or better. 
 
 
Appendix table 3.5: Pairwise correlations among declared cabinet position and cabinet 
weighted mean on the RILE dimension and on welfare state expansion 
 Declared cabinet 
position on the 
RILE dimension 
Declared cabinet 
position on 
welfare state 
expansion 
Cabinet weighted  
mean  on the 
RILE dimension 
Cabinet weighted  
mean  on welfare 
state expansion 
Declared cabinet 
position on the 
RILE dimension 
1.0000    
Declared cabinet 
position on 
welfare state 
expansion 
-0.5367* 1.0000   
Cabinet weighted  
mean  on the 
RILE dimension 
0.4459* -0.4082* 1.0000  
Cabinet weighted  
mean  on welfare 
state expansion 
-0.2976* 0.4110* -0.6096* 1.0000 
Notes: * p<0.001 or better. 
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Appendix Table 3.6: Influences on declared cabinet position on welfare state expansion 
 M7b M8b M9b M10b M11b M12b 
Declared cabinet  
position lagged 
0.0748 0.0759 0.144† 0.0779 0.0841 0.0778 
(0.0829) (0.0831) (0.0830) (0.0827) (0.0823) (0.0814) 
Cabinet weighted  mean   
 
0.390*** 0.392*** 0.400*** 0.405*** 0.376*** 0.423*** 
(0.111) (0.112) (0.104) (0.111) (0.109) (0.112) 
Median party – cabinet 
distance 
0.391** 0.395** 0.414** 0.403** 0.388** 0.437** 
(0.135) (0.136) (0.126) (0.134) (0.131) (0.135) 
Formateur – cabinet 
distance 
 0.0410     
 (0.238)     
Labor/social affairs 
minister –  
cabinet distance 
  0.378**    
  (0.131)    
Average district  
magnitude 
   0.120*   
   (0.0546)   
Postelection time     -0.00146†  
     (0.000829)  
Change in inflation  
rate 
     -0.502* 
     (0.234) 
Change in  
unemployment rate 
     -0.184 
     (0.334) 
Change in GDP      0.162 
      (0.233) 
Constant 1.789 1.725 0.828 0.289 2.322 1.086 
 (2.639) (2.647) (2.465) (2.736) (2.587) (2.660) 
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.346 0.346 0.383 0.355 0.358 0.371 
N 147 145 147 147 147 147 
Notes: OLS estimations with panel corrected standard errors in parentheses. The dependent variable is 
declared cabinet position on welfare state expansion (CMP variables per503 and per504). † p<0.10, * 
p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. 
 
i Although a lively debate has arisen over both the coding scheme and the measure of the 
RILE position derived from it (see, for example, Electoral Studies 26 (1), 2007), it has yet 
to be demonstrated that any other approach yields clearly superior party position estimates 
(Warwick, 2011: 1679). Moreover, the additive method proposed by Laver & Budge 
(1992) has already been used in Chapter 2 to operationalize the social policy supply of 
political parties on the RILE dimension (Cfr. Chapter II, Section 2.2). Therefore, I employ 
this operationalization also in Chapter III for internal coherence.  
ii To test the robustness of the results on the welfare dimension, a third dependent 
variable, namely declared cabinet position on welfare state expansion only, has been calculated. 
The formula behind this variable corresponds to the one employed in Chapter II to 
operationalize political parties’ social policy supply on the welfare dimension (Cfr. 
Chapter II, Section 2.2). In detail, it is equal to the CMP dimension “welfare”, which sums 
the proportion of quasi-sentences devoted to welfare state expansion (CMP variable 
per504) to the proportion of quasi-sentences devoted to social justice (CMP variable 
per503). The theoretical range of this scale is 0 (absence of quasi-sentences devoted to 
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welfare state expansion and to social justice) to +100 (totality of quasi-sentences devoted 
to these two topics), although in practice all scores are comprised between 0 and +40.91 
(Cfr. Appendix Tables 3.2 and 3.3). 
iii Appendix Figure 3.1 displays the temporal evolution of declared cabinet position on welfare 
state expansion only (Cfr. endnote ii). As for the variables declared cabinet position on the RILE 
and on the welfare dimensions, the within variance (i.e., 4.638, cfr. Appendix Table 3.3) is 
higher than the between one (i.e., 3.072, cfr. Appendix Table 3.3). The cabinets in the 
sample oscillate around the mean value of -7.476, with significant deviations of ±6 points.   
iv Appendix Figure 3.2 displays the pairwise correlation between declared cabinet position on 
the RILE dimension and that on welfare state expansion only. These two variables are 
negatively correlated (i.e., -0.537 at 99% confidence interval; cfr. Appendix Table 3.5). 
This coefficient suggests that these two variables, even if similar, do not describe exactly 
the same phenomenon. Note that the correlation coefficient is negative because the 
variable declared cabinet position on welfare state expansion sums the CMP variables per503 and 
per504 that refer respectively to welfare state expansion and social justice (Cfr. Appendix 
Table 3.2 and endnote ii).  
v A second version of the variable weighted cabinet position on the welfare dimension has been 
calculated, namely the weighted cabinet position on welfare state expansion only. As for the 
variable declared cabinet position on welfare state expansion only, it corresponds to the weighted 
(parliamentary seats) mean of governing parties’ positions on the CMP dimension 
“welfare” (CMP variables per503 and per504). The theoretical range of this scale is 0 to 
+100, although in practice all scores are comprised between 1.5 and +46.2 (Cfr. Appendix 
Tables 3.2 and 3.3). 
vi Appendix Table 3.5 shows that the variable cabinet weighted mean on welfare state expansion 
is negatively correlated with the variable declared cabinet position on the same dimension (i.e., 
0.411at 99% confidence interval). Note that the correlation coefficient is negative because 
this policy dimension sums the CMP variables per503 and per504 that refer respectively 
to welfare state expansion and social justice (Cfr. Appendix Table 3.2 and endnote v).  
vii To verify the robustness of the results on the welfare dimension, the degree of 
correspondence between government position estimates obtained through government 
declarations (Budge et al., 2001) and party manifestos (MARPOR, 2014) will be tested on 
a third scale: namely, the CMP dimension “welfare” (CMP variables per503 and per504). 
Results are displayed in Appendix Table 3.6.  
viii A second version of the variable median party - cabinet distance on the welfare dimension has 
been calculated, namely the median party - cabinet distance on welfare state expansion only. It 
corresponds to the distance between the position of the party containing the median 
legislator on the CMP dimension “welfare” (CMP variables per503 and per504) and the 
cabinet weighted mean on the same dimension (Cfr. Appendix Tables 3.2 and 3.3). 
ix A second version of the variable formateur - cabinet distance on the welfare dimension has been 
calculated, namely the formateur - cabinet distance on welfare state expansion only. It corresponds 
to the distance between the position of the formateur’s party on the CMP dimension 
“welfare” (CMP variables per503 and per504) and the cabinet weighted mean on the same 
dimension (Cfr. Appendix Tables 3.2 and 3.3). 
x A second version of the variable labor/social affairs minister - cabinet distance on the welfare 
dimension has been calculated, namely the labor/social affairs minister - cabinet distance on welfare 
state expansion only. Once again, this variable corresponds to the distance between the 
position of the parties holding the labor and the social affairs portfolios on the CMP 
dimension “welfare” (CMP variables per503 and per504) and the cabinet weighted mean 
on the same dimension (Cfr. Appendix Tables 3.2 and 3.3). 
LOOKING AT THE SECOND LINK OF THE CHAIN OF RESPONSIVENESS 
140 
                                                                                                                                                                    
xi A second version of the variable lagged declared cabinet position on the welfare dimension has 
been calculated, namely the lagged declared cabinet position on welfare state expansion only. (Cfr. 
Footnote ii and Appendix Tables 3.2 and 3.3). 
xii To test the robustness of the results on the welfare dimension, six additional model 
specifications have been estimated using dependent and independent variables referring 
to the CMP dimension “welfare” (CMP variables per503 and per504). Results are 
provided in Appendix Table 3.6.  
xiii The six models displayed in Appendix Table 3.6 investigate the determinants of 
declared cabinet position on welfare state expansion only (CMP variables per503 and 
per504).  
xiv These results concerning the relationship between declared cabinet position on the 
RILE dimension and the weighted cabinet mean on the same ideological scale are 
consistent with those of Warwick (2001, 2011). 
xv These results are consistent with those of Warwick (2001). Indeed, the betas referring 
to the roles of the formateur’s and the finance minister’s parties displayed in Table 3.2 are 
correctly signed. They do not reach statistical significance because I employed the 
standard two-tailed test, while Warwick chose the one-tailed test. 
xvi Overall, models M7b to M12b displayed in Appendix Table 3.6 confirm the results of 
Table 3.3. Declared cabinet position on the welfare state expansion only (CMP variables 
per503 and per504) is strongly affected by the weighted mean position of cabinet parties. 
Moreover, it is strongly biased by the position of the median party in parliament. The 
distance between the position of the formateur party and the cabinet weighted mean does 
not reach statistical significance. The role played by the party holding the labor and the 
social affairs portfolios is more pronounced on this dimension, shedding light on the 
hypothesis H4b (Cfr. Table 3.1). Here too, as the average district magnitude increases, 
declared cabinet position moves toward a more expansionary attitude. Analogously, as 
the length of time passed between the last parliamentary election and government 
formation increases, the declared cabinet position on welfare state expansion becomes 
less expansionary. Finally, changes in the inflation rate since the end of the preceding 
government mandate moves declared cabinet position toward a more contractionary 
attitude.  
xvii The 16 models presented and discussed in section 3.3 have been estimated also using 
GLS random effects models, GLS fixed effects models and standard OLS models. 
Overall, results concerning political actors are confirmed. Tables are available upon 
request. 
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Chapter IV 
Looking at the third link of the chain of responsiveness. 
Partisan influence on social and labor policies: Do parties 
matter? 
 
 
Abstract. Do governing parties shape social policies according to their long lasting 
ideological preferences? Although this question may look as trivial, political scientists 
struggle to answer it. Traditional partisan theory states that political parties play a 
significant role: in particular, left parties are expected to implement social policies able to 
foster the interests of the working class as a whole. Recently, the insider-outsider literature 
reframed this argument, suggesting that, after the dualization of labor into individuals 
with and without permanent contracts, left parties are more likely to pursue social policies 
that benefit their historically meaningful group of voters, the insiders, ignoring those of 
the outsiders. Other scholars argue that increasing economic and institutional constraints 
strongly vanish political parties’ abilities to manipulate social policies for electoral and 
partisan gains. This chapter investigates the role played by governing parties in shaping 
social and labor policies by employing panel data on 19 OECD countries from 1985 to 
2011. The alternative hypotheses are tested through an Error Correction Model, a 
multiple time series model that is able to directly estimate the speed at which four 
dependent variables referring to social policy outcomes return to equilibrium after a 
change in the location of each government on a continuous left-right scale. Results 
suggest that the ideological position of the executive on the left-right scale is unable to 
affect social policy outcomes in the short run, when economic control variables prevail. 
However, parties acquire relevance on the long run: specifically, when the government 
coalition moves to the right, there is a negative impact on social expenditure as a whole, 
on public spending in active (ALMP) and passive (PLMP) labor market policies and on 
the net unemployment replacement rate. 
 
 
Introduction 
Chapter III focuses on the second link of the ideal chain of responsiveness, the BC bond 
between parties’ and governments’ policy preferences (Cfr. Chapter I, Figure 1.4) to 
identify the main determinants of the positions adopted by coalition governments in West 
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European parliamentary democracies on the ideological RILE scale and on the more 
policy-based welfare scale.  
As endorsed by the theories of party government sketched in chapter I (Cfr. Section 1.3), 
chapter III demonstrates that, both on the RILE and on the welfare dimensions, 
governing parties are likely to formulate coalition agreements which are somehow 
coherent with the policy stances expressed in their electoral manifestos at the election 
time (Cfr. Chapter III, Section 3.3). This promising result allows concluding that the 
second link of the ideal chain of responsiveness holds.  
However, this finding does not rule out the presence of additional forces able to weak the 
robustness of this linkage. Notably, the analysis proposed in the previous chapter suggests 
that, on the RILE dimension, the formateur party is able to influence declared cabinet’s 
position more than its share of seats in the lower chamber would have suggested. 
Similarly, on the welfare dimension, the two political actors able to exploit their positions 
more than their proportional share of seats are the median parliamentary party and the 
party holding the labor and social affairs portfolios. Finally, results underline how the 
economic condition experienced by governing parties during their mandate strongly 
affects cabinet’s position on the welfare dimension (Cfr. Chapter III, Section 3.3).   
Once proved that governmental declarations are similar to the policy promises formulated 
by governing parties at the election time, it is time to look at what political parties actually 
do in the social policy domain when they are charged with governmental responsibilities 
(i.e., at the CD bond of the ideal chain of responsiveness; cfr. Chapter I, Figure 1.5). Do 
political parties in office significantly affect government behavior and shape social policies 
according to their ideological preferences? Although this question may look as trivial, the 
relationship between political partisanship and policy outcomes is one of the key issues in 
comparative political economy (Jensen & Mortensen, 2014) inasmuch as political 
scientists and political economists struggled to answer it. Indeed, studies dealing with this 
topic failed to reach any firm conclusion, providing, at best, mixed results (e.g. 
Baumgartner et al., 2009; John et al., 2014).  
As described in the next section, studies split into two schools of thought, here labelled 
as “parties-do-matter” and “parties-do-not-matter” hypotheses. Under the first one, it is 
possible to locate at least three broad streams of literature, namely Partisan Theory (PT), 
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Power Resources Theory (PRT) and Mandate Theory (MT), all of them establishing a 
clear linkage between parties’ long lasting ideological preferences, their contextual 
electoral pledges and policy outcomes pursued once they are in office. Vice-versa, scholars 
belonging to the opposite school of thought, the “parties-do-not-matter” hypothesis, tend 
to find limited or inconsistent partisan effects on policy design, underlying the role played 
by growing economic and institutional constraints in conditioning political parties’ ability 
to manipulate policies for electoral and partisan gains (Cfr. Section 4.1). 
Despite the conventional wisdom on the “dependent variable problem” (Green-Pedersen, 
2002), according to which empirical works using aggregate spending measures as 
dependent variables are more likely to confirm the “parties-do-not-matter” hypothesis, 
while studies adopting measures of welfare state generosity tend to support the “parties-
do-matter” hypothesis, I posit that such mixed results could be driven by an “independent 
variable problem”.  
Indeed, as recently underlined by Häusermann et al. (2013), the large majority of studies 
dealing with party politics and welfare state adopts an overly rough measure of political 
partisanship. In particular, scholars use to operationalize the ideological position of 
governments on the left-right dimension by clear-cut dichotomies at party level between 
parties of the left and the right, with allowances sometimes made for Christian Democrats 
in the center. Adopting this questionable approach, groups of parties in coalition 
government contexts are treated with simple dummy variables, indicating whether a 
government is more left or right leaning. 
I intend to contribute to the literature in this field going beyond such dichotomous left-
right classification of political parties. In particular, I operationalize government 
partisanship building a continuous variable based on all of the major party expert surveys. 
I argue that, adopting this measure, the “parties-do-matter” hypothesis will be confirmed, 
no matter the choice of the dependent variable to account for social and labor market 
policies (Cfr. Section 4.2.2). 
This expectation is borne out in an empirical test of the effect of government partisanship 
on three sets of dependent variables used to operationalize social and labor policies in 19 
OECD countries from 1985-2011, time span defined as the era of “permanent austerity” 
(Pierson, 1994), “the silver age of welfare state retrenchment” (Taylor-Gooby, 2002) or 
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“recalibration” (Ferrera, 2008). The first and the second sets of dependent variables 
consist in aggregate spending measures, while the third one is an index of welfare state 
generosity (Cfr. Section 4.2.1). 
This chapter begins by discussing the previous inconclusive evidences for partisan effects 
on social and labor policy outcomes (Cfr. Section 4.1). Then, it presents the research 
design, namely the choice of three sets of dependent variables to take into account the 
“dependent variable problem” (Cfr. Section 4.2.1) and the construction of a continuous 
measure of government partisanship to overcome what I call the “independent variable 
problem” (Cfr. Section 4.2.2). A description of control variables (Cfr. Section 4.2.3) and 
of the estimation technique (Cfr. Section 4.2.4) follows. In the third section, I present 
evidences for my expectation. Conclusions are provided in the last section. 
 
4.1 Partisan influence on social and labor policies: state of the art and 
theoretical underpinnings 
The role played by political parties charged with governmental responsibilities in shaping 
public policies, especially social ones, is the object of a long-standing debate among 
political scientists and political economists. According to the supported stance, two 
schools of thought could be identified, here labelled as “parties-do-matter” and “parties-
do-not-matter” hypotheses. 
Under the label “parties-do-matter” hypothesis, it is possible to locate at least three broad 
streams of literature, namely Partisan Theory (PT), Power Resources Theory (PRT) and 
Mandate Theory (MT).  
PT was firstly formulated by Hibbs (1977, 1992), Hewitt (1977) and Tufte (1978) in the 
realm of comparative political economy to analyze the effect of political parties on social 
policies and welfare state developments in modern representative democracies (See also 
Cameron, 1978, 1984, 1985; Schmidt, 1978, 1982, 1983; Garrett & Lange, 1986, 1991). 
According to this approach, political parties tend to implement public policies consistent 
with the economic interests of their core electoral constituencies, which are defined in 
terms of social classes. PT rests on the stylized argument that the electorate of left parties 
is manly made up of individuals belonging to down-scale groups, whose economic well-
being depends almost entirely on earning from labor and which usually occupy 
LOOKING AT THE THIRD LINK OF THE CHAIN OF RESPONSIVENESS  
145 
 
unsheltered and lower paid jobs. Conversely, supporters of right parties are seen as 
primarily members of up-scale groups, holding financial capital and higher status jobs. 
Economic conditions experienced by individuals in their everyday life shape their revealed 
preferences in macroeconomic policies (Wittman, 1983; Keech, 1995). On the one hand, 
the working class bears the costs of unemployment and therefore favors an active role of 
the State in promoting expansionary policies able to minimize the unemployment rate. 
On the other hand, the upper class is mainly concerned to keep the price level constant 
because inflation undermines financial capital gain. Since to win elections parties have to 
promote policies consistent with the preferences of their constituencies, the basic 
prediction of PT is that, when in office, left parties are more likely than right ones to 
pursue expansionary policies designed to yield lower unemployment and extra growth. 
The same, right parties are more likely than left ones to promote policies designed to keep 
the inflation rate steady (Castles, 1982, 1986a, 1986b). 
Parallel to PT, Stephens (1979) and Korpi (1983) developed a relate, but separate, 
approach, known as “power resources theory” (PRT). In particular, this approach argues 
that social policies are the outcomes of distributive conflicts between socioeconomic 
groups. Since these conflicts are solved in the political arena, partisan politics plays a 
crucial role in shaping social policy outcomes. Moreover, social rights won in the 
parliamentary arena by left parties feed back into the economic sphere as new power 
resources for the working class, counterbalancing the power of capital. In this manner, 
PRT makes the link between class mobilization, party affiliation and partisan government 
more explicit than the original PT: indeed, it emphasizes the feedback effects of policies 
on collective mobilization through political parties and unions and supports the 
constituency-party link with detailed studies on the class structure of politics. 
In the later decades of the XIX century, Downs (1957) derived from economic theory an 
alternative model, labelled “mandate theory” (MT). This third tradition focuses on the 
extent to which political parties, once in office, fulfil the preferences of the median voter 
(See also Black, 1958; Kavanagh, 1981; Page & Shapiro, 1983; Burstein, 2003; Ezrow, 
2007). According to MT, parties are teams of politicians, which compete to be hired as 
the agents of the whole society, rather than of particular social segments. More precisely, 
MT states that popular preferences translate into public policies because, at the election 
time, voters choose as their government the political party or the coalition of parties 
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offering the closest policy program to their preferred policy outcomes. Therefore, political 
parties, once elected, are bounded to carry through the programs on which they have been 
selected (Polsby & Wildavsky, 1971; Sullivan & O’Connor, 1972; Ranney, 1975; Aldrich, 
1995). 
According to McDonald and Budge’s median mandate thesis of democratic governance 
(Cfr. Chapter I, Section 1.3; Chapter III, Section 3.1), for example, governing parties are 
expected to align their policy decisions with the preferences of the median legislator in 
Parliament and, ultimately, with those of the median voter in the electorate. As noticed 
by Warwick (2011), this is a particularly strong version of the idea that government policy-
making is centripetal because it implies that governments (a) intentionally seek to match 
the middle and (b) largely achieve this end. Unfortunately, the analysis developed by these 
two authors finds weak results: the left-right positions of the median voter and of the 
median legislator in Parliament prove not to be good determinants of the central 
governmental spending on social welfare as percentage of GDP from 1982 to 1992 in 21 
democracies. The same happens for the weighted left-right position of the coalescing 
parties (McDonald & Budge2005: 158-161). 
I contend that these PT, PRT and MT could be considered as variants of the canonical 
principal-agent model of democracy (Miller, 2005), which sees the executive as the agent 
of the parties in Parliament, which in turn are considered the agents of the electorate 
(Muller, 2000; Strøm et al., 2003).  
On a more detailed inspection, however, PT, PRT and MT display relevant differences 
(Katz, 2014). In particular, even though MT investigates parties’ influence on 
governments’ decision making as PT and PRT, it differs from the latest for the following 
reasons. As first, MT and PT/PRT differ in their notions of political parties, which are 
seen as teams of politicians competing to be the agents of the whole society (MT) or as 
associations of citizens acting as agents of particular social segments (PT/PRT). As 
second, they deviate in their conceptualizations of the political space: a policy continuum 
and a fluid society (MT) versus clusters of policy positions and discrete classes of citizens 
(PT/PRT). As third, they diverge in their characterization of the ultimate principal: the 
entire electorate as embodied in the median voter (MT) versus the social segment or 
coalition of social segments associated with the party or coalition of parties that won the 
previous election (PT/PRT). 
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Lastly, moving from the theoretical to the empirical ground, MT differs from PT and 
PRT because it ties parties’ influence to public policy promises made by parties in their 
formal electoral programs (Budge & Hofferbert, 1990). Therefore, it can be refuted by 
showing that the actual government policies are not related to the electoral programs on 
which political parties in office won the ballot of the median voter at the election time. 
On the contrary, PT and PRT can be falsified by demonstrating that government policies 
are not consistent with long-standing ideological and policy positions of the governing 
parties, driven by the economic interests of their core electoral constituencies. 
Scholars belonging to the opposing school of thought, the “parties-do-not-matter” 
hypothesis, criticize the approaches reviewed so far for underemphasizing the role played 
by growing economic and institutional constraints in conditioning political parties’ 
abilities to manipulate policies for electoral and partisan gains. 
The role of economic constraints is seen as crucial by the so-called “industrialization 
thesis” (IT). According to this approach, political parties, once in office, play little if any 
role in driving public policies design because policy differences that exist between 
countries at any time or within countries over time are shaped by overwhelming 
economical, technological and demographic imperatives (Dawson & Robinson, 1963; 
Cutright, 1965). This approach has been firstly applied to the welfare state development 
in the aftermath of the Second World War, which has been explained by the unexpected 
matching between increasing needs for social protection and the availability of financial 
resources provided by the economic growth (Wilensky, 1975). More recently, it has been 
employed to analyze welfare state retrenchment: analogously, post-industrial labor 
markets and population ageing create the need for revising existing welfare state schemes 
(Espring-Andersen, 1999, 2002; Taylor-Gooby, 2002; Armigeon & Bonoli, 2006), but 
reduced economic growth and pre-existing welfare commitments force public authorities 
to contain public expenditure in social protection programs. 
Other scholars focus their attention on the process of globalization, suggesting that 
increasing trade and financial openness diminish left parties’ ability to implement 
expansionary policies, vanishing the distinction between left and right-wing executives 
(Keohane & Nye, 1989; Scharpf, 1988; Rose, 2014). 
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Moving from economic to institutional constraints, scholars underline how the 
environment in which governments act condition the ability to shape public policies 
according to their partisan preferences. Studies in this branch focus on electoral systems, 
representation and competition (Cox, 1997), coalition formation (Laver & Shepsle, 1996), 
divided government and shared policy control (Tsebelis, 2002) and thousands of other 
issues in delegation and agency, common pools, regulation and oversight (Franzese, 
2002). The veto player theory, for example, highlights that the governmental willingness 
to implement particular policies could be restrained by the number of parties involved in 
the government coalition, by their degree of reciprocal cohesion and by the ideological 
distance between the actual government and the previous one (Tsebelis, 2002; Franzese, 
2002). 
Moreover, scholars investigating the effect of partisanship on policy design tend to stress 
how path dependency and policy legacies diminish the role of  political parties in shaping 
policy outcomes: using McDonald and Budge’s words, “policies change from one 
government to the next, but not much and not rapidly” (2005:171). Wildavsky (1964), for 
example, interprets the slow and incremental changes in departmental budgets as an 
example of bureaucratic bargaining. King and Laver (1999) endorses this positions 
showing that US government expenditures are as related to political parties’ preferences 
as to national baseball scores. 
In this stream it is possible to locate one of the most important contributions to the 
“parties-do-not-matter” hypothesis, namely the “new politics approach” (NPA), fuelled 
by Pierson (1994, 1996, 2001), which focuses on the role played by policy legacies in 
determining welfare state changes in the era of austerity. In particular, Pierson underlines 
how, despite growing external and internal pressures, welfare institutions do not display 
radical changes for two reasons: first, welfare dismantling is a fairly unpopular policy; 
second, the expansion of the welfare state has contributed to the emergence of “powerful 
groups surrounding social programs”, which act as veto points, preventing radical reforms 
(Bonoli, 2001). Therefore, according to this view, the effect of partisanship on social 
policy has been weakened, if not erased, by policy legacies. 
Conclusions formulated by scholars belonging to the “parties-do-not-matter” hypothesis 
induced supporters of the opposing school of thoughts to re-conceptualize their main 
arguments, detecting the ways in which parties might still matter in spite of austerity and 
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globalization (Korpi & Palme, 2003; Rueda, 2005; Ferrera, 2008; Green-Pedersen & 
Haverland, 2002). Notably, Korpi and Palme (2003) and Allan and Scruggs (2004) 
reviewed the original PT and PRT. Particularly, their empirical analysis on the evolution 
of social programs entitlements suggest that partisanship still matters even in times of 
crisis: during the era of welfare-state expansion, left-wing governments have been 
associated with a more generous expansion of social entitlements, while in the era of 
retrenchment, one observes that right-wing governments are more ready to rein in social 
entitlements. Therefore, these scholars apply the same reasoning formulated by PT and 
PRT in the golden age of welfare state expansion to the silver age of welfare state 
retrenchment: they argue, indeed, that left parties stand for less cuts in the realm of social 
policy because they represent the beneficiaries of the welfare state and sustain a pro-
welfare ideology. 
Analogously, Rueda (2005) reframed the stylized argument at the basis of PT to take into 
account recent socio-economic transformations in post-industrial labor markets. 
Particularly, he underlines how the economic grow experienced by most industrial 
democracies in the late 1960s as well as the social unrest and union activism in the early 
1970s decreased unemployment’s threat to the working class as a whole, letting precarious 
workers enduring the most of economic fluctuations (Bentolila & Bertola 1990; Blanchard 
et al. 1986). The segmentation of labor into individuals with secure jobs, the insiders, and 
individuals without, the outsiders, changed the electoral constituency of left parties. 
According to the author, indeed, left parties in government disregard the needs of the 
most vulnerable sectors of the labor market, made up of unemployed people and atypical 
workers, promoting social and labor policies consistent with the preferences of standard 
workers only. 
In conclusion, this literature review proves that we are confronted with a multitude of 
plausible causal mechanisms linking government partisanship to social policy outcomes. 
Theories sketched so far underline both the role played by long lasting ideological 
preferences of political parties in making them able to shape social policies according to 
their will and the action of economical and institutional constraints, vanishing parties’ 
role. A meta-analysis of 693 published cross-section estimates on this issue found that 
22% of the estimates endorses the “parties-do-matter” hypothesis, while the remaining 
ones fail to support it. The same research explained such inconsistency by the severe 
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limitations of the existing methods to measure the party composition of governments 
(Imbeau et al., 2001). 
Given these inconsistent results, chapter IV assesses the robustness of the “parties-do-
matter” and the “parties-do-not-matter” hypotheses. As better explained in the next 
section, it verifies whether government partisanship affects social and labor policy 
outcomes by devoting considerable attention to the operationalization of the main 
dependent and independent variables. 
 
4.2 Research design, data and model specification 
4.2.1 Three sets of outcomes to take into account the “dependent variable problem” 
Empirical works dealing with the impact of political partisanship on social and labor 
policies have to take into account the so-called “dependent variable problem” (Green-
Pedersen, 2002, 2004), an expression used to underline how the choice of different 
measures to operationalize social and labor policies could significantly affect the estimates. 
Particularly, studies using aggregate spending measures as dependent variables are more 
likely to confirm the “parties-do-not-matter” hypothesis, while studies adopting measures 
of welfare state generosity are more likely to detect a statistically significant role of political 
partisanship on welfare state developments (Allan & Scruggs, 2004). 
Taking into account this general pattern, I will operationalize social and labor policies 
using three sets of dependent variables observed in 19 OECD countries over the period 
1985-2011. The first and the second sets of depend variables consist in aggregate spending 
measures, while the third one is an index of welfare state generosity. 
The first dependent variable is the total public and mandatory private social expenditure 
as a percentage of gross domestic product (GDP) and it is provided by the online OECD 
Social Expenditure Statisticsi. Even though this is the commonest indicator of welfare 
effort (e.g., Huber & Stephens, 2001 a, b; Swank, 2002), reservations about the use of 
expenditure data are well documented (Castles & Mitchell, 1992; Claygton & Pontusson, 
1998; Esping-Andersen, 1987, 1990; Neil & Moon, 1988; Goodin et al. 1999). In 
particular, scholars underline how regulatory decisions as well as decisions with a longer 
phase-in period are not captured by this kind of data, due to their lack of an immediate 
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impact on spending (Hinrichs & Kangas, 2003). Moreover, expenditure data can give a 
misleading impression, as the spending ratio automatically increases during periods of 
economic crisis due to higher recipient numbers of many benefits combined with the 
drop in GDP, the denominator of the social expenditure ratio. Finally, differences in the 
tax treatment of transfers distort the degree to which social spending, as measured in 
national accounts, translates into disposable income for program recipients (Allan & 
Scruggs, 2004). 
Since the total public social expenditure could be too crude, a second set of dependent 
variables, namely public spending in active (ALMP) and passive (PLMP) labor market 
policies, is introduced. Among the available social policy dimensions, I chose the one of 
labor-market interventions because it has been described in literature as the most conflict-
ridden social policy area in modern-day welfare state (Jensen, 2012; Pierson, 1994). These 
two additional dependent variables are measured as public spending in active ii  and 
passive iii  labor market policies as percentage of GDP using OECD data, which are 
available from 1985 to 2011 (Grubb & Puymoyen 2008)iv. 
Finally, the third dependent variables, namely the net unemployment replacement rate, is 
used to take into account the argument formulated by Esping-Andersen in his influential 
study of welfare state regimes, The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism (1990). In particular, 
the author suggests to use individual entitlement measures as dependent variables because 
they show more clearly how changes in welfare state impacted upon the life chances of 
typical individuals in the labor market. In particular, I will make use of the net 
unemployment replacement rate as calculated by Scruggs (2004) for a married worker with 
a non-employed spouse and two children. Replacement rate information is provided from 
1971 to 2002v. 
According to data availability, information concerning total public social expenditure (first 
dependent variable) and public spending in ALMP and PLMP (second and third 
dependent variables) will be observed from 1985 to 2011 in 19 OECD countries, namely 
Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, 
Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and 
United Kingdom. Information referring to net unemployment replacement rates for a 
married worker (forth dependent variable), instead, will be observed from 1985 to 2002 
in 17 OECD countries, due to the non-availability of data concerning Greece and 
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Portugal. A description of these dependent variables can be found in Appendix Table 4.1, 
whereas summary statistics are reported in Appendix Table 4.2.  
 
4.2.2 The main independent variable: going beyond the dichotomous operationalization of partisanship 
The main independent variable of this study is the ideological position of governments 
on the left-right dimension. The large majority of studies investigating the link between 
parties’ preferences and social policies outcomes uses to adopt clear-cut dichotomies at 
party level between parties of the left and the right or categorical classifications referring 
to party families. However, as already discussed in chapter II (Cfr. Section 2.2), these 
classifications of parties’ ideological position do not make much sense anymore 
(Häusermann et al., 2013). Accordingly, this chapter intends to contribute to the existing 
literature assessing to what extent shifts in government partisanship on a continuous left-
right scale correspond to consistent social policy changes. 
Two information sets are required to build a continuous variable referring to government 
partisanship: one concerning the presence of parties in government and the other 
reflecting their ideological characteristics. The first information set has been drawn from 
the Parliament and Government Composition Database (Döring and Manow, 2012), 
better known as ParlGov database. I used it to collect the following information 
concerning governments: starting and ending dates, the names of parties with ministers 
in cabinets and the share of seats won by each party in the lower Chamber.  
Concerning the second information set, assessments of left-right party positions are 
mainly based on two different methods: expert surveys and the analysis of party 
manifestos. None of these methods is free of costs. On the one hand, the major 
shortcoming affecting the expert surveys is that they are rarely performed and therefore 
data hardly reflect through-time variation in parties’ positions. In addition, national 
experts could differently interpret the questions according to their national contexts 
(Gabel & Huber, 2000). On the other hand, data provided by the analysis of party 
manifestos could simply reflect what parties say to public opinion to win the elections and 
not necessarily what they will do once they won them. This is a particularly relevant 
problem for the analysis developed in the present paper: left parties, for example, may not 
wish to emphasize in their electoral pledges their intentions not to increase public 
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spending in social and labor market policies to prevent critics from describing them as 
unconcerned about the interests of their core electoral constituencies.  
Therefore, taking into account pros and cons of these two different methods, I decided 
to use expert opinions to measure the ideological position of governments. In particular, 
the variable Partisanship combines the information provided by ParlGov database to all of 
the major party expert surveys, namely Castes and Mair (1984), Laver and Huntvi (1992), 
Huber and Inglehart (1995), Benoit and Lavervii (2006) and Chapel Hill (1999-2010)viii. 
The left-right indexes provided by these surveys have been standardized from 1 (extreme 
left) to 20 (extreme right) at party level and then collapsed to capture the influence of 
parties in governments. Therefore, Partisanship is equal to the mean of the left-right 
indexes of the parties involved in the government coalition according to the expert survey 
nearest to the election date. 
Since scholars demonstrated that the proportion of parliamentary seats possessed by each 
political party charged with government responsibilities in the lower Chamber influences 
its political power in the governing coalition (Browne & Franklin, 1973; Huber & Powell, 
1994; Muller & Strom, 2000), Partisanship weights the influence of each party in the 
governing coalition by its share of seats in the lower Chamber.  
Although not all issue positions can be adequately captured by it (Cfr. Chapter III, 
Sections 3.1 and 3.2), confining the analysis to the left–right dimension is also a reasonable 
compromise in most instances. Indeed, this ideological continuum represents by far the 
best single measure of overall position because it is grounded on the class-based cleavage 
whose omnipresence across countries is attested by the presence of Socialist or Labor 
parties everywhere. As discussed by MacDonald and Budge (2005: 31), among the 
traditional four cleavages identified by Rokkan (1970), “the Conservative-Liberal conflict 
in its nineteenth form has been buried by history, while the urban-rural cleavage outside 
Scandinavia was largely subsumed under others”. Regional cleavages, involving minority 
nationalist parties against the rest, tend to be insulated from mainstream national politics, 
while the religious one has been overtaken by the comprehensive separation of Church 
and State. Moreover, the left-right continuum has been used as such in countless studies 
(Warwick, 2011)ix. 
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Since all the dependent variables are early based, the variable Partisanship has been ascribed 
to all the years in which the same government stayed in power. When there were more 
than one government in office in the same year, the indexes have been weighed by the 
numbers of days in which each government has been in office. Definition and summary 
statistics of this variable are reported in Appendix Tables 4.1 and 4.2.  
Finally, it is important to underline that the choice to employ expert surveys rather than 
party manifestos has been driven also by the need to make chapter IV directly comparable 
with relevant empirical studies in the same field (See, inter alia, Scruggs, 2004; Rueda, 
2005). However, Table 6.2 in Chapter VI demonstrates that results obtained thr this 
operationalization of government partisanship (Cfr. Section 4.3) that governing parties 
are able to affect social expenditure according to their preferences even when their 
placement on the ideological RILE scale and on the more policy based welfare scale is 
operationalized using electoral manifestos.   
 
4.2.3 Control variables 
As discussed in section 4.1, scholars belonging the “parties-do-not-matter” hypothesis 
underline how economic and demographic imperatives, together with budgetary and 
institutional constraints, vanish the ability of political parties to shape public policies 
according to their will. The present analysis embeds these constraints as control variables 
in the model specification. 
Starting from economic and demographic imperatives, given that all the dependent 
variables can be affected by the overall economic situation, it is important to control for 
the effect of economic growth on the policy decisions of partisan governments. For this 
reason, the real GDP growth as percentage change from the previous year is included in 
the model using OECD data.   
Social policy expenditure may also respond immediately and semi-automatically to 
inflation rates. Social transfers could be insufficiently indexed to keep real payments 
unchanged, so that inflation lowers social transfers without any current policy-makers 
response. Vice versa, social transfers may be over-indexed. Either way, controlling for 
inflation seems wise (OECD data).   
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Moreover, since aggregate spending measures concerning social and labor policies tend 
to increase as answer to increasing societal needs, the unemployment rate and the 
percentage of population ageing more than 65 years old are used as control variables 
(OECD data). 
Finally, two variables capturing the degree of a country’s trade and financial openness 
have been introduced to take into account the potential effects of international 
interdependence on the budgetary autonomy of governments. Trade openness has been 
measured as imports plus exports as percentage of GDP. Data are provided by the United 
Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) Statistical Office. Financial 
openness has been operationalized with the Chinn and Ito’s KAOPEN index (2006), 
which takes on higher values the more open the country is to cross-border capital 
transactionsx. 
Following Rokkan’s motto (1970) according to which “Votes count, but resources 
decide”, budgetary constraints on the ability of political parties to shape social and labor 
policies according to their preferences have been operationalize as the central government 
debt as percentage of GDP (OECD data). Indeed, if the share of central government debt 
over GDP increases, the impact of government partisanship on social and labor policies 
spending is likely to decrease because governing parties will have fewer resources at their 
disposal.  
Moreover, to formulate their preferred social and labor policies, governments have to take 
into account not only the preferences expressed by political parties involved in the 
executive coalitions, but also the requests formulated by trade unions. Specifically, strong 
labor movements are expected to have a positive impact on all the dependent variables 
considered in the present study. The strength of labor movements is measured by the 
degree of union density, namely the percentage of unionized workers over the labor force 
(OECD data). 
Finally, several scholars in public policy studies, particularly those belonging to the 
incremental approach, underlined the importance to take into account the effect of path 
dependence in policies developments (cfr. section 1). Therefore, the lagged values of each 
dependent variable are embedded in the model specifications. 
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Table 4.1 in the Appendix lists and defines all these control variables, whereas Table 4.2 
in the Appendix provides descriptive statistics.  
 
4.2.4 Statistical model specification 
Once summarized the alternative hypotheses formulated in literature on the role played 
by government partisanship in shaping social and labor policy outcomes (Cfr. Section 4.1) 
and described the operationalization of the main dependent (Cfr. Section 4.2.1) and 
independent variables (Cfr. Sections 4.2.2 and 4.2.3), this section focuses on the statistical 
model specification.  
The panel data set contains repeated observations from 1985 to 2011 over 19 OECD 
countries, for a total of 513 observations (T=27, N=19, NT=513). The countries involved 
in the study are the following ones: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, 
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, 
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and United Kingdom. The main criterion determining the 
selection of time span and countries has been the availability of data for the dependent 
variables (Cfr. Section 4.2.1).  
Panel data offer important advantages. As first, since variables vary along two dimensions, 
namely years and countries, the number of degrees of freedom increases. This usually 
strengthens the efficiency of the estimates with respect to a cross sectional dataset with 
the same number of observations. As second, they allow the researcher to measure the 
effect of countries’ behavior, observable with cross-sectional data, in its temporal 
evolution, usually emphasized by time series data. Finally, panel data provide internal 
instruments: endogenous regressors could be easily replaced by transformations or lags 
of the independent variables, which are highly correlated with the endogenous regressors, 
but not with the error term. 
However, temporal and spatial properties of this kind of data make their use problematic. 
In particular, panel data are likely to exhibit contemporaneous correlation of the residuals 
(i.e. residuals from different cross-sections in the same time-period are correlated) in 
addition to the more usual time-series' property of serial-correlation and the typical cross-
sections’ property of heteroskedasticity. The joint effect of contemporaneous correlation, 
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serial-correlation and heteroskedasticity may lead to inefficient estimates and inconsistent 
standard errors. 
Taking into account these issues, I firstly adopt panel-corrected standard errors (PCSE), 
the commonly used technique for the analysis of panel data proposed by Beck and Katz 
(1995). In particular, I deal with the temporal and spatial properties of my data simply 
regressing the change in each dependent variable on its lagged level and the lagged levels 
of the independent variables listed in sections 4.2.2 and 4.2.3. Accordingly, the first 
estimation equation will have the following general form: 
∆Yit = α + β1Yit-1 + β2Partisanhip it-1 + ∑βjX it-1 + εit   (1) 
where ∆Yit is the change in the dependent variable (i.e. social expenditure, ALMP 
expenditure, PLMP expenditure or unemployment replacement rate) in country i in year 
t from one year to the next; α is the constant, Yit-1 is the lagged level of each dependent 
variable multiplied by its estimated coefficient, β1. Partisanhipit-1 is the lagged level of the 
main independent variable, referring to the location of the executive power on the left-
right scale in country i, multiplied by its estimated coefficient, β2. Finally, Xit-1 is a (k x 1) 
vector of lagged control variables, taken in levels; βj is a (k x 1) vector of coefficients with 
the subscript j referring to the particular explanatory variable, εit is the error term. Country 
and year dummies are included. 
Once estimated the effect of government partisanship on social and labor policies using 
PCSE, I turn to a more sophisticated model specification, namely the Error Correction 
Model (ECM).  
Tests on the four dependent variables reveal that they may have a unit root. In particular, 
I performed the Maddala and Wu (1999) test for panel unit root in unbalanced panel 
dataset with various lagged differences and with and without trends, failing to reject the 
null hypothesis according to which all the series are non-stationary. This result is 
confirmed also by the t-test for unit roots in heterogeneous panels proposed by Im, 
Pesaran and Shin (2003), which, differently from the previous one, provides consistent 
estimates under the hypothesis of cross-sectional dependence. The same tests, performed 
on the regressors, reveal that several likely candidates for co-integration exist. Specifically, 
the amount of public debt, the inflation rate, the unemployment rate and the share of 
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population ageing 65 or more may have a unit root, a necessary condition for co-
integration.  
In this situation, proceeding with simple lagged-dependent variable models as the one 
proposed before (Cfr. Equation 1) may be misleading: an ECM is advised. This method, 
developed by Beck (1992), consists in regressing the change in the dependent variable on 
its lagged level, the lagged level of each potential co-integrating factor and whatever other 
levels or differences theory or empirics may suggest. Provided that the coefficient on the 
lagged dependent variable in levels is negative, this approach provides valid estimates.  
Using the ECM structure, the estimated coefficients of differenced independent variables 
refer to momentum-like, short-run, transitory relations between changes in independent and 
dependent variables. The estimated coefficients of independent variables in levels refer to 
equilibrium-like, long run, permanent, relations between levels. Moreover, the long-term 
effects dissipate over time through the coefficients on the lagged dependent variable, 
reflecting rates of adjustments of levels to equilibrium relations (Franzese, 2002). In the 
present application, the large majority of the independent variables may have both short 
term and long-term effects. For this reason, they enter the regression in current changes 
and lagged levels. Vice versa, trade union density, trade openness and financial openness 
enter in lagged levels only.   
Accordingly, the general form of the second estimation equation will be: 
∆Yit = α + λYit-1 + ∑βj∆X it-1 + ∑βjX it-1 + εit   (2) 
where ∆Yit is the change in the dependent variable in country i in year t from one year to 
the next.  X is a vector of (k x 1) explanatory variables with the subscript j referring to the 
particular explanatory variable. α is the intercept and ε is the disturbance term. The short-
term effects are measured by the estimated coefficient βj of any differenced independent 
variable. The long-term effects are captured by dividing the coefficient βj of any 
independent variable in levels by λ, which is called “error correction rate”. As suggested 
by Beck and Katz (1995), even with this model specification, I use PCSE to correct for 
panel heteroskedasticity in the data structure.  Next section provides results for both the 
model specifications corresponding to the equations 1 and 2. 
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4.3 Results 
Table 1 displays four models, one for each dependent variable, estimated according to the 
equation 1. The first model, ∆ Social exp., aims at assessing the impact of a unitary increase 
in the lagged values of each independent variable on the change in the total public and 
mandatory private social expenditure as percentage of GDP from one year to the next. 
Table 4.1: The effect of government partisanship on social and labor policies 
(PCSE) 
 ∆ Social exp. ∆ ALMP exp. ∆ PLMP exp. ∆ UEF 
Partisanship t-1 -0.0437* -0.00777* -0.0192*** -0.0157* 
 (0.0177) (0.00397) (0.00452) (0.00663) 
Yt-1 -0.115*** -0.157*** -0.0433 -1.018*** 
 (0.0278) (0.0346) (0.0242) (0.218) 
GDP growth t-1 -0.129*** -0.0100** -0.0440*** 0.000433 
 (0.0262) (0.00372) (0.00544) (0.00452) 
Debt t-1 -0.0122*** 0.0000549 -0.00279*** 0.000458 
 (0.00334) (0.000563) (0.000774) (0.00154) 
Inflation t-1 -0.0542* 0.00321 -0.00203 -0.00389 
 (0.0272) (0.00476) (0.00567) (0.00644) 
Unemployment t-1 -0.0659*** -0.00163 -0.0271*** 0.00606 
 (0.0174) (0.00331) (0.00511) (0.00772) 
Elderly t-1 0.000196*** 0.00000325 0.0000335*** 0.0000124 
 (0.0000352) (0.00000691) (0.00000886) (0.00000945) 
Trade unions t-1 -0.0343*** -0.00124 -0.00526* -0.0149* 
 (0.00832) (0.00152) (0.00250) (0.00587) 
Trade openness t-1 -0.0137* -0.00147 -0.00366** -0.00106 
 (0.00559) (0.000774) (0.00120) (0.00119) 
Financial openness t-1 0.0875 0.0104 0.00951 0.0213 
 (0.0629) (0.00786) (0.0115) (0.0187) 
Constant 1.694* 0.116 0.370* 0.879*** 
 (0.698) (0.115) (0.170) (0.260) 
Year and country d. Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.669 0.300 0.609 0.575 
N 403 390 402 227 
Notes: OLS estimations with panel corrected standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** 
p<0.001 
In particular, results suggest that if the government coalition moves one point toward the 
right side of the ideological spectrum in the year t-1, the change in the share of social 
expenditure over GDP in the year t is expected to be 0.04 percentage points lower than 
what it would have been without this ideological shift. In particular, if the social 
expenditure as percentage of GDP in the year t increases (i.e. ∆Yit is positive), it would 
have been 0.04 percentage points higher without this ideological shift in the year t-1. Vice 
versa, if the same decreases (i.e. ∆Yit is negative), this retrenchment would have been 0.04 
CHAPTER IV 
160 
 
percentage points lower without the same ideological shift of the governing coalition in 
the year t-1. 
The same reasoning applies to the estimated coefficients of the independent variable of 
interest, Partisanship, in the remaining three models. Indeed, all the betas are negative and 
statistically significant at least at the 95% confidence interval. Overall, if the governing 
coalition in the year t-1 moves to the right, there will be a negative, although modest in 
magnitude, impact on the changes in the amounts of money devoted to social and labor 
policies and in the index of welfare state generosity in the following year.  
As discussed in the previous section, these findings could be significantly biased by the 
joint effect of contemporaneous correlation, serial-correlation and heteroskedasticity in 
the data structure. To better address these properties, Table 4.2 shows four ECMs, 
estimated according to the equation 2.  
As first, the coefficients of the lagged dependent variables in levels are negative and highly 
statistically significant, meaning that inferences from these estimates should be free of 
unit-root concerns. Results suggest that social policy expenditure adjusts very slowly. In 
particular, 86% (1-.14=.86) of a shock in one year persists into the next, than 86% of that 
into the following year, and so forth. Thus, the long-run impact of any permanent shock 
in the share of social policy expenditure over GDP is about 7.14 (≈.14-1) times its 
immediate impact. The same reasoning applies to ALMP and PLMP spending as 
percentages of GDP. Specifically, respectively 86% and 90% of a shock in one year in the 
amount of money devoted to ALMP and PLMP persist into the next years, and so forth. 
Thus, the long-run impacts of any permanent shock in the share of money devoted to 
these two programs are respectively about 6.25 and 10 times their immediate impacts. A 
different behavior is shown by the last dependent variable, the net unemployment 
replacement rate. Indeed, in this case, only the 1% of a shock in one year will persists into 
the next. It means that the long run impact of a shock in the net unemployment 
replacement rate nearly coincides with its immediate impact.  
Having discussed the error corrections terms of the four models, I focus on the estimated 
coefficients of the main independent variable, Partisanship, which enters the regressions 
both in current changes and in lagged levels. 
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Table 4.2: The effect of government partisanship on social and labor policies 
(ECM) 
 ∆ Social exp. ∆ ALMP exp. ∆ PLMP exp. ∆ UEF 
∆ Partisanshipt 0.0290 0.00520 0.00304 -0.000275 
 (0.0260) (0.00528) (0.00573) (0.00562) 
Partisanshipt-1  -0.0378* -0.00814* -0.0144** -0.0118** 
 (0.0177) (0.00412) (0.00452) (0.00458) 
Yt-1 -0.142*** -0.161*** -0.106*** -0.999*** 
 (0.0280) (0.0336) (0.0284) (0.196) 
∆ GDP growtht -0.181*** -0.00463 -0.0168** -0.00452 
 (0.0204) (0.00431) (0.00536) (0.00705) 
GDP growth t-1 -0.190*** -0.0142* -0.0185** -0.00543 
 (0.0282) (0.00570) (0.00676) (0.00824) 
∆ Debtt 0.0408*** 0.00438** 0.00929*** 0.00210 
 (0.00953) (0.00155) (0.00204) (0.00248) 
Debt t-1 -0.00386 0.000403 -0.000617 0.00167 
 (0.00315) (0.000562) (0.000683) (0.00124) 
∆ Inflationt -0.0633* -0.00956 -0.0192** -0.0159* 
 (0.0302) (0.00623) (0.00631) (0.00670) 
Inflation t-1 -0.0950*** -0.00126 -0.0111* -0.0124 
 (0.0273) (0.00498) (0.00522) (0.00711) 
∆ Unemploymentt 0.00249 -0.0198* 0.0895*** -0.0190 
 (0.0338) (0.00770) (0.00943) (0.0133) 
Unemployment t-1 -0.0616*** -0.00590 -0.00977 -0.00328 
 (0.0175) (0.00348) (0.00571) (0.00686) 
∆ Elderlyt 0.000736*** 0.000106* 0.0000910* 0.0000161 
 (0.000198) (0.0000461) (0.0000396) (0.0000369) 
Elderly t-1 0.000106*** -0.000000573 0.0000179* 0.000000975 
 (0.0000316) (0.00000697) (0.00000778) (0.00000811) 
Trade unions t-1 -0.0216* -0.000386 -0.00244 -0.0110* 
 (0.00850) (0.00149) (0.00229) (0.00445) 
Trade openness t-1 -0.00431 -0.00110 -0.00145 -0.000311 
 (0.00457) (0.000778) (0.000925) (0.000982) 
Financial openness 
t-1 
0.0489 0.00368 0.0129 0.00808 
 (0.0581) (0.00758) (0.0107) (0.0130) 
Constant 1.990** 0.0563 -0.207 0.825*** 
 (0.763) (0.117) (0.138) (0.219) 
Year and country 
d. 
Yes Yes Yes 
Yes 
R2 0.747 0.327 0.718 0.577 
N 403 390 402 248 
Notes: OLS estimations with panel corrected standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** 
p<0.001 
The probabilities that the estimated coefficients of the independent variable Partisanship in first 
differences and in lagged levels are simultaneously equal to zero have been tested through four Wald 
tests. P-levels always reject H0. 
Overall, the four models suggest that there are not short-term relations between changes 
in government partisanship and social and labor policy outcomes. A temporary 1 point 
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movement toward the ideological right in the governing coalition induces statistically 
insignificant changes in the amount of money devoted to social and labor policies and in 
the index of welfare state generosity.  
These results are consistent with McDonald and Budge’s finding of inconsistent and week 
short-term relationship between government partisanship and social policy outcomes. 
Also the analysis performed by these  authors, indeed, reveal that while “preferences of 
voters translate into preferences of governors reasonably well”, on the short-run there is 
some sort of disconnection between the preferences of governing parties and actual social 
policy outcomes (2005: 158-161). 
McDonald and Budge explain this absence of short term effects by the transient nature 
of power holding in democracy (2005: 230-231): “If any one party was fixed in power 
over a long period of time, it could well take policy in the direction it prefers. But that is 
precisely what representative democracy has a system guards against. Either it produces 
coalitions were policy has to be negotiated between partners. Or it creates elective 
dictatorship where everything a government does in its limited term of office is subverted 
by the next one (2005: 230-233)”. 
On the short run, policy change from one government to the next may even be 
imperceptible. For a full understanding of the democratic policy process, a broader time 
horizon is needed. Taking this perspective, all the models displayed in Table 4.2 detect 
statistically significant relationships between government partisanship and the four 
dependent. In particular, a permanent shift toward the right of the governing coalition is 
estimated to produce significant .27% (-(-.0378)/-.142 ≈-.27), .05% and .14% declines 
respectively in the amount of money devoted to social expenditure, ALMP and PLMP. 
Finally, the same permanent shift in the ideological position of the executive is expected 
to decrease of .01 point the unemployment replacement rate. The implications of these 
results will be discussed in the last section. 
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4.4 Conclusion and discussion 
This chapter addresses the following research question: “Do political parties’ long-lasting 
ideological positions significantly affect government decision making concerning social 
and labor market policies?”.  
Being able to answer in an affirmative way to this question holds important implications 
for research on parties and public policy and, more generally, for theories of democratic 
representation. As first, proving that government partisanship still plays a role in 
determining welfare state developments helps political scientists to get rid of a quite 
disturbing result. Indeed, the uninfluential role of political variables in shaping policy 
variations damages the relevance of the political science as discipline, which is inherently 
tied to the substantive importance of the phenomena it examines. As second, from the 
perspective of democratic theory, it means supporting the broad conclusion that parties’ 
behavior once in office offers voters real differences in their policy priorities. 
As highlighted by the literature review (Cfr. Section 4.1), at least from the late 1970s, more 
and more contributions in comparative political economy and welfare state research tried 
to analyze the linkage between political partisanship and social policy outcomes. However, 
there is not yet sufficient evidence to end the debate on this issue: researches analyzing 
the effect of partisanship on the overall social expenditure (levels or dynamics), single 
program expenditure or income replacement rates seem to be inconclusive, as some 
scholar find evidence in favor of the “parties-do-matter” hypothesis, some against it, some 
other reports mixed results. In sum, the quantitative literature on the policy impact of 
political parties displays a high level of accumulation, but it has not achieved a comparable 
level of scientific aggregation (Imbeau et. al., 2001). 
The main contribution of chapter IV is the choice to test the robustness of the “parties-
do-matter” and the “parties-do-not-matter” hypotheses taking both “the dependent 
variable problem” (Green-Pedersen, 2002) and the “independent variable” one seriously. 
This study, indeed, employs three sets of outcomes ranging from general spending 
measures to an index of welfare state generosity and relates them to a continuous variable 
referring to government partisanship, able to overcome the classifications of governments 
based on both left-right dichotomies and party families.  
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Another contribution of this chapter is the use of an ECM, which is able to directly 
estimate the speed at which a dependent variable returns to equilibrium after a change in 
the independent variable of interest. With this multiple time series model, indeed, 
economic controls can be embedded in the estimation equation without dampen the 
effect of political variables, which, on the contrary, tend to be erased using simple lagged 
dependent variables models.  
Results suggest, as expected, that the ideological position of the executive on the left-right 
scale is unable to affect social policy outcomes in the short run, when economic control 
variables prevail. However, parties’ influence seems to acquire relevance on the long run. 
Specifically, the estimated coefficients of the lagged independent variable in levels are 
always statistically significant and correctly signed: ceteris paribus, when the government 
coalition moves to the right, there is a negative impact on social expenditure as a whole, 
on public spending in active (ALMP)  and passive (PLMP) labor market policies and on 
the net unemployment replacement rate. 
To sum up: political parties are unable to affect social policy outcomes on the short run, 
their influences on social policy-making are tangible only on the long run. Is it enough to 
say that the third link of the chain of responsiveness, the CD bond between governmental 
social policy preferences and actual social policy outcomes (Cfr. Chapter I, Figure 1.5), 
holds? 
McDonald and Budge (2005) would have certainly suggested to say “Yes”. In their 
seminal contribution, indeed, they explain: “Democracy requires competition. From 
competition come winners and losers, and being one or the other has consequences for a 
person’s willingness to support democracy. Over the long haul, however, an especially 
important contribution to maintaining democracies comes from the consent of losers” 
(2005: 232). Therefore, according to them, this slow moving policy change is the most 
important way representative democracy has to keep the consent of the societal segments 
who recently lost the elections.   
Nevertheless, it is impossible not to think about the motto by John Maynard Keynes 
(1971 [1924]: 65), according to which: “In the long run, we are all dead”. Of course, 
Keynes addressed this over-cited critique to the economists, which tend to “set 
themselves too easy, too useless a task if in tempestuous seasons they can only tell us that 
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when the storm is long past the ocean is flat again”. However, the same reasoning may 
be applied to the political sphere. Taking this long-view on the parties-policies nexus, am 
I simply waiting that the ocean becomes flat again?  
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Appendix 
Appendix table 4.1 – Variables’ description 
Name Description Source T  N 
Dep. variables     
Social 
expenditure 
Total public and mandatory private 
social expenditure as a % of GDP. 
OECD Social Expenditure 
Database.  
1985-
2011 
19 
ALMP 
expenditure 
First measure: public spending in 
active policies as % of GDP. 
OECD Employment 
Database. 
1985-
2011 
19 
 Second measure: share of ALMP 
spending in total labor market 
spending as % of GDP. 
   
PLMP 
expenditure 
First measure: Public spending in 
passive policies as % of GDP. 
OECD Employment 
Database. 
1985-
2011 
19 
 Second measure: Share of PLMP 
spending in total labor market 
spending as % of GDP. 
   
Unemployment 
replacement rate 
Net unemployment replacement 
rate for a couple with a single 
earner and two dependent 
children. 
L. Scruggs (2004), Welfare 
State Entitlements Data Set, 
Version 1.1. 
1985-
2002 
17 
Indep. variable 
Partisanship Early based mean of the left-right 
indexes of the parties involved in 
the government coalition 
according to the expert survey 
nearest to the election date. The 
influence of each party has been 
weighted by its share of seats in the 
lower Chamber. It goes from 1 
(extreme left) to 20 (extreme right). 
Parliament and Government 
Composition Database 
(Döring and Manow 2012) 
combined with the following 
expert surveys: Castes & Mair 
(1983), Laver & Hunt (1992), 
Huber & Inglehart (1995), 
Benoit & Laver (2006) and 
Chapel Hill (1999-2010). 
1985-
2011 
19 
Control variables 
GDP growth Real GDP growth as % change 
from the previous year. 
OECD Factbook Country 
Statistical Profiles, 2013 
edition. 
1985-
2011 
19 
Debt Gross government debt (financial 
liabilities) as % of GDP. 
OECD dataset on Central 
Government Debt – 2013 
edition. 
1985-
2011 
19 
Inflation Growth of consumer price index 
(CPI), all items, percent change 
from previous year. 
OECD Main Economic 
Indicators Database. 
1985-
2011 
19 
Unemployment  Unemployment rate: unemployed 
persons divided by the labor force. 
OECD Employment 
Database. 
1985-
2011 
19 
Elderly % of population ageing more than 
65 years old. 
OECD Employment 
Database. 
1985-
2011 
19 
Trade unions Trade union density: % of 
employees who are trade unions’ 
members. 
OECD Employment database. 1985-
2011 
19 
Trade openness Imports plus exports as % of GDP 
in current prices. 
UNCTAD Statistical Office. 1985-
2011 
19 
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Financial 
openness 
KAOPEN index, measuring 
countries’ degree of capital account 
openness. 
Chinn, M. D. & Ito, H. (2006). 
“What Matters for Financial 
Development? Capital 
Controls, Institutions, and 
Interactions”. Journal of 
Development Economics 81 (1): 
163-192. 
1985-
2011 
19 
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Appendix table 4.2: Descriptive statistics 
Variable  Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Min. Max. Observations 
Social expenditure overall 22.64004 5.143651 10.4 36.2 N = 472 
 between  4.632098 15.504 30.576 n = 19 
 within  2.431908 15.50404 30.90404 T = 24.8421 
ALMP expenditure overall .7915584 .4906436 .1 2.8 N = 462 
 between  .4426433 .2 1.824 n = 19 
 within  .2337973 -.0324416 1.767558 T = 24.3158 
PLMP expenditure overall 1.474681 1.047618 .1 5.3 N = 470 
 between  .9125421 .412 3.552 n = 19 
 within  .5487886 -.3773191 3.842681 T = 24.7368 
Unemployment repl. 
rate  
overall .6612258 .137776 0 .910798 N = 284 
 between  .1230917 .3621204 .8248106 n = 16 
 within  .0675222 -.0845608 .9066253 T = 17.75 
Partisanship overall 5.360433 1.56025 .3318956 8.660761 N = 513 
 between  .7562842 4.379128 7.546601 n = 19 
 within  1.375304 1.06005 9.142351 T = 27 
GDP growth overall 2.349001 2.411645 -8.538561 11.27173 N = 513 
 between  .746444 1.44224 4.783084 n = 19 
 within  2.29938 -8.830272 8.837645 T = 27 
Debt overall 55.02813 31.87047 4.922 183.53 N = 459 
 between  28.22651 10.53631 109.8807 n = 19 
 within  16.22304 4.856606 141.4126 T = 24.1579 
Inflation overall 3.062997 3.002812 -4.479938 23.01544 N = 513 
 between  1.76947 .5281248 8.765069 n = 19 
 within  2.458628 -4.491998 17.31337 T = 27 
Unemployment overall 7.837281 3.894426 1.616833 24.04179 N = 498 
 between  3.114519 3.62666 16.71926 n = 19 
 within  2.473658 -.5717737 16.07745 T= 26.2105 
Elderly overall 4673.184 5583.425 383 29752 N = 513 
 between  5517.705 431.9407 20768.59 n = 19 
 within  1508.512 -3623.409 13656.59 T = 27 
Trade unions overall 38.16933 20.2504 7.575857 83.89023 N = 489 
 between  20.23463 9.175788 78.02036 n = 19 
 within  4.660003 26.74539 56.71079 T = 25.7368 
Trade openness overall 72.03188 33.59106 15.92399 187.8485 N = 512 
 between  32.14736 22.21595 142.2611 n = 19 
 within  12.06371 26.19032 117.6193 T = 26.9474 
Financial openness overall 1.920704 .930721 -1.168828 2.439009 N = 502 
 between  .4490194 .7932544 2.439009 n = 19 
 within  .8224545 -.7159914 3.566459 T= 26.4211 
 
i In accordance with the availability of data concerning the second set of dependent 
variables, namely active and passive labor market policy spending as percentage of GDP 
(cfr. endnote iv), the time span taken into account for this first dependent variable will be 
1985-2011. 
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ii The operationalization of ALMP effort adopted in this paper, namely public spending 
in active policies as percentage of GDP, is the commonest. However, it presents two 
drawbacks. As firstly, it neglects that spending for labor market policies tends to increase 
with the level of unemployment: a sudden increase in ALMPs may simply be due to a 
contextual growth in the unemployment rate, rather than being the evidence of an aware 
policy change implemented by governments. As second, it does not take into account the 
overall labor market policy structure: two countries may allocate the same amount of 
financial resources expressed as a percentage of GDP in ALMP, despite the fact that they 
can vary hugely in their labor programs overall structures, which encompasses PLMP too. 
To overcome these limits, following Armigeon (2007), estimations have been replicated 
using a second indicator of ALMP, namely the share of ALMP spending in total labor 
market spending as percentage of GDP. For reasons of space, my discussion of the 
empirical results focuses only on the first indicator. Models using this second indicator 
are available upon request. 
iii As for ALMP, an additional indicator is used to measure PLMP efforts, namely the 
share of PLMP spending in total labor market spending as percentage of GDP. Models 
using this second indicator are available upon request. 
iv The OECD collected data on public expenditure on labor market programs from 1985 
to 2002. Starting with reference year 1998, Eurostat started collecting data according to a 
different classification system. After some time, the OECD adopted most of the features 
of the Eurostat system. OECD data according to the new classification are available for 
reference year 2002 onwards, or 1998 onwards for Eurostat countries. Grubb and 
Puymoyen warn that it is no longer practicable to combined using crude extrapolation the 
old data, which stop in 2002, with the new ones, which start in 2002, because time-series 
movements will result primarily from statistical breaks (i.e. changes in definition and 
coverage of the statistics) rather than from real changes in spending patterns. For this 
reason, the authors reconstruct long time series in this domain according to the updated 
classification system from 1985 (Grubb and Puymoyen, 2008). Therefore, 1985 – 2011 
will be the time span taken into account by the present study. 
v In accordance with the availability of data referring to the public expenditure in ALMP 
and PLMP, the time span taken into account for this last set of dependent variables will 
be 1985-2002. Unfortunately, Scruggs (2004) does not provide data for Greece and 
Portugal. Therefore, information concerning replacement rates are available for 17 
countries out of the 19 covered by the present study. 
vi In the original dataset by Laver and Hunt (1992), the dimension “left-right” was absent. 
Therefore, I used the dimension “public ownership”, which in literature has shown to be 
highly correlated with the positioning of political parties over the general left-right 
continuum.   
viiIn the original dataset by Laver and Benoit (2006), the dimension “left-right” was 
missing for French political parties. Not to lose observations, I replaced this dimension 
with the “taxes v. spending” one for this country.  
viii These expert surveys are not scaled up the same range. Particularly, the left-right 
indexes provided by Castes & Mair (1983) and by Chapel Hill (1999-2010) range from 0 
(extreme left) to 10 (extreme right); the one by Huber & Inglehart (1995) goes from 1 
(extreme left) to 10 (extreme right); while the ones computed by Laver & Hunt (1992) 
and Benoit and Laver (2005) run from 1 (extreme left) to 20 (extreme right). For this 
reason, they have been standardized from 1 (extreme left) to 20 (extreme right) at party 
level. 
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ix Table 6.2 in Chapter VI demonstrates that governing parties are able to affect social 
expenditure even when their policy preferences are operationalized as the weighted mean 
position of cabinet parties on the welfare dimension using electoral manifestos. 
x This index belongs to the broad category of de jure measures of financial openness. As 
most of the de jure indicators, this index performs a data reduction exercise on the IMF’s 
Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions (AREAER), 
which summarizes, in prose format, the rules and regulations that countries use to govern 
capital transactions, as well as the proceeds arising from them, between residents and non-
residents. KAOPEN has been preferred to other indices because it provides the broadest 
country and time coverage (Quinn, Schindler and Toyoda, 2011) and because it is publicly 
available. 
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Chapter V 
Zooming in on the third link of the chain of responsiveness. 
Missing links in explaining government’s ability to shape 
social expenditure according to its will: an application to the 
Italian case (1946-2009) 
 
 
Abstract. Although both political scientists and political economists wrote reams of 
papers on the relationship between governing parties’ ideological positions and actual 
social policy outcomes, empirical studies failed to reach any firm conclusion. I maintain 
that such mixed results could be driven by two major shortcomings affecting this field of 
studies. The first limitation comes at the empirical level and concerns the ways in which 
governments’ partisanship uses to be operationalized. The second limitation, instead, is 
rooted at the theoretical level and refers to the over-simplified idea of political parties as 
unitary actors. This chapter addresses both these limitations. In particular, I take 
advantage of two datasets, both referring to the Italian case over the last 70 years. The 
first one provides data on the positions of Italian Prime Ministers and parties; the second 
one reports the policy positions expressed by factions inside Italian parties. This chapter 
demonstrates that declared cabinets’ positions on welfare state expansion as expressed in 
Prime Ministers’ investiture and confidence speeches are strong determinants of social 
expenditure. However, results prove also that the “agenda setting power” enjoyed by the 
cabinet is strongly weaken by party politics dynamics (the majority the governing coalition 
enjoys in the lower chamber and the ideological distance between the actual and the 
previous government) and, more interestingly, by intra-party dynamics. In particular, the 
ability to shape social expenditure according to the content of the coalition agreement 
proves to be strongly undermined by the degree of internal polarization inside the major 
party of the governing coalition. 
 
 
Introduction 
Chapter IV shed light on the last link of the ideal chain of responsiveness (Cfr. Chapter 
I, Figure 1.5), demonstrating that, on the long run, governing parties are able to shape 
social policy outcomes according to their long lasting ideological preferences (Cfr. 
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Chapter IV, Sections 4.3 and 4.4). In detail, that chapter proved that the inconsistent 
results provided so far in literature on the executives’ abilities to affect social policies (Cfr. 
Chapter IV, Section 4.1) can be explained by an “independent variable problem”, that is 
by the tendency to measure governments’ positions using dummy variables, distinguishing 
between left and right executives, or categorical variables, classifying governments 
according to the party families they embed (Cfr. Chapter IV, Section 4.2.2). Once 
substituted such rough measures with a continuous variable based on parties’ placements 
provided by the major expert surveys, governments’ partisanship turned to be a good 
determinant of social policy outcomes, at least on the long run (Cfr. Chapter IV, Sections 
4.3 and 4.4).    
However, because of data shortage in comparative perspective, the analysis developed in 
chapter IV was unable to address two additional shortcomings affecting the large majority 
of studies dealing with governing parties’ preferences and social policy outcomes. The 
first limitation comes at the empirical level and concerns once more the operationalization 
of governing parties’ ideological preferences. The second limitation, instead, is rooted at 
the theoretical level and refers to the over-simplified idea of political parties as unitary 
actors. Chapter V addresses these two limitations by taking advantage of two datasets, 
both referring to the Italian case over the last 70 years: the first one provides data on the 
positions of Italian Prime Ministers and parties; the second one reports the policy 
positions expressed by factions inside Italian parties (Cfr. Sections 5.2.3 and 5.2.4). 
Concerning the first limitation, I maintain that, even if measures of executives’ ideological 
preferences based on expert surveys or parties’ manifestos are surely preferable to dummy 
or categorical variables referring to party families, they are still less suitable than Prime 
Ministers’ (PMs) investiture and confidence speeches. Indeed, I assert that these speeches, 
when available, are better proxies of the agreement the coalescing parties have reached 
(Cfr. Section 5.1.1).  
In particular, chapter V tests whether or not declared cabinets’ positions on welfare state 
expansion, as expressed by Italian PMs in their investiture and confidence speeches, 
correspond to the weighted mean of the coalescing parties’ positions on the same issue. 
Once established that these two measures, even if positively correlated, do not describe 
exactly the same phenomenon (Cfr. Section 5.3, Figure 5.2), chapter V assesses their 
respective impact on social policy outcomes, proving that declared cabinets’ positions on 
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welfare state expansion stated in PMs’ investiture and confidence speeches are more likely 
to affect social policy design. Finally, this chapter demonstrates that the executive power’s 
ability to affect social policies is conditional on the parliamentary majority enjoyed by the 
governing coalition in the lower chamber and on the ideological distance between the 
actual and the previous cabinet.  
Concerning the second limitation, all the empirical studies in the field of policy 
congruence conceive political parties as unitary actors, whose members display cohesive 
behaviors consistent with party preferences. I maintain that this claim is nothing but a 
fictional representation of reality and, accordingly, I hypothesize and demonstrate that the 
more heterogeneous social policy preferences are inside governing parties, the more 
difficult will be for the executive to implement the coalition agreement in this policy area 
(Cfr. Sections 5.1.2 and 5.3).  
Chapter V is structured as follows. Section 5.1 presents the puzzle and formulates the 
research hypotheses. In particular, section 5.1.1 justifies the choice to assess the 
executives’ ideological positions using PMs’ investiture and confidence speeches and 
describes the expected effect of governmental partisanship on social policy outcomes, 
conditional on the majority enjoyed by the governing coalition in the lower chamber and 
on the ideological distance between the actual and the previous government. Section 5.1.2 
motivates the importance to take into account intra-party policy preferences and discusses 
why intra-party heterogeneity is expected to decrease the executive’s ability to shape social 
policies according to the content of the coalition agreement. Section 5.2 presents the 
research design. In detail, it describes the dataset and the case study-selection (Cfr. Section 
5.2.1), the operationalization of the dependent (Cfr. Section 5.2.2) and independent 
variables (Cfr. Sections 5.2.3, 5.2.4, 5.2.5).  
The research hypotheses formulated in section 5.1 are borne out in an empirical test of 
the effect of governments’ partisanship on social expenditure in Italy from 1946 to 2009 
(Cfr. Section 5.3). As better detailed later (Cfr. Section 5.2.1), I focused on the Italian case 
because both the main independent variable of interest, namely executives’ social policy 
preferences as expressed in PMs’ investiture and confidence speeches and intra-party 
social policy preferences, were not available in a comparative setting and have to be 
manually computed. Last section concludes (Cfr. Section 5.4). 
CHAPTER V 
182 
 
5.1 The puzzle 
5.1.1. Using investiture and confidence speeches as better proxies of governments’ positions  
Chapter IV identified the main shortcoming affecting the large majority of studies dealing 
with party politics and welfare state with the tendency to operationalize governments’ 
ideological positions either by clear-cut dichotomies at party level between parties of the 
left and the right or by categorical variables referring to party families. To overcome these 
rough measures of governments’ partisanship, I assessed governments’ ideological 
position by computing the weighted mean of the coalescing parties’ positions, with their 
relative legislative sizes constituting the weights (Cfr. Chapter IV, Section 4.2.2). In 
chapter IV, I employed expert surveys to assess each governing party’s position on the 
left-right spectrum. However, governing parties’ positions could be obtained also through 
the analysis of party manifestos, as will be done in the last chapter of this dissertation (Cfr. 
Chapter VI).  
Even if better than dummy or categorical variables referring to party families, these 
methods are not free of costs. The major shortcoming affecting expert surveys is that they 
are rarely performed. Similarly, data relying on party manifestos risk to be strongly 
affected by electoral dynamics: in their electoral pledges, parties talk to voters and, by 
doing that, they emphasize policy and ideological divides in order to maximize their policy 
and office seeking objectives (Budge et al., 2001; Strom, 1990; Warwich, 2014; Curini et 
al., forthcoming). 
In this chapter, I decide to avoid all these alternative methods (i.e. dummy variables 
distinguishing between left-wing and right-wing executives; categorical variables 
classifying governments according to the party families they embed; weighted mean of 
coalescing parties’ positions as attributed by experts or as coded from electoral 
manifestos). On the contrary, the ideological positions of the Italian executives have been 
estimated by coding the investiture and confidence speeches pronounced by Prime 
Ministers (PM) in the parliamentary arena from 1946 to 2009 following the CMP method 
(Budge et al., 2001; Curini, 2011).  
Indeed, according to the Italian Constitution, shortly after its formal nomination by the 
President of the Republic, the PM pronounces two speeches to seek investiture through 
a positive vote of confidence by the lower (Camera dei Deputati) and the upper (Senato 
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della Repubblica) houses. On both occasions, he/she is expected to detail governmental 
policy proposals. After each speech, parliamentary debate is opened and party 
representatives are allowed to speak, discussing the wide range of issues mentioned by the 
PM and concluding with a vote of confidence. 
The choice to assess the ideological position of the Italian executives using PMs’ 
investiture and confidence speeches may be fruitful for the following reasons. 
As first, measures of governments’ positions based on PMs’ investiture and confidence 
speeches are less likely to be biased by electoral dynamics than measures derived from 
coalescing parties’ manifestos. Indeed, in their electoral manifestos, political parties tend 
to highlight their peculiarities rather than common policy positions, in order to maximize 
their vote-seeking objectives (McDonald & Budge, 2005; Warwick, 2011). Vice-versa, 
investiture and confidence speeches are pronounced by the PM in a formal legislative 
setting, where he/she is supposed to publicly confront him/herself with the other 
members of Parliament (MPs). In these formal occasions, the PM and the MPs mainly 
talk to themselves rather than to voters, shifting the dimension of conflict from purely 
ideological positions to issues more related to the actual agenda of the cabinet (Curini, 
Hino & Osaki, forthcoming). According to McDonald and Budge (2005: 141) suggestion, 
PMs’ investiture and confidence speeches should certainly be taken as better indicators of 
eventual policy than simple party electoral program intentions because “they have the 
advantage of outlining a whole range of plans, for legislation and administration as well 
as spending”. 
As second, measures of governments’ positions based on PMs’ investiture and confidence 
speeches are more suitable to approximate the agreement that the coalescing parties have 
reached than measures based on the weighted mean of coalescing parties’ positions as 
expressed by MPs during the legislative debate. Indeed, PMs’ investiture and confidence 
speeches are unified textual documents summarizing what the coalescing parties actually 
intend to do on a wide range of policy issues (Warwick, 2011). These documents have to 
be considered as effective ex-ante control mechanisms, helping coalescing parties to 
prevent ministers from unilateral actions that benefits their parties at the cost of the 
coalition partners. In particular, it has been proved that the more detailed the coalition 
agreements are, the lower the probability of cabinet members pursuing policies not 
acceptable to the coalition partners (Strom & Muller, 2000). Vice-versa, in the speeches 
CHAPTER V 
184 
 
pronounced by MPs in reaction to the investiture or confidence speech spelled by the 
PM, governing parties are supposed to show their closeness to the PM while, at the same 
time, underlining those policy issues on which an agreement has not yet been achieved. 
Therefore, I argue that the most direct strategy to establish governments’ position is to 
code the investiture and confidence speeches pronounced by the PMs. According to this 
claim, the following hypotheses concerning the relationship between government’s 
positions on welfare state expansion and social expenditure will be tested: 
H1: In his/her investiture or confidence speech, the PM spells the compromise the 
coalescing parties have reached on social expenditure. Therefore, if in his/her 
investiture or confidence speech, the PM expresses negative (positive) attitudes toward 
welfare state expansion, he/she is expected to cut (increase) social expenditure.  
H2: The seat weighted mean of governing parties’ positions on welfare state 
expansion does not necessarily correspond to the coalition agreement they have 
reached. Therefore, the seat weighted mean of governing parties’ positions on welfare 
state expansion is expected to be weakly positively correlated with the PM’s position 
on the same issue. Moreover, the seat weighted mean of governing parties’ positions 
on welfare state expansion is expected to be less related to social expenditure than 
the PM’s position on the same issue.  
Of course, as highlighted by theories of party discipline, the executive power is more likely 
to be able to shape social expenditure according to the content of the coalition agreement 
when the governing coalition enjoys a large majority in Parliament (e.g. Cox & 
McCubbins, 1993; Cox et al., 1999). Accordingly, I expect that in case of minority 
governments, the executive’s ability to shape social expenditure following the content of 
the coalition agreement should be weaken. In this situation, indeed, the PM is forced to 
offer policy concessions as inducements both to governing parties’ and to external 
supporters that might otherwise defect from voting to avoid the blame of enacting 
electorally costly policies, like measures of welfare state retrenchment are (Jensen & 
Mortensen, 2014). 
H3: Even if in his/her investiture or confidence speech the PM expresses negative 
(positive) attitudes toward welfare state expansion, he/she is expected to be less able 
to cut (increase) social expenditure in case of minority government.  
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Finally, it has been argued that the governmental ability to shape public policies according 
to its preferences is crucially affected by the degree of conflict among the governing 
parties and by the ideological distance between the current and the previous governments 
(Tsebelis, 2002). If the impact of governing parties’ heterogeneity on the executive’s policy 
making power seems straightforward, the role played by the ideological distance between 
the current and the previous governments deserves more attention. 
Indeed, governments’ alternation crucially affects the position of the status quo and the 
perception of its stability (Zucchini, 2011a). In particular, when alternation is a rare feature 
of the party system, the status quo in different policy areas is less likely to be between the 
government and the opposition. Vice-versa, it is expected to be within the present 
government’s range or, at the most, marginally on its left or right. The status quo, indeed, 
mostly coincides with the policy outcome of the previous government, which in the 
absence of alternation is ideologically very similar to the current one. 
Things change when the alternation becomes a stable feature of the party system. In this 
case, indeed, the policy outcomes of the previous government (i.e. the status quo) are more 
likely to be outside the government’s range, between the actual government and the 
opposition. This is relevant for the present study because, if the status quo concerning 
social policies is far from the ideal outcome of the whole governing coalition, the PM’s 
ability to shape social expenditure according to the content of the coalition agreement is 
expected to be strengthened. 
H4: PM’s ability to cut (increase) social expenditure according to the negative 
(positive) attitudes toward welfare state expansion expressed in his/her investiture 
or confidence speech is expected to increase as the alternation between his/her cabinet 
and the previous one increases. 
 
5.1.2  Going beyond the assumption of political parties as unitary actors 
Once discussed the first shortcoming affecting the research on governments’ preferences 
and actual policy outcomes at the empirical level (i.e. the ways in which governments’ 
positions use to be operationalized), I move to the second limitation, which undermines 
this field of studies at the theoretical level. 
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All the empirical studies dealing with the linkage between governments’ positions and 
policy outcomes conceive political parties as unitary actors, whose members display 
cohesive behaviors consistent with party preferences. As recently underlined, however, 
this claim is nothing but a fictional representation of reality (Schumacher, 2012; Ceron, 
2013; Marx & Schumacher, 2013; Bevan & Greene, 2015). Parties are complex 
organizations composed by a variety of subgroups (i.e. factions) retaining similar, but non-
identical, preferences (Ceron, 2015). Scholars identified several elements affecting party 
unity, such as the features of the national electoral law (Carey & Shugart; 1995; Shugart, 
2001, 2005; Pasquino, 1972; Cox et al., 1999; Carey, 2007); the effective number of parties 
and their respective polarization (Sartori, 1976); internal electoral rules or modes of party 
organization (Sartori, 1971, 1973; Ceron, 2011); the ways in which resources (Zincone, 
1972) and offices (Zuckerman, 1979; Golden & Chang, 2001; Bettcher, 2005) are 
distributed among party members and the heterogeneity of policy preferences (Reiter, 
2004). 
Among these elements, this chapter draws attention on the last one, namely the 
heterogeneity of policy preferences inside a political party. Bernauer and Braüninger 
(2009) analyzed parliamentary speeches released in the 15th German Bundestag showing 
that “factionalism manifests itself in observable intra-party preference heterogeneity”. In 
another case study concerning factional membership within the Italian Democrats of the 
Left (DS), Giannetti and Laver (2009) highlighted how divergent factional preferences 
alter the degree of party unity and explain variation in MPs’ voting behavior.  
Building on this research, I argue that the more heterogeneous the major party of the 
governing coalition is in terms of preferences concerning welfare state expansion, the less 
effective the PM will be in implementing the coalition agreement. In this case, indeed, the 
number of potential veto players with which the PM is forced to compromise is expected 
to increase, including both the governing parties and the polarized factions inside the 
major party of the executive coalition. 
H5: Heterogeneous intra-party preferences on welfare state expansion in the major 
party of the governing coalition are expected to decrease PM’s ability to shape social 
expenditure according to the attitudes toward welfare state expansion expressed in 
his/her investiture or confidence speech (Cfr. H1). 
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5.2 Research design 
This section describes the dataset (Cfr. Section 5.2.1) on which hypotheses H1 to H5 will 
be tested. In particular, it deals with the operationalization of the dependent (Cfr. Section 
5.2.2) and independent variables of interest, namely PMs’ and coalescing parties’ positions 
on welfare state expansion (Cfr. Section 5.2.3) and the factional preferences on the same 
topic inside the major party of the governing coalition (Cfr. Section 5.2.4). Finally, it 
briefly discusses controls variables (Cfr. section 5.2.5). 
 
5.2.1 Data and case selection 
The ideal research design to test the hypotheses listed so far would have involved a large 
N dataset providing information on two issues, namely the annual proportion of public 
expenditure devoted to social policies and political actors’ preferences on welfare state 
expansion in several parliamentary democracies over a consistent period of time. 
Unfortunately, if it is easy to find budgetary data, such a vast archive on political actors’ 
preferences does not yet exist. Indeed, expert surveys and CMP data collect information 
concerning the policy preferences expressed by political parties, but provide only limited 
facts referring to PMs’ investiture and confidence speeches and do not supply any clue 
on party factions.  
In detail, the dataset on governments’ policy preferences built by Laver and Budge (1992) 
and already employed in chapter III (Cfr. Chapter III, Section 3.2 and Appendix Table 
3.1) is not suitable to test hypotheses H1 to H5 for two reasons. As first, I would have still 
lack information on party factions in a comparative perspective to test the main theoretical 
claim (i.e. the need to go beyond the idea of parties as unitary actors). As second, these 
data largely refers to cabinets in office from the aftermath of World War II until the 
Eighties, a period of time that has been defined as the “golden age of welfare state 
expansion”, in which both right-wing and left-wing governments hugely increased social 
expenditure. Unfortunately, the two scholars ceased to code government declarations 
exactly at the beginning of the so-called “silver age of welfare state retrenchment” 
(Pierson, 1994; Taylor-Gooby, 2002, Ferrera, 2008), in which increasing socio-economic 
constraints forced governments to cut welfare provisions, taking ideology-based 
decisions. 
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The information I need could be grasped only through a time-consuming textual analysis 
of both PMs’ investiture and confidence speeches and motions presented by party 
factions on party congresses over a longer period of time, including also the latest three 
decades. Fortunately, there are two available datasets, both referring to the Italian case: 
the first one (i.e. ILSD, 2014) provides data on the positions of Italian PMs and parties 
from 1946 to 2014 (Curini & Martelli, 2009, 2010; Curini, 2011; Curini & Ceron, 2014); 
the second one reports factions’ policy positions inside Italian parties from 1946 to 2010 
(Ceron, 2012). Thanks to these datasets, I have been able to test the five hypotheses on 
the Italian case over 63 years (1946–2009). 
Beside data availability, there are other good reasons to draw attention on the Italian case 
(Curini & Zucchini, 2014). Indeed, the Italian political system experienced relevant 
modification in the government’s agenda-setting power and repeated changes in its 
electoral system during its nearly 70 years of history.  
Concerning the first element, it is possible to distinguish the so-called First Italian 
Republic (1946–1994), which presented the highest rate of cabinet turnover in Western 
Europe (Müller & Strøm, 2000; Curini, 2011) and a lack of substantial alternation 
(Mershon, 1996; Curini & Pinto, 2013), from the so-called Second Italian Republic (1994-
now), in which the government’s informal agenda-setting power (Zucchini, 2011a, b) 
dramatically increased. Starting with the bribe scandals and the reform of the electoral law 
in 1993, indeed, Italy experienced a sudden transition toward a new political system 
(Morlino, 1996). In particular, a new bipolar party system appeared during the 1994 
elections and, two years later, in 1996 national election, the first complete governmental 
alternation in the Italian history took place (see also Newell, 2000).  From then on, the 
center-left and the center-right coalitions have alternated in government and the 
government has dramatically boosted its informal agenda-setting power (Zucchini, 2011a, 
b) through a significant increase in delegations received from Parliament.  
Moving to the second element, the Italian history has also been characterized by various 
electoral systems. In particular, until 1993, elections were held under proportional 
representation with an open list; from 1994 until 2001, elections were held under a mixed 
electoral system, in which 75% of seats were assigned by the “first-past-the-post” system 
(SMPS) and the remaining 25% were allocated using a proportional electoral system with 
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a closed list; finally, beginning with the 2006 general election, seats were allocated 
according to a proportional system with a closed listi. 
Because of this interplay between a changing party-system dynamic that caused a de facto 
increase in the government’s agenda-setting power and a varying electoral system, Italy 
appears a fruitful case-study to test the five hypotheses. Finally, this single-country analysis 
allows to control for any idiosyncratic country factors referring to the institutional setting. 
 
5.2.2 Measuring public expenditure in social services in Italy from 1946 to 2009 
This analysis relies on budgetary data on public spending classified by function from 1946 
to 2009 in Italy. These data have been elaborated and published by the State General 
Accounting Department in the year 2011 applying the harmonized COFOG classification 
scheme to the Italian budgetary laws (Ragioneria Generale dello Stato, 2011). 
As highlighted by the publication itself, Italian public expenditure as percentage over 
GDP is comparable in levels and historical trend to those of other European countries, 
namely France and Great Britain. However, it displays significant peculiarities in terms of 
composition. In particular, Italy seems to be characterized by a significantly higher 
incidence of public expenditure devoted to retirement plans, social security and public 
health. Moreover, public expenditure in these functions acquired increasing importance 
after World War II, when it gradually moved from representing less than 1% point of the 
total public expenditure to the 30% in the last 1980s (n.b. from 1946 to 2009, Italy devoted 
to social expenditure a mean of 15% of the total public expenditure, Cfr. Figure 5.1). 
Constrained by periodic economic crises, the Italian executives repeatedly tried to cut it, 
obtaining heterogeneous results (Ragioneria Generale dello Stato, 2011). 
This analysis focuses on the proportion of public expenditure devoted each year from 
1946 to 2009 by the Italian executives to social services (i.e. to retirement plans, social 
security and public health) for the following reasons. As already explained, indeed, this is 
the most investigated budgetary dimension by the studies on the relationship between 
governments’ partisanship and policy outcomes (Cfr. Chapter I, Section 1.4.1 and Chapter 
IV, Section 4.2.1). Moreover, the role of the State in providing social services proved to 
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be the most debated topic during PMs’ investiture and confidence speeches together with 
defense (Curini, 2011).  
 
Time series data on public expenditure may pose unit root concerns. I performed the 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller unit-root test including the constant and one lagged value in 
the regression. At 90% confidence interval, the test rejected the null hypothesis that the 
variable contains a unit root, suggesting that it has been generated by a stationary process 
(MacKinnon approximate p-value for Z(t) = 0.0676). In addition, I tested it again using 
the Phillips-Perron test, which uses Newey-West standard errors to account for serial 
correlation. Again, the null hypothesis according to which the variable contains a unit root 
could be rejected at 95% confidence interval (MacKinnon approximate p-value for Z(t) 
= 0.0553). These tests made me quite confident that the dependent variable does not 
contain a unit root and allowed to keep it in levels into the estimation equation. This is 
quite a good result because, if the dependent variable had had a unit root, I would have 
been forced to differentiate it, losing at least one observation. Anyway, for additional 
precaution, I controlled for the lagged values of the dependent variable in levels and I 
differentiated once the two control variables presenting potential risk of co-integration 
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(i.e. the employment rate and the proportion of population ageing more than 65 years old, 
cfr. Section 5.2.5). 
 
5.2.3  Measuring PM’s and governing parties’ preferences on welfare state expansion 
In section 5.1.1, I claimed that the PM’s investiture and confidence speeches represent 
the best proxies of the compromises the coalescing parties have reached on several issues, 
among those, social expenditure. Accordingly, if these speeches contain negative 
(positive) attitudes toward welfare state expansion, a cut (increase) in social expenditure 
should be expected (Cfr. H1). Hypothesis H2 added that the seat weighted mean of 
governing parties’ positions on welfare state expansions as expressed by MPs during 
legislative speeches does not necessarily correspond to the coalition agreement on the 
same topic. Therefore, a weakly positive correlation between the seat weighted mean of 
governing parties’ positions and the one expressed by the PM on welfare state expansion 
should be expected. For the same reason, the seat weighted mean of governing parties’ 
positions on welfare state expansion should be less related to social expenditure than the 
PM’s one. 
The empirical test of these two hypotheses is made possible thanks to the Italian 
Legislative Speeches Dataset (ILSD, 2014), which provides information about the 
positions of Italian PMs and parties from 1946 to 2014 (Curini & Martelli, 2009, 2010; 
Curini, 2011; Curini & Ceron, 2014). These dataset is based on a manual codification of 
all the investiture and confidence debates of the Italian governments. For each debate, 
the authors selected and codified the speeches released by the party leader (or by a relevant 
representative) plus the PM’s programmatic speech. Following the well-known CMP 
methods (Budge et al., 2001), in each legislative speech the authors identified the number 
of quasi-sentences and assigned each of them to a number of pre-established categories 
that form the classification scheme. To take into account the Italian political context, the 
original 56 categories of the CMP dataset have been increased to 68. The dataset contains 
the percentage of the total text of legislative speech that deals with these categories. 
Similarly to what has been done in the previous chapters, the executive’s position on 
welfare state expansion as expressed in PM’s investiture or confidence speech in the year 
t has been estimated as follows: 
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(Pro-market polarityt – Pro-State polarityt) 
________________________________________ 
∑ni=1 (Pro-marketit + Pro-State polarityit)*sit /100 
where sit is governing party i’s share of seats in the lower house. The summation is over 
the number of parties within each governing coalition (n). Finally, since the dependent 
variable (i.e. public expenditure in social services as a proportion over the total amount 
of public spending), is early based while PMs’ investiture and confidence speeches are 
not, I attributed to each annual observation the position on welfare state expansion of the 
PM’s which adopted the corresponding budgetary law. For example, the position 
expressed by Bettino Craxi in his fist investiture speech held in August 1983 has been 
attributed to the years 1984, 1985 and 1986 because his government was responsible for 
the budgetary laws determining social expenditure in those years. Unfortunately, 
information concerning the day in which each budgetary law has been approved are 
available only from 1978 until today. It means that, from 1946 to 1977, it is impossible to 
attribute each budgetary law to a single cabinet if there have been more than one 
government per year. In these cases, I computed the mean of the positions on welfare 
state expansion expressed by all the PMs in office in the same year, weighting them by 
the number of days in office.  
I used exactly the same formula to estimate each governing party position on welfare state 
expansion and then I computed their weighted mean, obtaining the seat weighted mean 
of governing parties’ positions needed to test H2. As for PMs’ positions, I attributed to 
each annual observation the position of the governing coalition that adopted the 
corresponding budgetary law. As before, for the years 1946 to 1977, I computed the mean 
of the positions on welfare state expansion expressed by all the governing coalitions in 
office in the same year, weighting them by the number of days in office.  
To test whether the executive’s ability to shape social expenditure according to the 
content of the coalition agreement is affected by the parliamentary majority enjoyed by 
the governing coalition (Cfr. H3), I generated a dummy variable called Minority government. 
It is equal to 1 if the government responsible for the adoption of the budgetary law in the 
year t does not possess the majority of the overall seats in the lower house, 0 otherwise. 
Again, since it is impossible to attribute each budgetary law to a single cabinet from the 
year 1946 to the year 1977, in this period of time the dummy variable Minority government 
PMt = 
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is equal to 1 if the government which has been in power for the longest amount of days 
in that year has been a minority one, 0 otherwise. 
Finally, to verify whether the executive’s ability to cut (increase) social expenditure 
according to the negative (positive) attitudes toward welfare state expansion expressed in 
PM’s investiture or confidence speech increases as the ideological distance between the 
actual and the previous cabinet enlarges (Cfr. H4), I measured governmental alternation 
as the absolute difference between the seat weighted mean of governing parties’ position 
in the year t and the same variable in the year t-1. 
 
5.2.4  Measuring intra-party preferences on welfare state expansion 
In section 5.1.2, I claimed that the executive’s ability to shape social expenditure according 
to the content of the coalition agreement could be weakened, if not totally vanished, by 
the presence of heterogeneous intra-party preferences on welfare state expansion in the 
major party of the governing coalition. Indeed, I hypothesized, that in this case the PM 
would be forced to compromise not only with the political parties in his/her coalition, 
but also with such polarized factions (Cfr. H5). 
To test this claim, I need to assess political parties’ internal degree of polarization on 
welfare state expansion, evaluating the different policy positions expressed by rival intra-
party factions on this topic. Several techniques are available to achieve this goal (Giannetti 
& Benoit, 2009). 
Some authors (e.g., Spirling & Quinn, 2010) estimated factional preferences through roll 
call votes (RCVs). However, this technique seems not to fit the purpose of the present 
study because, by scaling RCVs, I would obtain a description of the “revealed behavioral 
space” (Hix & Jun, 2009) and a measure of actual ex-post behaviors, while I am interested 
in ex-ante ideological preferences. In addition, data concerning roll call votes in the Italian 
parliament are available only since 1988, after the removal of the secret ballot. 
Alternatively, factional preferences can be evaluated by analyzing parliamentary speeches 
(Bäck et al., 2011; Proksch & Slapin, 2010). However, this approach could be 
problematical as well. Indeed, looking at legislative debates as interplays between party 
leaders and backbenchers, parliamentary speeches may misrepresent ideological 
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heterogeneity within the party. In fact, legislative speeches delivered publicly are easy to 
observe and are likely to be affected by the party whip (Proksch & Slapin, 2012; Herzog 
& Benoit, 2015). 
Taking into account these concerns, I propose an index of intra-party divisiveness on 
welfare state expansion grounded on the content analysis of the motions drafted by each 
party faction on party congresses. This kind of texts, indeed, have been defined as “the 
best choice to identify <intra party groups’> respective preferences” (Benoit et al., 2009) 
because they are supposed to be exogenous to legislative behavior and unaffected by 
leaders’ control. Moreover, congress motions seem fruitful documents to estimate 
factional preferences because factions are almost completely free to express their views 
about the party platform given that, during internal debates, party discipline should play 
only a limited role (Ceron, 2015).  
In particular, I gathered 57 motions presented by factions during 12 contested party 
congresses held by the Italian governing parties from 1946 to 2009. These 57 motions 
have been coded manually, following the well-known CMP method (Budge et al., 2001)ii. 
The party congress is an assembly of delegates elected by party members. It is the arena 
where “factions organize teams of candidates and appeal to people enjoying the right to 
vote for one team or another” (Mershon, 2001). Factions usually compete for members’ 
votes, presenting a policy motion attached to a list of candidates. The congress motion is 
an omnibus policy document that aims to shape party strategy and ideology, setting out 
the factions’ “opposing views on the ideological direction of the party” (Giannetti & 
Laver, 2009). After a public debate, party congress delegates vote on the policy principals 
and establish the new party line that the leadership should pursue (Levy, 2004). Delegates 
elect the party body (i.e. a committee in charge of running the party until the next 
congress) and, directly or indirectly, the party leader. In that sense, party congresses 
provide “hard data” about the party’s factional structure (Giannetti & Laver, 2009), 
helping to determine the number and strength of each faction (Boucek, 2009), as well as 
their policy positions. 
As first, I assessed the position of each faction (i) on welfare state expansion in each 
congress (t) according to the following formulaiii: 
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(Pro-market polarityit – Pro-State polarityit) 
________________________________________ 
∑ni=1 (Pro-marketit + Pro-State polarityit)*sit /100 
where Fit is faction i’s policy position in the congress t and sit is faction i’s share of seats 
in the party body. The summation is over the number of factions within each congress 
(n). These measures proved to be positively correlated with the scores totalized by the 
same motions on the latent scale proposed by the device of quantitative text analysis 
Wordfish (i.e., 0.55 at 99% confidence interval)iv. 
Then, I built the index of intra-party divisiveness on welfare state expansion (IPD) in each 
congress (t), adapting the concept of “ideological standard deviation” (Warwick, 1992) to 
intra-party politics (Ceron, 2015).  
IPDt = √∑
n
i=1 sit (Position of factionit - WFPt)
2 
where WFP is the weighted mean of faction positions in the congress t. Of course, in case 
of non-contested party congresses (i.e., the ones in which only a single motion is 
discussed, without any rival position), the index of IPD on welfare state expansion is 
supposed to be 0. Finally, since the dependent variable is early based while parties’ 
congress do not take place every year, I attributed to each annual observation the index 
of IPD totalized by the major party of the governing coalition in its nearest congress in 
time. On average, the time gap between the observed party congress and the nearest PM’s 
investiture or confidence speech lasts nine months. 
 
5.2.5 Control variables 
As already discussed in chapter IV (Cfr. Section 4.1), several scholars proved to be 
skeptical concerning the executives’ ability to shape social policies according to their 
ideological positions. Indeed, they underlined the role played by economic and 
demographic imperatives, together with institutional constraints. This analysis embeds 
these potential limitations as control variables in the model specifications. 
Starting from economic and demographic imperatives, since aggregate spending measures 
concerning social policies tend to increase as answers to increasing societal needs, the 
Fit = 
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annual changes in the employment rate (Broadberry, Giordano & Zollino, 2011) and in 
the proportion of population ageing more than 65 years old (ISTAT, 2013) are added as 
control variables. 
Moving to institutional constraints, I took into account the absolute number of coalescing 
parties in the governing coalition (ILSD, 2014) and the absolute number of factions in 
the mayor party in each governing coalition (Ceron, 2012). As for PMs’ and governing 
parties’ positions on welfare state expansion, for the years 1946 to 1977, I computed the 
mean of the absolute number of parties in all the governing coalitions in office in the 
same year, weighting them by the number of days in office. The same procedure has been 
followed to compute the absolute number of factions inside the major party of all the 
governing coalition in office in the same year. 
Moreover, I estimated an index of Intra Government Divisiveness (IGD) similar to the 
index of IPD previously described (Cfr. Section 5.2.4): 
IGDt = √∑
n
i=1 sit (Position of partyit - WPPt)
2 
where WPP is the weighted mean of coalescing parties’ positions in the year t. The 
summation is over the number of parties within each government (n). Since our 
dependent variable is early based, I attributed to each annual observation the index of 
IGD of the governing coalition that voted the corresponding budgetary law. As before, 
from 1946 to 1977, I computed the mean of the indexes of IGD on welfare state 
expansion of all the governing coalitions in office in the same year, weighting them by the 
number of days in office. 
Appendix Table 5.1 lists all the variables employed in this analysis and provides 
descriptive statistics. 
 
5.3 Results 
The dependent variable, public expenditure in social policies, is expressed as a proportion 
over the total amount of public expenditure whose values are bounded by 0 and 1. 
Consequently, the assumptions required by the ordinary least squares (OLS) estimator 
may not hold due to heteroscedasticity and/or non-normal distribution of the errors 
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(Wooldridge, 2002). Moreover, adopting the OLS estimator, the predicted values may fall 
outside the unit interval. Therefore, taking into account the nature of the dependent 
variable, I decided to adopt a fractional logit model, which is a generalized linear model 
(GLM) with a binomial distribution and a logit link function (Papke & Wooldridge, 
1996)v. To test the hypotheses formulated in section 5.1, I estimated five different model 
specifications (Cfr. Table 5.1). 
Table 5.1: PM’s ability to shape social expenditure according to the content of the coalition 
agreement 
 M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 
Yt-1 4.954*** 5.433*** 5.639*** 4.363*** 3.863*** 
 (0.686) (0.553) (-0.588) (0.786) (0.795) 
PM’s position -0.196* -0.155** -0.009† -0.235** -0.219* 
 (0.092) (0.055) (0.054) (0.074) (0.096) 
Governing parties’ position 0.159     
 (0.139)     
Minority government  0.001    
  (0.048)    
PM’s position*Minority gov.  0.226*    
  (0.088)    
Alternation   0.09   
   (0.092)   
PM’s position*Alternation   -0.518*   
   (0.202)   
Intra-party divisiveness    0.051* 0.045 
    (0.026) (0.038) 
PM’s position*Intra-party div.    0.106* 0.123* 
    (0.045) (0.057) 
Abs. number of factions     0.028* 
     (0.012) 
Abs. number of gov. parties     0.049* 
     (0.022) 
Intra government divisiveness 0.114 -0.026 -0.0534 -0.004 -0.2 
 (0.107) (0.098) (-0.066) (0.089) (0.124) 
∆ Employment rate 0.033 0.025 0.021 0.05 0 
 (0.061) (0.063) (0.063) (0.066) (0.053) 
∆ Population over 65 0.273 0.214 0.194 0.227 0.163 
 (0.265) (0.244) (0.222) (0.249) (0.220) 
Constant -2.545*** -2.571*** -2.643*** -2.492*** -2.591*** 
 (0.099) (0.089) (0.093) (0.088) (0.085) 
Log Pseudolikelihood  -19.026 -19.027 -19.027 -19.018 -19.005 
N 62 62 62 62 62 
Notes: The models are fractional logistic regressions. Robust standard errors in parentheses.  
† p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
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The empirical analysis provides strong evidence for the executives’ ability to shape social 
expenditure according to the content of the coalition agreements. Indeed, declared 
cabinet position on welfare state expansion as expressed in PM’s investiture and 
confidence speech is rightly signed and statistically significant across all the models, even 
after the inclusion of several interaction and control variables. These results mean that if 
PM’s position on welfare state expansion moves one point to the right (i.e. if he/she 
declares to support the limitation of the role of the state in the national economy in 
his/her investiture or confidence speech), the executive is expected to cut the amount of 
public expenditure devoted to social policies. These findings strongly support H1, 
according to which the PM’s position on welfare state expansion is expected to translate 
into consistent budgetary decisions because his/her investiture or confidence speech 
represents the compromise on which all the coalescing parties have agreed.  
Once provided support for H1, further questions arise. To what extent does the position 
on welfare state expansion expressed by the PM in his/her investiture or confidence 
speech resemble the weighted mean position of governing parties on the same issue? 
Moreover, do these two measures of government position have the same impact on social 
expenditure? 
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To answer these questions, I firstly estimated the pairwise correlation coefficient between 
these measures (Cfr. Figure 5.2). PMs’ positions on welfare state expansion, as expressed 
in the investiture or confidence speeches pronounced from 1946 to 2013, proved to be 
positively correlated with the weighted mean positions of the parties involved in their 
coalitions (i.e. 0.436 at 99% confidence interval). 
This coefficient, however, suggests that PMs’ and governing parties’ positions on welfare 
state expansion, even if similar, do not describe exactly the same phenomenon, giving us 
a reason to test if they are equally responsible for social expenditure decision making (Cfr. 
model M1 in Table 5.1 and models M1b and M1c in Appendix Table 5.2). M1 regresses the 
percentage of public expenditure devoted to social policies on its lagged value, 
government’s position operationalized as PM’s social policy preferences and as the 
weighted mean of coalescing parties' positions on the same topic, socio-economic 
controls and the index of IGD. This model demonstrates that the attitudes toward welfare 
state expansion expressed by the PM in his/her speech are able to consistently affect 
social expenditure even controlling for governing parties’ ones. Vice-versa, this second 
measure of government’s position fails to reach statistical significancevi. Accordingly, it is 
possible to confirm H2: the seat weighted mean of governing parties’ positions on welfare 
state expansion does not necessarily correspond to the PM’s position on the same issue, 
representing the compromise the coalescing parties have reached. For this reason, PM’s 
position on welfare state expansion proves to be a better determinant of social 
expenditure than governing parties’ one.  
However, PM’s ability to shape social expenditure according to the content of the 
coalition agreement is affected by external political constraints. M2 adds to the baseline 
specification (Cfr. M1b in Appendix Table 5.2) a dummy variable equal to 1 if the 
government responsible for the adoption of the budgetary law in that year did not enjoy 
the majority of the overall seats in the lower house and then interacts this dummy variable 
with the PM’s position on welfare state expansion.  
Figure 5.3, based on M2, plots the effect of PM’s position on welfare state expansion when 
his cabinet is supported by the overall majority of the MPs in the lower chamber or not. 
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Results support H3: even if the PM expresses negative attitudes toward welfare state 
expansion in his investiture or confidence speech, he/she will not be able to cut social 
expenditure if his/her government is a minority one. In this situation, indeed, he/she is 
more likely to be forced to offer policy concessions as inducements both to governing 
parties’ and to external supporters that might otherwise defect from voting electorally 
costly policies, like measures of welfare state retrenchment (Jensen & Mortensen, 2014). 
M3 adds to the baseline specification (Cfr. M1b in Appendix Table 5.2) a measure of 
governmental alternation and then interacts this variable with the PM’s position on 
welfare state expansion. Results are graphically displayed in Figure 5.4.  
As expected, PM’s ability to shape social expenditure according to the attitudes toward 
welfare state expansion expressed in his/her speech increases when the ideological divide 
between his/her governing coalition and the previous one deepens (Cfr. H4). In particular, 
a PM willing to reduce welfare state provisions is expected to increasingly cut social 
expenditure as the alternation between his government and the previous one increases. 
Finally, M4 and M5 shift the attention from party-politics to intra-party politics, adding to 
the baseline specification (Cfr. M1b in Appendix Table 5.2) the index of IPD (Cfr. section 
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3.4) and then interacting it with the PM’s position on welfare state expansion. Moreover, 
M5 controls for the absolute number of parties in the governing coalition and for the 
absolute number of factions in the major party of the same coalition (Cfr. section 5.2.5). 
 
Figure 5.5, based on M4, plots the average marginal effect of PM’s position on welfare 
state expansion on social expenditure as the index of IPD increases from 0 to 4. Results 
show that PM’s willingness to shape social expenditure is strongly affected by the level of 
internal divisiveness in the major party of his coalition. 
In particular, when the index of IPD becomes higher than 1, PM’s decision making power 
turns to statistical insignificance. These results hold even controlling for the absolute 
number of coalescing parties and for the absolute number of factions in the major party 
of the governing coalition (Cfr. M5). Therefore, the last hypothesis is confirmed: the more 
heterogeneous intra-party preferences on welfare state expansion are in the major party 
of the governing coalition, the less the PM will be able to shape social expenditure 
according to the content of the coalition agreement because he/she is more likely to be 
forced to compromise (Cfr. H5). 
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Moreover, the additional control variables embedded in M5 suggest that when the absolute 
number of stakeholders that has to agree to cut social expenditure increases (i.e. when the 
absolute numbers of coalescing parties and factions increase by 1 unit), welfare state 
retrenchment becomes more difficult to implement. 
 
5.4 Conclusion and discussion  
As the previous one (Cfr. Chapter IV), chapter V deals with the last link of the chain of 
responsiveness to assess whether and to what extent executives are able to shape social 
policy outcomes according to their will (Cfr. Chapter I, Figure 1.5). Indeed, it focuses on 
the Italian case from 1946 to 2009 to address the two major shortcomings that, according 
to me, affect the research on policy congruence: namely, the ways in which governments’ 
policy positions use to be operationalized and the so far uncontested idea of parties as 
unitary actors. 
In detail, the analysis here performed estimates the Italian executives’ ability to shape 
social expenditure according to the policy preferences on welfare state expansion 
expressed by PMs in their investiture and confidence speeches. Moreover, it takes into 
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account both party and intra-party politics, assessing the conditional roles played by the 
parliamentary majority the governing coalition enjoys in the lower chamber, the 
ideological alternation between subsequent governments and, more interestingly, the 
heterogeneity of policy preferences among factions inside the major party of the 
governing coalition. 
Results provide strong evidences for the five research hypotheses listed in section 5.1. As 
first, the pairwise correlation between PMs’ positions on welfare state expansion and the 
seat weighted means of the coalescing parties’ positions on the same issue proves to be 
weekly positive, suggesting that these two data sources do not describe exactly the same 
phenomenon. In particular, PM’s social policy preferences demonstrate to be strong 
determinants of budgetary decisions, confirming once again that the last link of the chain 
of responsiveness (Cfr. Chapter I, Figure 1.5) holds. This pattern, however, is not 
confirmed using the seat weighted positions of the coalescing parties on the same issue. I 
explain this difference claiming that PMs’ investiture and confidence speeches directly 
represent the compromises on which the coalescing parties have agreed. 
As second, results show that PM’s ability to shape social expenditure according to the 
content of the coalition agreement is affected by external political constraints. In 
particular, the ability of Italian executives to shape social expenditure according to their 
will is strongly weakened, if not completely erased, in case of minority government. In 
this case, indeed, the PM is more likely to be forced to offer policy concessions as 
inducements both to governing parties’ and to external supporters that might otherwise 
defect from voting measures of welfare state retrenchment. Vice-versa, the executives’ 
ability to shape social expenditure increases when the ideological divide between the actual 
and the previous government deepens.  
Finally, shifting the attention from party-politics to intra-party politics, findings point out 
how the cabinet’s willingness to shape social expenditure is strongly affected by the level 
of internal divisiveness in the major party of the governing coalition. In particular, this 
study proves that higher levels of IPD make the cabinet’s decision-making power 
statistically insignificant. 
In conclusion, the cabinet is able to shape social expenditure according to the policy 
preferences expressed in PM’s investiture or confidence speech, but this ability could be 
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strongly affected by party and, most of all, intra-party politics. The more polarized the 
major party in the governing coalition is, the less likely is the executive to be able to 
implement the content of the coalition agreement. 
Even if significant, these results leave unanswered an important question. Is the PM’s 
investiture or confidence speech strongly related to policy outcomes because it is the most 
suitable proxy of the coalition agreement the governing parties have reached, as 
hypothesized in chapter III and in this chapter, or because it embeds also the charismatic 
power the PM exercises as a leader?  
Indeed, the Weberian ideal-type of cabinet government in parliamentary democracies 
prescribes that all ministers should be equal colleagues, collectively responsible of their 
decisions in front of the parliament (Andeweg & Thomassen, 2010; Kooiman & Van Vliet 
1993, Rhodes 2000: 26; Tsebelis 2002). However, there are many formal and informal 
factors able to make governments to deviate from this ideal-type. Among these factors, 
the special position occupied by the PM immediately comes to mind. 
According to the Italian Constitution, “the Government of the Republic is made up of 
the President of the Council and the Ministers who together form the Council of 
Ministers” (Article 92) and “the Ministers are collectively responsible for the acts of the 
Council of Ministers” (Article 95). However, the same formal provisions set for the PM 
a leading role in the cabinet. In particular, he/she nominates a list of ministers to be 
appointed by the President of the Republic (Article 92) and, most notably, he/she holds 
responsibility for the general policy of the Government. According to the Article 95, 
indeed, “the President of the Council ensures the coherence of political and administrative 
policies by promoting and coordinating the activity of the Ministers”. 
This PM’s leading power has been used to a quite variable extent during the Italian history, 
according to individual ministers’ and coalescing parties’ political strength. For example, 
the PM’s lack of formal authority to fire ministers has been substituted by the practice of 
cabinet reshuffles and by individual vote of no confidence by the Parliament. Moreover, 
from the Nineties, the custom to add the leader’s name on the party’s or on the coalition’s 
symbols at the election time has increased the likelihood for these leaders to be nominated 
by the President of the Republic as the appointed PM during consultations. Finally, the 
process of presidentialization, widely applied to the premierships of Tony Blair and 
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Margaret Thatcher in United Kingdom (Foley, 2000) emphasized the role played by 
individual leadership, personal communications and presentational style, factors which 
might provide powerful PMs, assisted by favorable political conditions, with the means 
to be “first among less equals”. By now, I have not been able to disentangle the role played 
by such individual factors, but I keep them in mind for future developments of the present 
research.  
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Appendix 
Appendix Table 5.1: Descriptive statistics 
Variable Operationalization Souces Obs. Mean Std d. Min. Max. 
Social 
expenditure 
Public expenditure in social 
services as % over public 
expenditure.  
Rag. Gen. 
d. Stato, 
2011. 
62 0.159 0.040 0.089 0.291 
PM’s position Difference between pro-
market and pro-state quasi-
sentences in PM’s investiture 
or confidence speech (Cfr. 
Section 5.2.3)   
ILSD, 
2014. 
62 -0.085 0.390 -0.944 1.134 
Governing 
parties’ 
position 
Difference between pro-
market and pro-state quasi-
sentences in governing parties 
answers to PM’s investiture or 
confidence speech (Cfr. 
Section 5.2.3) 
ILSD, 
2014. 
62 -0.139 0.313 -0.691 0.569 
Minority 
government 
Dummy variable equal to 1 if 
the executive responsible for 
the budgetary law in year t is a 
minority one (Cfr. Section 
5.2.3). 
ILSD, 
2014. 
62 0.203 0.405 0 1 
Alternation Absolute difference between 
the seats weighted mean of 
governing parties' position in 
the year t and the same 
variable in the year t-1. 
ILSD, 
2014. 
62 0.203 0.221 0 0.998 
Intra-party 
divisiveness 
Cfr. Section 5.2.4. Ceron, 
2012. 
62 1.763 1.367 0 3.694 
Abs. number 
of factions 
# of factions in the nearest 
congress of the major party in 
the governing coalition (Cfr. 
Section 5.2.5). 
Ceron, 
2012. 
62 2.864 2.350 0 7 
Abs. number 
of gov. parties 
# of parties in the governing 
coalition  (Cfr. Section 5.2.5). 
ILSD, 
2014. 
62 3.625 1.768 0 8 
Intra 
government 
divisiveness 
Cfr. Section 5.2.5. ILSD, 
2014. 
62 0.316 0.225 0 0.828 
∆ Empl. rate  Annual change in the 
proportion of working-age 
population (from 15 to 64 
years old) that is employed. 
Broadber
ry et al., 
2011. 
62 -0.055 0.462 -1.115 0.788 
∆ Population 
over 65 
Annual change in the 
proportion of population that 
is more than 65 years old. 
ISTAT, 
2013. 
62 0.2 0.126 -0.200 0.400 
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Appendix Table 5.2: Comparison between PM’s and governing parties abilities to affect social 
expenditure 
 M1b M1c 
Yt-1 5.375*** 5.132*** 
 (0.539) (0.678) 
PM’s position -0.122*  
 (0.519)  
Governing parties’ position -0.001 
  (-0.095) 
Oversized government   
   
PM’s position*Oversized gov. 
   
Intra-party divisiveness  
   
PM’s position*Intra-party div. 
   
Intra government divisiveness 0.03 -0.001 
 (0.081) (-0.095) 
∆ Employment rate 0.025 0.028 
 (0.062) (0.063) 
∆ Population over 65 0.2 0.136 
 (0.247) (0.261) 
Constant -2.585*** -2.512*** 
 (0.091) (0.105) 
Log Pseudolikelihood  -19.03 -19.039 
N 62 62 
Notes: The models are fractional logistic regressions. Robust standard errors in parentheses.  
† p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
 
i In 2015, Italy changed once again its electoral law. In detail, Law 6 May 2015 n. 52, 
colloquially known as “Italicum”, provides for a two-round system based on party-list 
proportional representation, corrected by a majority bonus and a 3% election threshold. 
Candidates run for election in 100 multi-member constituencies with open lists, except 
for a single candidate chosen by each party who is the first to be elected. However, this 
last electoral reform is not taken into account in the present analysis because the dataset 
here employed ends in 2009. 
ii Data available upon request.  
iii Detailed information on the dimensions used to compute Pro-market and Pro-State 
polarities are provided in Martelli & Curini, 2009; Curini, 2010.  
iv Data available upon request. 
v To check the robustness of  our results, I re-estimated all the models reported in Table 
5.1 and in Appendix Table 5.2 adopting the standard OLS estimator. Results hold and are 
available upon request. 
vi M1b and M1c reported in Appendix Table 5.2 are baseline models estimated to test the 
robustness of  this first result. M1b operationalizes government position only through 
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PM’s one, while M1c only through the governing parties’ one. As displayed, PM’s position 
on welfare state expansion is a statistically significant determinant of  social expenditure, 
while governing parties’ position on the same issue failed to reach statistical significance 
even alone. 
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Chapter VI 
Conclusion. 
Putting the pieces back together  
 
 
Abstract. This last chapter reviews and discusses the main findings of this dissertation. 
In detail, it underlines how the doomsday scenario according to which democracy at the 
national level has been hollowed out has jet to come. Of course, exogenous socio-
economic processes and the complexities of politics weaken parties’ responsiveness 
toward their voters. However, this dissertation reveals that parties still play a role in 
Western democracies, at least in the social policy domain. Moreover, this chapter has a 
last look on the overall chain of responsiveness, from voters’ preferences directly to 
governmental social policy outcomes, to understand whether citizens’ preferences manage 
to overcome all the obstacles identified in the previous chapters so that they can be 
translated into consistent spending choices. In particular, controlling for a complete set 
of potential external confounders and, more interestingly, for the position of the median 
legislator in Parliament and for that of the ruling coalition, this last chapter demonstrates 
that median voter’s preferences in the year t-1 are related to the change in social 
expenditure in the subsequent year. Finally, to contrast popular frustration with political 
parties, this chapter proposes a learning model of party government, which sees both 
voters and parties as able to alter, respectively, their policy preferences and their electoral 
promises according to the contingent constraints imposed by external reality. 
 
 
6.1 Putting two and two together: the chain of responsiveness holds but “the 
job has become harder” 
This dissertation tried to assess whether and to what extent the normatively informed 
vision of representative democracy discussed in chapter I (Cfr. Chapter I, Sections 1.1, 
1.2 and 1.3) captures the essential relations among voters, political parties, governments 
and social policy outcomes. In particular, it revolved around the following question: do 
political parties perform their expressive and instrumental functions (Cfr. Chapter I, 
Section 1.2), allowing voters’ wants, needs and preferences to be translated into consistent 
governmental choices in the social policy domain, or are they little more than moribund 
anachronisms, now superseded by other linkages between state and society?  
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Providing an answer to this core question is of great importance because, in recent years, 
the notion of representative democracy has come under serious attack both inside and 
outside the academia. Inside the academia, an increasing volume of literature denounces 
that elected politicians are no more able to provide authoritative solutions due to 
increasing globalization and internationalization. Outside the academia, citizens are 
increasingly distrustful toward the political process, with lower levels of electoral 
participation and party membership and a fading sense of identification with traditional 
party families (Cfr. Chapter I, Section 1.4) 
To measure how far actual representative processes are from the normatively informed 
vision of representative democracy, this dissertation focused on social and labor policies. 
Since the 1970s, indeed, these policy areas largely drew the attention of scholars 
concerned with the role of parties in achieving policy congruence because they refer to 
the main cleavage in industrial democracies: the capital-labor conflict. Moreover, in times 
of crises, focusing on social and labor policies, which imply heavy budgetary 
consequences, allows to shed light on the so-called “politics of constrained choice” (Cfr. 
Chapter I, Section 1.4.1). 
Through the chapters of this dissertation, the ideal chain of responsiveness between 
voters’ redistributive preferences and governmental social policy outcomes (Cfr. Figure 
6.1) has been broken down and each linkage has been theoretically and empirically 
analyzed, every time maximizing the number of observations according to the available 
data sources (Cfr. Table 6.1).  
Figure 6.1: Schematic rendering of the ideal chain of responsiveness applied to 
the social policy dimension  
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter II, titled “Labor market risk, redistributive demand and parties’ social policy 
supply. Not all labor market outsiders are created equal”, explored the AB bond between 
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preferences
A
Parties' 
social 
policy 
prefereces
B
Government's 
social policy 
preferences
C
Social 
policy 
outcomes
D
Expressive function of parties Instrumental function of parties 
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citizens’ redistributive preferences and parties’ social policy supply (Cfr. Figure 6.1). In 
particular, it investigated the role played by labor market status in shaping individual social 
policy preferences and political orientations by combining individual level data from the 
European Social Surveys (i.e., the 4th, the 5th and the 6th waves) for 23 OECD countries 
with party level information from the Comparative Manifesto Project Database 
(MARPOR, 2014; cfr. Table 6.1 and Chapter II, Section 2.2). Beside discrete choice 
models, instrumental variables and matching statistical techniques have been employed to 
test the robustness of the main findings (Cfr. Chapter II, Section 2.4).  
Results confirmed that the AB bond of the ideal chain of responsiveness holds. In 
particular, economic conditions experienced by individuals in the labor market strongly 
determine their social policy preferences and their electoral behaviors. Moreover, results 
suggest that future research should overcome the simple notion of dualization of the labor 
market between insiders and outsiders, emphasizing the differences between temporary 
workers and unemployed individuals. Temporary workers, indeed, proved to be clearly 
distinguished from labor market insiders by their stronger support for redistributive 
policies and by their more pro-left and pro-welfare lining political preferences. However, 
they appear to be more integrated in the political process than unemployed individuals 
are. Finally, their stronger support for left and pro-welfare parties seems not to be 
combined with more pronounced non-corporatist attitudes (Cfr. Chapter II, Sections 2.3, 
2.4 and 2.5). 
Once verified that political parties are able to perform their expressive function at the 
election time, chapter III, titled “From parties’ policy supply to declared government 
positions: who affects the coalition agreement on the left-right and on the welfare 
dimensions and why”, shed light on the BC bond of the chain of responsiveness. Indeed, 
it assessed the degree of correspondence between governing parties’ positions, as 
obtained from their electoral manifestos (i.e., the B terminal in Figure 6.1), and declared 
governments’ positions, as derived from their investiture and confidence speeches (i.e., 
the C terminal in Figure 6.1) in 10 West European parliamentary democracies from the 
aftermath of World War II until 2002 (Cfr. Table 6.1). 
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Table 6.1: Country and year coverage by chapter 
 Chapter II Chapter III Chapter IV Chapter V Chapter VI 
Analyzed link 
of the chain of 
responsiveness 
(Cfr. Figure 
6.1) 
AB bond 
between 
voters’ and 
parties’ social 
policy 
preferences 
BC bond 
between 
parties’ and 
governments’ 
social policy 
preferences 
CD bond 
between 
governments 
social policy 
preferences 
and social 
policy 
outcomes 
CD bond 
between 
governments 
social policy 
preferences 
and social 
policy 
outcomes 
AD bond 
between 
voters’ social 
policy 
preferences 
and social 
policy 
outcomes 
# of countries 23 10 19 1 27 
Countries   Australia  Australia 
   Austria  Austria 
 Belgium Belgium Belgium  Belgium 
   Canada  Canada 
 Czech 
Republic 
   Czech 
Republic 
 Denmark Denmark Denmark  Denmark 
 Estonia    Estonia 
 Finland  Finland  Finland 
 France France France  France 
 Germany Germany Germany  Germany 
 Greece  Greece  Greece 
 Hungary    Hungary 
 Iceland    Iceland 
 Ireland Ireland Ireland  Ireland 
 Italy Italy Italy Italy Italy 
   Japan  Japan 
  Luxembourg   Luxembourg 
 Netherlands Netherlands Netherlands  Netherlands 
 Norway Norway Norway  Norway 
 Poland    Poland 
 Portugal  Portugal  Portugal 
 Slovakia    Slovakia 
 Slovenia    Slovenia 
 Spain  Spain  Spain 
 Sweden Sweden Sweden  Sweden 
 Switzerland  Switzerland  Switzerland 
 Turkey     
 United 
Kingdom 
 United 
Kingdom 
 United 
Kingdom 
Years 2008-2012 1945-2002 1985-2011 1946-2009 1985-2011 
Technique Logit models 
CEM 
Instrumental 
variables 
PCSE PCSE 
ECM 
Fractional 
logit 
PCSE 
Mediation 
analysis 
 
 
In detail, it investigated several hypotheses (Cfr. Chapter III, Section 3.1, Table 3.1) on 
the main determinants of the positions adopted by coalition governments on two separate 
dimensions: the traditionally employed ideological left-right scale and a more genuinely 
policy-based welfare scale. The most important finding of chapter III is that there is a 
connection between the weighted mean positions of cabinet parties as obtained from their 
electoral manifestos (i.e., the B terminal in Figure 6.1) and declared cabinets’ policy stances 
(i.e., the C terminal in Figure 6.1) both on the left-right and on the welfare dimensions. 
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However, the magnitude of this relationship is far from the one-to-one correspondence 
needed to affirm that the proportional criterion at the basis of the Gamson’s rule (1961) 
applies to policy payoffs as well as to portfolio allocations. 
Indeed, the comparison between the ideological left-right dimension and the policy based 
welfare dimension suggested that there are other political actors and external forces able 
to affect declared cabinets’ positions. Notably, such political actors and external forces do 
not behave in the same way on the left-right and on the welfare dimensions (Cfr. Chapter 
III, Sections 3.3 and 3.4), suggesting that Lowi’s motto according to which “Policies 
determine politics” is not far from the truth (1972). 
In particular, on the left-right scale, declared cabinet position is driven by the weighted 
mean position of cabinet parties and by the position of the formateur party. Conversely, 
on the welfare scale, declared cabinet position is also affected by the position of the 
parliamentary median party and by those expressed by the parties holding the labor and 
social affairs portfolios (Cfr. Chapter III, Sections 3.3 and 3.4). This finding has been 
explained by the distributive and redistributive nature of the programs included in the 
welfare dimension, which need an higher engagement of parliamentary parties and of the 
labor and social affairs ministers in decision-making processes because they usually see 
economic resources to be provided to specific societal segments. In addition, declared 
cabinet position on the welfare dimension shows a marked tendency to drift rightward 
with adverse economic conditions. These results proved once again that the genuinely 
policy based nature of the welfare dimension allows capturing the effect of adverse 
economic conditions on declared cabinet positions better than the ideological nature of 
the left-right dimension does (Cfr. Chapter III, Sections 3.3 and 3.4). 
Once stated that the weighted mean positions of coalescing parties consistently affect 
declared cabinets’ positions, chapter IV, titled “Partisan influence on social and labor 
policies: Do parties matter?”, moved to the last link of the chain of responsiveness: the 
CD bond between governments’ social policy preferences and actual social policy 
outcomes (Cfr. Figure 6.1).  
The ideal research design to test the robustness of this last link of the chain of 
responsiveness would have implied a systematic comparison between declared 
governments’ positions (i.e., the C terminal in Figure 6.1) and actual social policy 
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outcomes (i.e., the D terminal in Figure 6.1) across different countries and over a 
consistent period of time. Unfortunately, the dataset on declared cabinets’ policy 
preferences already employed in chapter III (Cfr. Chapter III, Section 3.2 and Appendix 
Table 3.1) embeds only 10 countries and largely refers to cabinets in office from the 
aftermath of World War II until the Eighties, a period in which both right and left 
governments increased welfare state provisions. Therefore, I turned to the familiar 
operationalization of cabinet’s ideological position as the mean position of cabinet parties, 
weighted by their parliamentary seat share (Cfr. Chapter IV, Section 4.2.2).      
The CD bond is, at the same time, the most intriguing and the most awkward linkage of 
the chain of responsiveness to be studied. Indeed, it is exactly in this last segment that 
governing parties’ ability to shape social policies according to the will of their voters 
encounter “the burden of responsibility”, that is the necessity to take into account internal 
and international systemic constraints and compatibilities (Mair, 2009; cfr. Chapter I, 
Section 1.4.4). Accordingly, the task of chapter IV has been to document if and to what 
extent the burden of responsibility is making it harder for political parties to respond 
sympathetically to their electorate, executing social policies consistent with their long 
lasting ideological preferences. 
Despite the conventional wisdom on the “dependent variable problem” (Green-Pedersen, 
2002), according to which studies using aggregate spending measures are less likely to 
identify a significant role of parties in shaping social policies, while studies adopting 
measures of welfare state generosity are more likely to do it, chapter IV demonstrated that 
such mixed results are related to an “independent variable problem”. Indeed, the large 
majority of studies dealing with party politics and social policy outcomes uses to 
operationalize governments’ ideological position either by clear-cut dichotomies at party 
level between parties of the left and the right or by categorical variables referring to party 
families.  
Chapter IV went beyond such dichotomous left-right classifications of government 
partisanship by building a continuous variable based on all of the major party expert 
surveys (Cfr. Chapter IV, Section 4.2.2). Adopting this continuous measure, the role of 
governing parties in shaping social policy outcomes is confirmed, no matter the choice of 
the dependent variable to account for social policies (i.e., public spending in social 
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policies, public spending in active and passive labor market policies or the level of 
unemployment insurance replacement rate; cfr. Chapter IV, Section 4.2.1). 
In particular, results obtained analyzing data on 19 OECD countries from 1985-2011 
through an Error Correction Model (Cfr. Table 6.1 and Chapter IV, Section 4.2.4) proved 
that the ideological position of the executive on the left-right scale appears unable to affect 
social policy outcomes in the short run, when economic control variables prevail. 
However, parties’ influence acquires relevance on the long run. Ceteris paribus, when the 
government coalition moves to the right, there is a negative impact on social expenditure 
as a whole, on public spending in active and passive labor market policies and on the net 
unemployment replacement rate (Cfr. Chapter IV, Sections 4.3 and 4.4). 
Finally, chapter V, titled “Missing links in explaining government’s ability to shape social 
expenditure according to its will: an application to the Italian case (1946-2009)”, drew its 
attention once more the CD bond between governments’ social policy preferences and 
social policy outcomes (Cfr. Figure 6.1), but developed a single-country case study in 
order to shed light on two important, but empirically under researched, aspects of 
congruence. In particular, it addressed the role exercised by the executive power and the 
one played by factions inside the major parties of the governing coalitions in shaping 
social expenditure (Cfr. Chapter V, Section 5.1) in Italy over the 63 years (i.e., from 1946 
to 2009; cfr. Table 6.1). The choice to focus on the Italian case allowed me to avoid the 
problem of data shortage discussed above for chapter IV. Accordingly, in this case, the C 
terminal has been operationalized using Prime Ministers’ (PM’s) investiture and 
confidence speeches, while public expenditure in social services represented the D 
terminal (Cfr. Figure 6.1).   
Several reasons have been put forward to justify the choice to develop this single country 
case study (Cfr. Chapter V, Section 5.2.1). The first one has been the availability of two 
datasets suitable to analyze both the role of cabinets (Curini &Martelli, 2009; Curini, 2011; 
cfr. Chapter V, Section 5.2.3) and the one of party factions (Ceron, 2012; cfr. Chapter V, 
Section 5.2.4). Moreover, Italy appeared a fruitful case-study because the Italian political 
system has experienced relevant modifications in governments’ agenda-setting power and 
repeated changes in its electoral system during its nearly 70 years of history (Curini & 
Zucchini, 2014). Finally, this case-study allowed to control for any idiosyncratic country 
factors referring to the institutional setting. 
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Results proved once more that the CD bond holds: indeed, cabinets’ positions on welfare 
state expansion as derived from PMs’ investiture and confidence speeches are strong 
determinant of social expenditure. However, results underlined also that cabinets’ agenda 
setting power is strongly weaken by party politics dynamics and, more interestingly, by 
intra-party dynamics.  
Concerning party politics dynamics, government’s agenda setting power is strongly 
weakened, if not completely erased, in case of minority government because in this case 
the PM is more likely to be forced to offer policy concessions as inducements both to 
governing parties’ and to external supporters that might otherwise defect from voting. 
Vice-versa, government’s ability to shape social policies increases when the ideological 
divide between the actual governing coalition and the previous one deepens (Cfr. Chapter 
V, Sections 5.3 and 5.4). 
Shifting the attention from party-politics to intra-party politics, results highlighted that 
higher levels of internal divisiveness in the major party of the governing coalition erase 
the executive’s ability to shape social policy according to the content of the coalition 
agreement. In this case, indeed, the PM becomes less effective because the number of 
potential veto players with which he/she is forced to compromise increases, including 
both the governing parties and the polarized factions inside the major party of the 
executive coalition (Cfr. Chapter V, Sections 5.3 and 5.4). 
Chapters II to V dissected the rough path from voters’ redistributive preferences to social 
policy outcomes. At the end of this journey, I have to agree with G. Bingham Powell, 
when he pointed out that in the real world, the chain of responsiveness can be quite 
complex (2005). Indeed, this dissertation highlighted how the linkages connecting 
citizens’ redistributive preferences and electoral behaviors, parties’ electoral pledges and 
long lasting ideological commitments, cabinets’ positions and actual social policy 
outcomes may be subverted at each stage (Powell, 2004).  
Just to recall some of the issues discussed in the previous chapters, economic conditions 
experienced by each individual in his/her everyday life is likely to affect his/her 
redistributive preferences and, accordingly, his/her behavior at the election time (Cfr. 
Chapter II). While the relationship between labor market status, once labelled “social class 
belonging”, and political behavior has been a constant in the industrialized democratic 
CONCLUSION 
222 
world of forty years ago, this dissertation outlined that political parties are able to bundle 
together the demands of their various constituencies in a coherent and stable fashion even 
in post-industrial labor markets. 
However, their “job has become harder”. Indeed, our society is more affluent, leisured, 
introverted and cognitively mobilized: citizens are less closely bound to parties through 
old social group identities and less dependent on them for their cognitive clues about 
public affairs. Moreover, parties are forced to share the stage with other actors, such as 
interest groups, social movements and the mass media, which involve citizens in the 
political arena in respect of single issues that concern them (Webb, 2002; van Biezen & 
Poguntke, 2014).  
The obstacles that voters’ redistributive preferences have to overcome to be translated  
into consistent social policy outcomes could arise even after the dust of the election has 
settled, on the one hand, when a governmental coalition has to be formed in Parliament 
and, on the other hand, when the governing parties have to face the constraints imposed 
by external reality.  
The previous chapters, indeed, highlighted that the position of the party holding the 
median legislator (Cfr. Chapter III) and the parliamentary majority the cabinet enjoys (Cfr. 
Chapter V) are able to respectively affect cabinet’s social policy position and social 
expenditure. 
Shifting the attention from the Parliament to the executive, previous results highlighted 
how cabinet’s position on social policy is likely to be biased by those of the labor and 
social affairs ministers (Cfr. Chapter III). Moreover, a higher number of parties in the 
governing coalition and their degree of ideological heterogeneity significantly diminish 
cabinet’s ability to implement social policies consistent with the coalition agreement (Cfr. 
Chapter V). In addition, intra-party politics seems to play a role: as intra-party divisiveness 
and fractionalization increases, the government’s “agenda setting” power in policy-
making processes is erased (Cfr. Chapter V). 
Finally, several external forces are making it more difficult for governing parties to be 
effectively as well as formally responsible for social policy outcomes. Namely, adverse 
economic conditions (i.e., GDP growth, inflation rate and unemployment rate; Cfr. 
chapters III, IV and V); population ageing (Cfr. chapters III, IV and V ); globalization 
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and international interdependence (Cfr. Chapter IV) force the chain of responsiveness 
sketched by Figure 6.1. 
Does this long list of obstacles imply that the margin to manoeuvre left for parties is so 
heavily constrained that it is drained of all meaning or are there still significant political 
choices to be made even within the tightening constraints? This is a crucial question 
because if it appears that “elections and changes of government cannot make a difference, 
the democratic legitimacy of the political regime itself may be undermined” (Scharpf, 
2011: 4). If parties cannot be responsive to electorates, why vote? If party differences do 
not matter, why have party government? (Laffan, 2014). 
At the end of this dissertation, it is possible to say that we have not to accept the 
doomsday scenario according to which democracy at the national level has been hollowed 
out (Krastev, 2002; Mair, 2002, 2006). Of course, the challenges and complexities of 
politics and the socio-economic processes affecting Western post-industrial democracies 
rob politicians of agency and weaken their responsibility to engage with their electorates. 
Social and labor market policies fall within the political space of constrained choice. 
However, these policy domains imply choices nonetheless. 
Indeed, social and labor market policies, together with taxation and education, largely 
remain national responsibilities with choices about the structure and the overall level of 
public expenditure to be made. National governments have to make choices about the 
balance between spending cuts and tax increases and, within both categories, about where 
to cut and where to raise taxes (Laffan, 2014). 
Of course, the politics of constrained choice is much more difficult for parties and 
electorates than populist appeals: distributing pain across the board is easier than taking 
on entrenched vested interests. It appears particularly challenging for parties of the centre-
left as centre-right voters are more in favor of a less interventionist role of the State in 
national economies.  
However, notwithstanding the constraints undoubtedly imposed by globalization, 
international interdependence, adverse economic conditions, demographic changes and 
bargaining processes among parliamentary and governing parties, the previous chapters 
demonstrated that party effects can still be readily discerned. Breaking down the chain of 
responsiveness, results highlighted that the partisan composition of governing coalitions 
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does affect welfare state developments in parliamentary democracies. Moreover, from the 
perspective of democratic theory, confirming the ability of governing parties to shape 
social policies according to their long lasting ideological stances supports the broad 
conclusion that parties’ behavior offers voters real differences in their policy priorities. 
Therefore, my view is that there is no real case for concluding that parties’ centrality to 
national governmental processes and social policy outcomes has been declining. 
So far, good news for the normatively informed vision of representative democracy. What 
is missing? What is lacking is an overall view on the chain of responsiveness from voters’ 
social policy preferences to governmental social policy outcomes (i.e., the additional arrow 
connecting the A terminal to the D one in Figure 6.1). Do citizens’ preferences manage 
to overcome all the obstacles identified in the previous chapters so that they can be 
translated into consistent spending choices in the field of social policies? Vice-versa, do 
they get stuck in some links of the chain of responsiveness? This is the question that this 
last chapter aims to answer. 
 
6.2 Data description 
To verify whether and to what extent voters’ social policy preferences consistently 
translate into social policy outcomes once the dust of the election is settled, the analysis 
here performed largely draws on data-sources already discussed and employed in the 
previous chapters.  
There is only one measure used in this last chapter that has not already been described: 
namely, the A terminal in figure 6.1, referring to voters’ social policy preferences. Indeed, 
chapter II, which dealt with the correspondence between individuals’ redistributive 
preferences and parties’ social policy supplies, addressed the AB linkage of the chain of 
responsiveness by adopting a micro-level approach. This last chapter, instead, asks for an 
aggregate measure of voters’ needs and preferences, which has to be confronted with 
social policy outcomes by country and over time. Accordingly, section 6.2.1 discusses how 
voters’ social policy preferences (i.e. the A terminal in Figure 6.1) have been 
operationalized in this last chapter; while section 6.2.2 briefly recalls the other dependent 
and independent variables.    
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6.2.1 Measuring voters’ preferences on the RILE and on the welfare dimensions 
To investigate how well elected individuals or parties, as agents, represent citizens, as 
principals, through the electoral delegation process, valid and reliable estimations of the 
substantive policy preferences of parties and citizens are needed. The substantive 
representation literature, which focuses exactly on this topic, suggests three different 
approaches (Powell, 2009). 
The first approach identifies parties’ positions through expert surveys asking country 
experts to place political forces on a left-right scale and the position of the median citizen 
through mass surveys asking citizens to place themselves on a left-right scale. Party 
placements formulated by country experts are then employed to find out the location of 
the median legislator in Parliament and that of the governing coalition. Examples of 
studies using this approach are Huber and Powell (1994), Powell (2000; 2006) and Powell 
and Vanberg (2000).  
The second approach estimates parties’ positions and that of the median citizen through 
mass surveys asking citizens to place both political parties and themselves on a left-right 
scale. As before, the positions of the median parliamentarian and that of the government 
are obtained from parties’ placements. Recent works like Blais and Bodet (2006), Powell 
(2009) and Golder and Stramski (2010) employed this approach. The Comparative Study 
of Electoral Systems (CSES), a collaborative program of research among election study 
teams from around the world, is the most important data-source adopting this technique.  
Finally, the third approach relies on data collected by the MARPOR (Manifesto Research 
on Political Representation) Manifesto Project, funded by the German Science 
Foundation (DFG). This project continues the work of the Manifesto Research Group 
(MRG) and the Comparative Manifestos Project (CMP), performing the comparative 
content analysis of over 1000 parties’ manifestos from 1945 until today in over 50 
countries. Parties’ placements on the left-right scale are estimated through the measure 
proposed by Laver and Budge (1992; Cfr. Chapter II, Section 2.2). These placements are 
then used to locate on the left-right spectrum the median legislator in Parliament and the 
governing coalition. Moreover, Heemin Kim and Richard C. Fording (1998; 2002; 2003) 
developed a three steps procedure to locate the median voter on a left-right ideological 
scale staring for parties’ placements and vote shares. 
CONCLUSION 
226 
In particular, for each election, it is necessary to rank political parties on the left-right 
continuum. Then, according to the Euclidean preference relations, it is assumed that  the 
voters of each particular party fall into the interval that goes from the midpoint between 
the chosen party and the one immediately left of it to the midpoint between the same 
party and the one immediately right of it. Finally, for each election, the percentage of 
votes obtained by each party is used to estimate the percentage of the electorate that falls 
into each interval created in the previous step. At this point, data have to be transformed 
into a grouped frequency distribution and, applying a basic statistical formulai, it is 
possible to estimate the median voter’s position. Beside Kim and Fording (1998; 2002; 
2003), McDonald, Mendes and Budge (2004) and McDonald and Budge (2005) employed 
this procedureii. 
None of these three methods is free of costs. The first approach rests on the rather 
dubious assumption that citizens and experts interpret the left-right scale in the same way 
(Kim & Fording, 1998; Blais & Bodet, 2006; Powell, 2009). Moreover, citizens’ and 
experts’ surveys are usually conducted at different points in time and they tend to be based 
on different scales. Therefore, authors are forced to make some adjustments to be able to 
compare these two data sources (Blais & Bodet, 2006).  
The second approach is based on two rather problematic assumptions too. As first, it 
assumes that citizens are effectively informed about the position of each party, while they 
may in fact be ignorant about the left-right position of several parties. Using Powell’s 
words, citizens are likely to be “more ignorant than the experts” and to offer perceptions 
“that are less authentic than manifestos. The citizens may be subject to stereotypes, 
rationalization of non ideologically based support, projection of their own beliefs, and so 
forth” (2009: 1479). As second, this approach assumes that citizen placed themselves truly 
on left-right scale, whereas less politically involved citizens may place themselves just by 
guessing. As third, cross-national studies asking citizens to estimate the position of both 
parties and themselves are very recent: the CSES project, for example, began only in 1996.  
The most serious problem affecting the third approach is that the identification of the 
position of the median voter lies on the assumption that all voters support the party that 
is closest to their own ideological positions (Blais & Bodet, 2006; Powell, 2009). However, 
according to Richard Rose and Ian McAllister (1992: 115), which summarized a larger 
body of literature on voting behavior, voters may approach elections in two ways. In 
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particular, they may act expressively, when their primary goal is simply to get the 
opportunity to express their preferences, or they may act instrumentally, when they care 
about nothing except the policies they are likely to get. In this second case, voters may 
choose to support a party which is not the closest to their policy preferences in the attempt 
to move the expected policy outcomes closer to their ideal points. Moreover, electoral 
behavior is not entirely a matter of individual voter choice: it may be affected by additional 
determinants, such as the nature of the party system, incumbent’s status, leader’s 
performance evaluation and valence issues (Blais & Bodet, 2006). Kim and Fording (1998) 
addressed this critique claiming that instrumental voting primarily takes place under 
single-member district plurality electoral systems, where third party supporters may vote 
for one of the major parties. In the overwhelming majority of democratic political 
systems, instead, the possible bias introduced by this instrumental behavior is minimal. 
Lastly, another potential problem affecting MARPOR based measures of voters’ and 
parties’ ideological positions is the circularity of data, namely the fact that the median 
voter’s positions are estimated through parties’ positions as derived from their electoral 
manifestoes. This is probably the reason why this approach generates more congruence 
in respect to the others (Powell, 2009). Nevertheless, McDonald, Mendes and Budge 
argued that measuring the preferences of the different actors involved in the chain of 
responsiveness (Cfr. Figure 6.1) through the same scale has not to be considered as a 
limit: on the contrary has to be seen as a benefit and a necessary requirement for a 
meaningful analysis (2004: 42).  
Taking into account pros and cons of each approach, I decided to adopt the MARPOR 
based method in the following empirical analysis. Indeed, without neglecting the potential 
problems just recalled, there are several strengths that led me to select this approach  
First of all, the most important advantages are the large number of countries and the 
considerable time span for which data are available. Indeed, while cross-country mass 
surveys asking people to place themselves on a left-right scale are not readily available for 
most countries prior to 1970s and estimate citizens’ positions only in few specific points 
in time, with the MARPOR based method data are available since 1946 for many 
countries.  
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As second, the fact that both voters and parties are located on the same ideological scale 
makes the comparison between the relative positions of electorates, parties and 
governments across countries and time-periods easier.  
As third, using party manifestoes and actual vote shares as the main sources of 
information seems promising both on the citizens’ and on the parties’ sides. Indeed, on 
the one hand, electoral manifestoes collapse in comprehensive documents all the 
promises made by parties during electoral campaigns; on the other hand, actual vote 
shares are behavioral manifestations of voters’ real preferences. On the contrary, mass 
surveys provide only the median positions of the subgroups of citizens that answer to 
surveys’ questions (Powell, 2000). 
Finally, I tried to assess median voter’s positions through the recently released MARPOR 
Party-Voter Dataset (Lehmann & Schultze, 2012), which combines data on parties’ 
placements (MARPOR, 2014) with the most relevant international surveys data (i.e., the 
Eurobarometer Trend file; Modules I, II and III from the CSES; the World Value Survey 
V Wave Aggregated File 1981-2008 and the European Values Study Longitudinal Data 
File 1981-2008). However, this new data set turned not to be suitable for measuring 
programmatic congruence between voters and governing parties at the aggregate level. 
Indeed, the variable selfrile, which reports respondents’ self-placement on a common 1-9 
left-right scale, tend to be cross-country and time invariant (i.e., it tends to be always equal 
to 5). 
In the following analysis, the median voter’s positions are calculated according to the 
procedure developed by Kim & Fording (1998; 2002; 2003), as adjusted by McDonald & 
Budge (2005: 113-115). As in Chapters II (Cfr. Section 2.2) and III (Cfr. Section 3.2), 
median voter’s positions have been estimated on two dimensions: the traditionally 
employed RILE scale (Laver & Budge, 1992) and the more policy based welfare scale. In 
particular, this last dimension is based on the difference between the percentage of quasi-
sentences devoted to welfare state retrenchment (CMP variable per505; Cfr. MARPOR, 
2014) and that devoted to social justice and welfare state expansion (CMP variables per 
503 and per504; Cfr. MARPOR, 2014) in parties’ manifestosiii.  
These two measures of voters’ preferences are the treatment variables whose effects on 
social policy outcomes I am interested in. Note that, since the dependent variable referring 
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to social policy outcomes is early based (Cfr. Section 6.2.2), median voter’s positions have 
been ascribed to all the years between two subsequent parliamentary elections, weighting 
them by the number of days. Further details and descriptive statistics are reported in 
Appendix Tables 6.1 and 6.2.  
 
6.2.2 Recalling the other dependent and independent variables  
Starting from the dependent variable, social policy outcomes (i.e., the D terminal in Figure 
6.1) have been operationalized by the commonest indicator of welfare effort, namely the 
total public and mandatory private social expenditure as a percentage of GDP (e.g., Huber 
& Stephens, 2001 a, b; Swank, 2002). This measure is provided by the online OECD 
Social Expenditure Statistics from 1980 to 2011 for the large majority of the countries 
included in this studyiv (For a brief discussion on pros and cons of this indicator, see 
Chapter IV, Section 4.2.1). As in chapter IV, this dependent variable enters the model 
specification as first difference in order to control for serial-correlation. Moreover, its 
lagged level is embedded among the regressors to take into account the effect of path 
dependency in social policies developments (Cfr. Chapter IV, Section 4.2.4).  
To be translated into consistent social policy outcomes (i.e., the D terminal in Figure 6.1), 
voters’ preferences (i.e., the A terminal in Figure 6.1) have to be mediated by political 
parties (i.e., the B terminal in Figure 6.1), especially by those in office (i.e., the C terminal 
in Figure 6.1). The roles played by these political actors have been taken into account 
drawing on the analysis developed in Chapter III (Cfr. Chapter III, Section 3.2). In 
particular, the weighted mean position of governing parties and the position of the median 
party in parliament have been estimated by combining the information provided by the 
CMP’s coding of the electoral manifestos (MARPOR, 2014) with the ones on 
governments’ compositions provided by Woldendorp, Keman and Budge (2000).  
The most important mediator variables are the cabinet weighted means on the RILE and on the 
welfare dimensions. The first one corresponds to the mean of the RILE positions of cabinet 
parties, weighted by their seats share in the lower chamber (Powell, 2009). Similarly, the 
second one has been calculated as the mean of the welfare positions of cabinet parties, 
weighted by their seats share in the lower chamberv. Since the dependent variable is yearly 
based, these two measures have been ascribed to all the years in which the same 
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government stayed in power. When there were more than one government in office in 
the same year, they have been weighed by the numbers of days in which each government 
has been in office. 
Moreover, the mediator variables cabinet weighted mean on the RILE and on the welfare 
dimensions enter the model specification also as deviations from median voter’s positions 
on the same scale. Indeed, the variable cabinet – voter distance on the RILE dimension 
corresponds to the governing coalition’s RILE position minus the median voter’s position 
on the same dimension. Similarly, the variable cabinet – voter distance on the welfare dimension 
measures the difference between the government’s welfare position and that of the 
median voter on the same scalevi. 
The CMP dataset (MARPOR, 2014) has been used also to locate the median legislator on 
the RILE and on the welfare dimensions (Cfr. Chapter III, Section 3.2). In particular, the 
variable median party – voter distance on the RILE dimension corresponds to the median party’s 
RILE position minus that of the median voter on the same dimension. The variable median 
party – voter distance on the welfare dimension is equal to the difference between the median 
party’s welfare position and that of the median voter on the same scalevii. Since the 
dependent variable is early based, median party – voter distances on the RILE and on the welfare 
dimensions have been ascribed to all the years between two subsequent parliamentary 
elections, weighting them by the number of days. 
Finally, voters’ preferences need to overcome external constraints imposed by economic 
and demographic imperatives, together with budgetary restrictions, to be translated into 
consistent social policy outcomes. As in Chapter IV (Cfr. Section 4.2.3), lagged levels of 
these potential confounding factors are embedded as control variables in the model 
specification (Cfr. Appendix Table 6.1 for complete list of these control variables).  
Appendix Tables 6.1 and 6.2 provide detail descriptions, data sources and descriptive 
statistics of all the variables listed so far.  
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6.3 Results 
 
6.3.1 Assessing the role played by the median voter in shaping social expenditure  
I begin my analysis by investigating the direct effects of the mediator variables (M) on the 
outcome variable (Y). In detail, the models displayed in Table 6.2 respectively estimate 
the impact of a unitary shift in the lagged values of government partisanship toward the 
right side of the political spectrum (M1) and toward a more contractionary attitude in 
welfare state development (M2) on the annual change in social expenditure as percentage 
of GDP. Complete set of control variables in t-1 is included. 
Table 6.2: Effect of government partisanship (mediator variable) on social expenditure 
(outcome variable) 
 RILE dimension Welfare dimension 
 M1 M2 
Cabinet weighted meant-1 -0.00748** -0.0230** 
 (0.00268) (0.00726) 
Yt-1 -0.0771** -0.0703* 
 (0.0279) (0.0275) 
GDP growtht-1  -0.108** -0.112*** 
 (0.0331) (0.0330) 
Debtt-1 -0.00454 -0.00444 
 (0.00309) (0.00311) 
Inflationt-1 0.0403† 0.0426* 
 (0.0213) (0.0213) 
Unemploymentt-1 -0.0810*** -0.0819*** 
 (0.0215) (0.0210) 
Elderlyt-1 0.143** 0.141** 
 (0.0447) (0.0444) 
Trade unionst-1 -0.0225** -0.0246** 
 (0.00815) (0.00830) 
Trade openness t-1 -0.00267 -0.00190 
 (0.00671) (0.00667) 
Financial openness t-1 0.0927 0.124 
 (0.295) (0.293) 
Constant 1.628 1.103 
 (1.505) (1.500) 
Year and country d. Yes Yes 
R2 0.287 0.290 
N 642 642 
Notes: OLS estimations with panel corrected standard errors in parentheses. The dependent variable is 
the change in the total public and mandatory private social expenditure as percentage of GDP from one 
year to the next. † p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. 
M1 and M2 confirm that the mediator variables have the expected effects on the outcome 
variable. Indeed, if the governing coalition moves one point toward the right side of the 
ideological spectrum in the year t-1, the change in the share of total public and mandatory 
private social expenditure as percentage of GDP in the year t is expected to be 0.007 
percentage points lower than what it would have been without this ideological shift. The 
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effect is more pronounced on the welfare dimension, where a unitary increase in the 
lagged value of the cabinet weighted mean in the year t-1 is associated with a decrease of 
about 0.02 percentage points in the annual change of social expenditure as percentage of 
GDP. 
In the next step, I investigate the direct effect of the treatment variables (T) on the 
outcome variable (Y). In particular, M3 and M4 assess the impact of a unitary increase in 
the lagged values of the median voter’s position on the RILE and on the welfare 
dimensions on the annual change in the total public and mandatory private social 
expenditure as percentage of GDP. As before, a complete set of control variables in t-1 
is included (Cfr. Table 6.3). 
Table 6.3: Effect of median voter’s position (T) on social expenditure (Y) 
 RILE dimension Welfare dimension 
 M3 M4 
Median voter’s positiont-1  -0.0121** -0.0179* 
 (0.00403) (0.00907) 
Yt-1 -0.0749** -0.0732** 
 (0.0270) (0.0272) 
GDP growtht-1  -0.107** -0.111*** 
 (0.0330) (0.0335) 
Debtt-1 -0.00431 -0.00457 
 (0.00304) (0.00307) 
Inflationt-1 0.0352† 0.0385† 
 (0.0213) (0.0216) 
Unemploymentt-1 -0.0846*** -0.0863*** 
 (0.0212) (0.0209) 
Elderlyt-1 0.123** 0.136** 
 (0.0424) (0.0437) 
Trade unionst-1 -0.0209** -0.0206** 
 (0.00724) (0.00787) 
Trade openness t-1 -0.00208 -0.00236 
 (0.00659) (0.00663) 
Financial openness t-1 0.132 0.178 
 (0.301) (0.299) 
Constant 1.697 1.108 
 (1.488) (1.494) 
Year and country d. Yes Yes 
R2 0.290 0.283 
N 652 650 
Notes: OLS estimations with panel corrected standard errors in parentheses. The dependent variable is 
the change in the total public and mandatory private social expenditure as percentage of GDP from one 
year to the next. † p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. 
The estimated coefficients highlight that the treatment variables have the expected effects 
on the outcome variable. As expected, if the median voter’s position moves one point 
toward the right side of the ideological spectrum in the year t-1, the change in the share 
of social expenditure over GDP in the year t is expected to be 0.01 percentage points 
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lower than what it would have been without this ideological shift. Similarly, on the welfare 
dimension, if the median voter’s position moves one point toward a more contractionary 
attitude in the year t-1, the change in the outcome variable in the year t is expected to be 
0.02 percentage points lower than what it would have beenviii. 
So far, models displayed in tables 6.2 and 6.3 demonstrated that, both on the RILE and 
on the welfare dimensions, a unitary increase in the mediator variables (i.e., the lagged 
positions of the governing coalition; cfr. Table 6.2) or in the treatment variables (i.e., the 
lagged positions of the median voter; cfr. Table 6.3) are associated with a decrease in the 
annual change of social expenditure over GDP. However, these encouraging results may 
be undermined by the ways in which the treatment variables are operationalized. 
Indeed, as better explained in section 6.2.1, the MARPOR approach derives the position 
of the median voter from parties’ placements on the RILE and on the welfare dimensions 
as obtained by their electoral manifestos. The same parties’ placements are then employed 
to locate both the position of the median legislator in Parliament and that of the governing 
coalition (Cfr. Section 6.2.1). In the sample, the similarity between the weighted mean 
position of governing parties (M) and the position of the median voter (T) appears to be 
quite strong. In particular, the pairwise correlation coefficient between the mediator and 
the treatment variables on the RILE dimension is equal to 0.753 (significant at 5% level 
or better); while the one on the welfare dimension is equal to 0.832 (significant at 5% level 
or better)ix.  
To avoid any risk of multicollinearity, I follow the same procedure employed in chapter 
III (Cfr. Chapter III, Section 3.2), generating two additional control variables equal to the 
difference between cabinet’s and median voter’s positions on the RILE and on the welfare 
dimensions. Models M5 and M6 in Table 6.4 demonstrate that the treatment variables (i.e., 
the lagged median voter’s positions) keep their negative effects on the annual change in 
the share of social expenditure over GDP even controlling for the distance between the 
governing coalition’s and the median voter’s placements.  
The analysis performed in chapter III suggested that, especially on the welfare dimension, 
the median legislator in Parliament is likely to bias declared cabinet’s position toward 
his/her ideal point (Cfr. Chapter III, Sections 3.3 and 3.4). Accordingly, this political actor 
may play a role also in shaping welfare state expenditure. In this analysis, the position of 
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the median legislator in Parliament is embedded through the variable median party-voter 
distancet-1, which is equal to the difference between the position of median legislator and 
that of the median voter in the year t-1x. Models M7 and M8 in Table 6.4 suggest that the 
negative relation between the lagged median voter’s position (T) and the annual change 
in the share of social expenditure over GDP (Y) holds controlling for the variable median 
party-voter distancet-1
xi
 too. 
Table 6.4: Effect of median voter’s position (T) on social expenditure (Y) controlling for 
cabinet’s and median legislator’s positions 
 RILE 
dimension 
Welfare 
dimension 
RILE 
dimension 
Welfare 
dimension 
 M5 M6 M7 M8 
Median votert-1 -0.0126** -0.0183† -0.0123** -0.0178† 
(0.00425) (0.00982) (0.00427) (0.00980) 
Cabinet-voter distancet-1 -0.00399 -0.0281** -0.00128 -0.0214* 
(0.00292) (0.00886) (0.00423) (0.0102) 
Median party-voter 
distancet-1  
  -0.00570 -0.0222 
  (0.00547) (0.0140) 
Yt-1 -0.0777** -0.0692* -0.0758** -0.0661* 
 (0.0277) (0.0276) (0.0277) (0.0276) 
GDP growtht-1  -0.107** -0.112*** -0.106** -0.110*** 
 (0.0329) (0.0331) (0.0327) (0.0331) 
Debtt-1 -0.00415 -0.00463 -0.00437 -0.00494 
 (0.00310) (0.00307) (0.00307) (0.00310) 
Inflationt-1 0.0387† 0.0429* 0.0402† 0.0446* 
 (0.0212) (0.0214) (0.0212) (0.0214) 
Unemploymentt-1 -0.0806*** -0.0821*** -0.0813*** -0.0824*** 
 (0.0216) (0.0210) (0.0217) (0.0210) 
Elderlyt-1 0.129** 0.144** 0.132** 0.150*** 
 (0.0440) (0.0441) (0.0445) (0.0449) 
Trade unionst-1 -0.0215** -0.0248** -0.0210** -0.0248** 
 (0.00795) (0.00825) (0.00800) (0.00821) 
Trade openness t-1 -0.00230 -0.00177 -0.00200 -0.00180 
 (0.00665) (0.00669) (0.00671) (0.00667) 
Financial openness t-1 0.0798 0.116 0.0944 0.125 
 (0.295) (0.294) (0.296) (0.293) 
Constant 1.769 1.139 1.569 0.939 
 (1.504) (1.500) (1.540) (1.497) 
Year and country d. Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.290 0.290 0.291 0.292 
N 641 641 641 641 
Notes: OLS estimations with panel corrected standard errors in parentheses. The dependent variable is 
the change in the total public and mandatory private social expenditure as percentage of GDP from 
one year to the next. † p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. 
In sum, results obtained through PCSE seem encouraging. Indeed, controlling for a 
complete set of potential external confounders and, more interestingly, for the position 
of the median legislator in Parliament and for that of the ruling coalition, median voter’s 
preferences in the year t-1 (i.e., the A terminal in Figure 6.1) prove to be related to the 
change in social expenditure in the subsequent year (i.e., the D terminal in Figure 6.1). 
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6.3.2 Assessing the role played by the median voter in shaping social expenditure through causal 
mediation analysis 
Kosuke Imai, Luke Keele and Dustin Tingley (2010; see also Imai et al., 2011) recently 
proposed the causal mediation analysis to estimate the role of causal mechanisms that 
transmit the effect of a treatment variable (T) on an outcome (Y).  
Following the potential outcomes framework of causal inference (Holland, 1986; 
Neyman, [1923] 1990; Rubin, 1974), the authors defined a causal mechanism as a process 
whereby one variable T casually effects another variable Y through an intermediate 
variable or a mediator M (Imai et al., 2011). Thus, the inferential goal is to decompose the 
average treatment effect (ATE) into the average causal mediation effect (ACME), which 
represents the indirect effect of the treatment on the outcome through the mediating 
variable, and the average direct effect (ADE). Graphically, the ACME combines two 
arrows going from the treatment T to the outcome Y through the mediator M, while the 
ADE may be represented as a single arrow connecting T to Y. 
Even if this method is suitable also for non-binary treatment (see Imai et al., 2010), let us 
take into consideration the case of a binary treatment (Ti), which is equal to 1 when unit 
i is in the treatment group and 0 otherwise. Accordingly, Yi(1) is the potential outcome 
that would be realized under the treatment; Yi(0) is the potential outcome that would be 
realized under the control condition.  
Given this setup, the causal effect of the treatment can be defined as the difference 
between Yi(1) and Yi(0). However, it is impossible to observe both Yi(1) and Yi(0) on the 
same unit i (i.e., the so-called fundamental problem of causal inference; cfr. Holland, 
1986). For this reason, researchers estimate the average treatment effect (ATE) over a 
populationxii, which is the average difference in outcome means between the treatment 
and control groups.  
Now, let Mi(t) denote the potential value of a mediator of interest for unit i under the 
treatment status Ti=t. Yi(t, m) corresponds to the potential outcome that would result if 
the treatment and mediating variables equal to t and m, respectively. As before, only one 
of the two potential outcomes can be observed. In particular, the observed outcome (Yi) 
equals Yi(Ti, Mi(Ti)), which depends upon both the treatment status and the level of the 
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mediator under the observed treatment status. Accordingly, the total unit treatment effect 
can be written as τi≡Yi(1, Mi(1))−Yi(0, Mi(0)).  
According to this framework, the ACME for each unit i will be equal to the difference in 
the outcome if the dependent variable is estimated with the mediator 1. under the 
condition of having estimated the mediator with the treatment variable and 2. under the 
condition of omitting the treatment variable from the estimation of the mediator (Imai et 
al., 2010: 311). Formally, δi(t)≡Yi(t, Mi(1))−Yi(t, Mi(0)). If the treatment has no effect on 
the mediator, i.e., Mi(1) = Mi(0), then the ACME will be equal to zero. 
The ADE for each unit i and each treatment status t=0, 1 is defined as ζi(t)≡Yi(1, 
Mi(t))−Yi(0, Mi(t)). It corresponds to the causal effect of the treatment on the outcome 
that is not transmitted by the hypothesized mediator.  
In what follows, I conduct a mediation analysis to distinguish the ADE of the median 
voter’s position in the year t-1(T) on the annual change in social expenditure as percentage 
of GDP (Y) from the ACME, which operates through political parties in office (M). As 
before, to avoid any risk of multicollinearity, the mediator variable, namely the role of 
political parties charged with government responsibilities, is embedded in the model 
specifications as the difference between the position of the ruling coalition and that of 
the median voter in the year t-1. The same procedure has been followed to take into 
account the position of the median legislator in Parliament among the controls. Complete 
set of control variables in t-1 is included. 
The estimation strategy consists in two steps. First, the mediator is modeled as a function 
of the treatment and any relevant controls. Second, the outcome is modeled as a function 
of the mediator, the treatment and controls. From these two steps, the model parameters 
are simulated from their sampling distribution. Based on these simulated potential values 
of the mediator and the resulting simulated outcomes values, it is possible to estimate the 
ADE and the ACME of the treatment variable (Hicks & Tingley, 2011).  Table 6.5 
presents the regressions the mediation analysis is based on. 
In detail, models M9 and M11, referring to the first step of the analysis on the RILE and 
on the welfare dimensions, use ordinary least squares (OLS) with robust standard errors 
clustered by country to estimate the effect of median voter’s position in t-1 (T) on cabinet-
voter distance in t-1 (M). On both dimensions, treatment variables prove not to be good 
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determinants of mediator variables: indeed, betas referring to the median voter’s positions 
on the RILE and on the welfare scales are not statistically different from zero. These 
results are consistent with the operationalization of the mediator variables, which are 
already expressed as cabinet’s deviations from median voter’s position. 
Table 6.5: Mediation analysis 
 RILE dimension Welfare dimension 
 M9 (I step) M10 (II step) M11 (I step) M12 (II step) 
Dependent variable Cabinet-voter 
distancet-1 
∆Social 
expenditure 
Cabinet-voter 
distancet-1 
∆Social 
expenditure 
Median voter’s 
positiont-1 
-0.0460 -0.0107* 0.0195 -0.023* 
(0.0613) (0.0047) (0.0395) (0.0091) 
Cabinet-voter distt-1  -0.0012  -0.025† 
 (0.0038)  (0.013) 
Median party-voter 
distancet-1 
0.8128*** -0.0052 0.7433*** -0.0063 
(0.0881) (0.0052) (0.1381) (0.0233) 
Yt-1 -0.1683 -0.0370*** -0.0661 -0.0385*** 
 (0.1389) (0.0095) (0.0497) (0.0089) 
GDP growtht-1 -0.2680 -0.0975*** -0.1404* -0.1057*** 
 (0.1646) (0.0232) (0.0523) (0.0243) 
Debtt-1 -0.0215 -0.0023 -0.0033 -0.0013 
 (0.0189) (0.0014) (0.0053) (0.0011) 
Inflationt-1 -0.3697† 0.0403* -0.0869 0.0383* 
 (0.2049) (0.0154) (0.0562) (0.0155) 
Unemploymentt-1 0.1266 -0.0423** -0.0357 -0.0472*** 
 (0.1607) (0.0121) (0.0694) (0.0126) 
Elderlyt-1 0.2587 0.0497* -0.0315 0.0528** 
 (0.3804) (0.0186) (0.1114) (0.0178) 
Trade unionst-1 0.0629 -0.0035† -0.0012 -0.0048* 
 (0.0414) (0.0019) (0.0138) (0.002) 
Trade opennesst-1 0.0167 0.0014 -0.0036 0.0015 
 (0.0176) (0.0012) (0.0055) (0.0011) 
Financial opennesst-1 -2.8857 0.0629 -0.6922 0.0294 
 (3.4848) (0.1641) (0.9285) (0.1376) 
Constant 1.0729 0.0746 4.2725† -0.1563 
 (5.3956) (0.3560) (2.2759) (0.2721) 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.444 0.212 0.280 0.215 
N 641 641 641 641 
Notes: OLS estimations with robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. † p<0.10, * 
p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. 
Models M10 and M12 ,  referring to the second step of the analysis, estimate the effect of 
median voter’s positions in t-1 on the annual change in total public and mandatory private 
social expenditure as percentage of GDP including the mediator variables among the 
covariates. Both on the RILE and on the welfare dimensions, median voter’s positions 
seem to have a direct effect on the outcome variable. Indeed, model M10 suggests that a 
unitary shift in median voter’s placement toward the right side of the political spectrum 
decreases the annual change in social expenditure over GDP of 0.01 percentage points. 
Similarly, model M12 reveals that a similar shift in median voter’s position toward a more 
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contractionary attitude with respect to welfare state expansion decreases the annual 
change in social expenditure over GDP of about 0.02 percentage pointsxiii. 
Finally, Table 6.6 presents the ACME and the ADE of median voter’s position on the 
annual change in social expenditure as percentage over GDP. On both dimensions, there 
is a significant and negative direct effect of median voter’s positions on the annual change 
in social expenditure, but no indirect effects through the distance between the position of 
the ruling coalition and that of the median voterxiv. 
Table 6.6: Simulated direct (ADE) and indirect (ACME) effects of median voter’s position on 
social expenditure 
RILE dimension Welfare dimension 
Effect Mean 95% conf. interval Effect Mean 95% conf. interval 
ACME 0.0000 -0.0005 0.0008 ACME -0.0005 -0.003 0.0017 
ADE -0.0104* -0.0185 -0.0022 ADE -0.0224* -0.0394 -0.0053 
ATE -0.0103* -0.0186 -0.0018 ATE -0.0229* -0.0400 -0.0053 
In sum, the mediation analysis confirms previous results (Cfr. Section 6.3.1). Both on the 
RILE and on the welfare dimensions, median voter’s preferences in the year t-1 (i.e., the 
A terminal in Figure 6.1) exert a direct effect (ADE) on the change in social expenditure 
in the subsequent year (i.e., the D terminal in Figure 6.1). In detail, if the median voter 
moves one point toward the right side of the ideological spectrum or toward a more 
contractionary attitude in welfare state expansion, the annual change in the share of social 
expenditure over GDP is expected to be lower than it would have been without these 
shifts in the electorate. Moreover, the indirect effect of the median voter’s position on the 
outcome through the political parties in office (ACME) does not reach statistical 
significance. This additional finding may suggest that governing parties’ positions largely 
correspond to the median voter’s ones, making the difference between the two unable to 
affect social policy outcomes. Following this reasoning, governing parties’ ability to shape 
public spending in the social policy domain has to be seen as largely emanating exactly 
from voters’ will. 
This last chapter aimed to verify whether and to what extent median voter’s preferences 
on the RILE and on the welfare dimensions relate to final spending choices in the social 
policy domain. Luckily for the normatively informed vision of representative democracy, 
the answer is “Yes”. However, the mediation analysis here performed added a potential 
insight, suggesting not only that voter’s will affects social policy outcomes, but also that 
it does it directly. This additional result surely deserves a deeper investigation. Are 
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governments’ preferences so close to the median voter’s ones that political parties in 
office do not need to shift policy outcomes toward their ideal points? Are there other 
mediating actors, such as trade unions and the media, to be taken into account? I will 
leave these questions for future developments of this research.  
 
Conclusion 
The analyses developed in chapters II to V (Cfr. Section 6.1) and the results presented in 
section 6.3 proved that the chain of responsiveness works largely as it is intended to, at 
least in the social policy domain.  
Indeed, notwithstanding the constraints, which are undoubtedly imposed by external 
reality and by a degree of left-right converge, this dissertation demonstrated that there is 
congruence between voters’ social policy preferences, the themes stressed in party 
manifestos and the subsequent social policies enacted by the parties that get into 
government. Accordingly, it is possible to state that, overall, political parties are 
reasonably responsive toward their electorate (i.e., the representative function in Figure 
6.1) and that there is no real case for concluding that parties’ ability to shape social policies 
at the national level has been irremediably declining (i.e., the instrumental function in 
Figure 6.1). These results are consistent with those of Robert Rohrschneider and Stephen 
Whitefield (2012), which showed that political parties in Western and Eastern Europe are 
fulfilling their representative function reasonably well.  
Accordingly, political parties continue to be useful and necessary instruments for our 
democratic systems (Dalton & Weldon, 2005). However, these findings stand in direct 
contradiction not only with the unequivocal decline in parties’ capacity to attract members 
and raise identification, but especially with the poor confidence they inspire in citizens. In 
other words, in advanced industrial democracies, political parties continue to assure a 
meaningful degree of popular choice and control over policies, but they need to regain 
citizens’ hearts and minds. The question is: “How?”. 
Over the past twenty years, political parties tried to answer to concerns about their waning 
legitimacy by undertaking internal reforms and by amending the legal contexts in which 
they operate. To foster intra-party democracy, they introduced participatory incentives in 
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internal decision-making processes for grass-roots members and sometimes even for non-
member supporters. Moreover, they tried to enhance citizens’ participation in the 
selection of candidates and in the major policy decisions by introducing primary elections 
and voter juries and by exploiting the new possibilities generated by ICTs. These internal 
reforms have blurred the distinction between traditional parties’ members and simple 
voters, giving to the latter increasing agenda setting power in candidates’ selections and 
policy decisions. Accordingly, parties’ membership may be declining because parties’ 
supporters do not feel the need to bear membership’s costs, knowing that they can still 
participate in parties’ decision-making processes. This is a topic deserving a deeper 
investigation.  
In the same vain, in many advanced industrial democracies, regulatory frameworks have 
been adopted to foster the transparency of parties’ income, preventing irregular and 
corrupt behaviors (Webb, 2002).  
Nevertheless, it is worth acknowledging that the response of the society to these reforms 
has not been particularly enthusiastic so far. Such changes, indeed, have rendered parties 
immune neither from scandals associated with political recruitment and illegitimate 
activities nor from popular disenchantment.  
Far from understating the negative valence of scandals and illegitimate activities, I believe 
that popular frustration with political parties is more likely to stem from the perception 
that they are ineffective in government than from the one that they are self-interested, 
unduly privileged and inclined to corruption.  
This dissertation proved that in most systems parties do make a significant difference to 
governing outputs, at least in the social policy domain. However, it underlined also how 
their ability to shape social policy outcomes according to their will or according to the 
preferences of their voters has to face formidable obstacles. These obstacles pose severe 
problems for responsible party government.      
In his behavioral model, Ted Gurr (1970) predicted that repeated failure of major parties 
to implement public policies consistent with voters’ preferences will determine popular 
frustration toward the party system and, over the long run, its destruction. Indeed, 
according to the equilibrium of responsible party government postulated by Schumpeter 
(1943; Cfr. Chapter I, Section I), insofar as major parties fail to deliver what voters want, 
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the latter can switch to new parties,  often protest parties, that claim to have the abilities 
to meet popular expectations. However, once in office, such new parties will be subjects 
to the same constraints that caused their predecessors to disappoint the electorate. Using 
Rose’s words, “in such circumstances, the rotation of parties in office risks becoming the 
recycling of failures” (Rose, 2014: 264). 
A possible answer may arise from a learning model of party government (Rose, 2014) 
which sees both voters and parties as able to alter, respectively, their policy preferences 
and their electoral promises according to the contingent constraints imposed by external 
reality.  
As far as voters are concerned, it is not to be aprioristically excluded that we can think 
about them in an optimistic perspective. Indeed, voters cannot be represented only as 
subjects endowed with fixed or exogenous policy preferences. Rather, they are rational 
actors, able to evaluate feedbacks starting from policy outcomes and to formulate 
judgements that take into account the real constraints on the capacity of their national 
governments to meet their preferences. Accordingly, in times of crises, citizens may 
modify their expectations toward governmental activity exactly as they are able to adjust 
their standards of living to the economic circumstances. 
Of course, voters may modify their expectations only if political parties adopt blame 
sharing tactics. In detail, both governing and opposition parties should encourage the 
awareness in the electorate that, whichever party wins the election, many aspects will 
remain beyond their control. All parties aspiring to govern need to be more explicit in 
their electoral manifestos about the constraints they are likely to face once in office if they 
want to prevent the destruction of the party system (i.e., if they want to guarantee their 
survival). This may be an intriguing research topic for further developments of this 
dissertation. Indeed, it would be interesting to measure the percentage of quasi sentences 
referring to external constraints in parties’ electoral manifestos. In this way, it would be 
possible to operationalize such blame sharing tactics, relating them to parties electoral 
behaviours and vote shares. 
As far as parties’ are concerned, at the election time they can compete on two kinds of 
issues: “position issues” and “valence issues” (Stokes, 1963). The former “involve 
advocacy of government actions from a set of alternatives over which a distribution of 
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voter preferences is defined”, while the latter “merely involve the linking of the parties 
with some condition that is positively or negatively valued by the electorate”. Twenty 
years later, James M. Enelow and Melvin J. Hinich (1982) clarified this distinction. In 
detail, they defined position issues as those that determine conflicts of interest among 
groups of electors (e.g., being in favor of or against welfare state expansion, civil 
partnership, etc.) and valence issues as those candidate characteristics about which all 
electors share the same (positive or negative) judgment. Giving the fact that all voters 
hold identical positions, valence issues can be both policy-based (e.g., reducing crime or 
increasing economic growth) and non-policy based (e.g., trustworthiness, credibility, 
integrity, campaigning ability, etc.) (Curini, 2015).  
With increasing external constraints exercised by intergovernmental institutions spanning 
continents and limited margin of manoeuvre at their disposal given by deteriorating 
economic conditions and debt crises, parties may still compete on non-policy based 
valence issues at the election time. Indeed, “character valence” attributes, such as honesty 
and competence (i.e., on which one would be best in coping with external constraint), and 
“strategic valence” attributes, such as fundraising skill, name recognition and campaigning 
ability (Adams et al., 2011) are expected to gain more and more space in electoral 
manifestos and to increasingly determines party fortunes.  
Literature has already underlined the effect of valence issues on political parties’ electoral 
support (See, inter alia, Abney et al., 2013; Buttice & Stone, 2012; Clark, 2009, 2014; Clarke 
et al., 2009; Green & Jennings, 2012). In detail, Luigi Curini (2015) and Paolo Martelli 
(together, 2015) demonstrated through a comparative analysis that, in multiparty systems, 
the more parties resemble each other on the ideological left-right continuum (i.e., when 
two or more parties are spatially adjacent on position issues), the greater their incentive 
to make use of non-policy based valence issues as a competitive strategy. Indeed, adjacent 
parties are less likely to praise one’s own policy position and to criticize that of one’s 
adversary because, as the two programs are very similar, would be like to praising the 
adversary’s position and criticizing one’s own (Curini, 2015). 
From a normatively informed vision of representative democracy, this expected shift 
from position issues to valence issues, especially to non-policy based ones, in party 
competition has to be considered positive or negative?  
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On the one hand, it seems to rule out the celebrated proposal formulated by the cartel 
party thesis, according to which the evolution of party structure toward the cartel party 
would have determined collusion and limited political competition (Katz & Mair, 1995). 
Indeed, as the salience of position issues declines, parties’ incentives for campaigning on 
non-policy based valence issues is expected to increase, making it harder for the same 
parties to collude as a cartel (Curini, 2015; Curini & Martelli, 2015; Krouwel, 2012). 
On the other hand, this dissertation demonstrated that, even in this world of constrained 
choice, political parties are still able to shape social policies according to their ideological 
preferences, which largely mirrors their electoral promises and their voters will. With 
limited margin of manoeuvre at their disposal, being ruled by a left government or by a 
right one still makes a difference on the policy outcomes citizens are likely to get.  
The recent past is here to remind us that an international financial crisis can blow up in a 
few days with painful and long-lasting consequences on national public finances. Similarly, 
transnational terrorist attacks and states’ failures may occur without warning, leaving an 
unsettling aftermath with thousands of refugees searching for a safe harbor. Even 
adopting a pessimistic perspective, in this context, there is still a position issue on which 
parties have to confront themselves at the election time, namely on how the costs of 
economic difficulties should be distributed among different societal segments. 
Over the long term, this new regime of “constrained choice” imposed on political parties 
by European integration, economic globalization, demographic changes and adverse 
economic circumstances may even generate societal benefits. Indeed, choosing to balance 
public budgets over the cycle may be considered as the provision of a public good (Laffan, 
2014). In this way, governing parties may prevent the society to adopt policy 
commitments at the expenses of future generations. Similarly, external surveillance and 
scrutiny performed by third bodies and technical agencies may shed light on distributive 
policies that favor some societal segments over others, leaving to domestic rent seekers 
fewer places to hide. 
Although a number of scholars argued that, with the end of the Cold War, the division 
between left and right has lost its grip on Western democracies so that these concepts 
have become obsolete and blurred (e.g., Giddens, 1994; Fairclough 2000), this dissertation 
revealed that ideology still plays a role, at least in shaping social policy outcomes.  
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Even in this era of welfare state retrenchment and constrained choice, there will always 
be reasons to side for the left or the right. The end of history (Fukuyama, 2006) has jet to 
come. 
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Woldendorp, J., Keman, H. & Budge, I. 
(2000). Party Government in 20 Democracies, 
1945-1998. Dordrecht, Boston and London: 
Kluwer Academic Publishers.  
Seki, K. &. Williams, L. K. (2014). 
“Updating the Party Government Data 
Set”. Electoral Studies 34: 270-279.  
Budge, I., Klingemann, H. D., Volkens, A., 
Bara, J. & Tanenbaum, E. (2001). Mapping 
Policy Preferences. Estimates for Parties, Electors, 
and Governments 1945-1998. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
Volkens, A., Lehmann, P., Merz, N., Regel, 
S., Werner, A. & Schultze, H. (2014): The 
Manifesto Data Collection. Manifesto Project 
(MRG/CMP/MARPOR). Version 2014b. 
Berlin: Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für 
Sozialforschung (WZB). 
Cabinet weighted  
mean on the 
welfare dimension 
As  before but on the welfare 
dimension. Partyi position: 
(per505)-(per503+per504) 
Cabinet weighted  
mean on welfare 
state expansion 
As before, but on welfare state 
expansion. Partyi position: 
per503+per504 
Cabinet – voter 
distance  
on the RILE 
dimension 
Early based distance between the 
cabinet’s position and that of the 
median voter on the RILE 
dimension. 
Cabinet – voter 
distance  
on the welfare 
dimension 
As before, but on the welfare 
dimension. 
Cabinet – voter 
distance  
on welfare state 
expansion 
As before, but on welfare state 
expansion. 
Median party – 
voter distance  
on the RILE 
dimension 
Early based distance between the 
position of the median party in 
Parliament and that of the median 
voter on the RILE dimension. 
Budge, I., Klingemann, H. D., Volkens, A., 
Bara, J. & Tanenbaum, E. (2001). Mapping 
Policy Preferences. Estimates for Parties, Electors, 
and Governments 1945-1998. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
Volkens, A., Lehmann, P., Merz, N., Regel, 
S., Werner, A. & Schultze, H. (2014): The 
Manifesto Data Collection. Manifesto Project 
(MRG/CMP/MARPOR). Version 2014b. 
Berlin: Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für 
Sozialforschung (WZB). 
Median party – 
voter distance  
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Appendix Table 6.2: Descriptive statistics 
Variable  Mean  Std. Dev. Min  Max Observations 
Social expenditure  overall 21.386 4.983 5.8 36 N = 766 
between  4.184 14.669 29.334 n = 27 
within  2.728 5.827 30.286 T = 28.370 
Cabinet weighted mean  
on the RILE dimension 
overall 0.126 15.004 -36.653 48.458 N = 772 
between  8.436 -17.035 16.960 n = 27 
within  12.367 -32.869 42.224 T-bar = 28.593 
Cabinet weighted mean  
on the welfare dimension 
overall -11.55 6.03 -39.7 2.572 N = 772 
between  3.353 -20.431 -4.187 n = 27 
within  4.984 -32.909 3.33 T-bar = 28.593 
Cabinet weighted mean  
on welfare state expansion 
overall 12.168 5.82 0 39.7 N = 772 
between  3.24 4.919 21.157 n = 27 
within  4.794 -2.778 33.272 T-bar = 28.593 
Cabinet – voter distance  
on the RILE dimension 
overall 2.68 10.935 -20.078 47.250 N = 771 
between  4.058 -3.043 15.568 n = 27 
within  10.135 -25.197 34.362 T-bar = 28.556 
Cabinet – voter distance  
on the welfare dimension 
overall -0.083 3.489 -22.028 10.488 N = 771 
between  1.041 -2.164 2.544 n = 27 
within  3.329 -21.275 10.843 T-bar = 28.556 
Cabinet – voter distance  
on welfare state expansion 
overall 0.226 3.291 -8.85 22.028 N = 769 
between  1.079 -2.893 2.3652 n = 27 
within  3.115 -8.201 21.429 T-bar = 28.481 
Median party – voter distance  
on the RILE dimension 
overall 0.251 8.176 -20.612 47.250 N = 824 
between  3.954 -5.036 14.586 n = 27 
within  7.146 -21.327 32.915 T-bar = 30.518 
Median party – voter distance  
on the welfare dimension 
overall 0.123 2.235 -12.111 9.802 N = 822 
between  0.9344 -1.57 2.503 n = 27 
within  2.032 -10.418 7.422 T-bar = 30.444 
Median party – voter distance  
on welfare state expansion 
overall -0.151 2.135 -7.992 11.545 N = 822 
between  0.9115 -2.823 1.298 n = 27 
within  1.94 -5.761 10.450 T-bar = 30.444 
Median voter’s position  
on the RILE dimension 
overall -2.565 11.227 -33.233 39.64 N = 824 
between  6.934 -18.397 12.913 n = 27 
within  8.853 -32.12 32.181 T-bar = 30.518 
Median voter’s position  
on the welfare dimension 
overall -11.581 4.87 -32.213 -0.3 N = 822 
between  3.066 -18.67 -3.398 n = 27 
within  3.808 -25.123 0.275 T-bar = 30.444 
Median voter’s position  
on welfare state expansion 
overall 12.077 4.69 1.992 32.213 N = 822 
between  2.847 4.69 19.117 n = 27 
within  3.736 2.312 25.23 T-bar = 30.444 
GDP growth overall 2.398 2.902 -14.738 11.736 N = 819 
between  0.969 1.084 4.545 n = 27 
within  2.763 -16.885 9.59 T-bar = 30.333 
Debt overall 62.501 33.794 4.638 216.477 N = 776 
between  28.585 9.703 124.908 n = 27 
within  19.576 -3.975 164.347 T-bar = 28.741 
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Inflation overall 6.364 22.011 -4.5 552.1 N = 820 
between  8.454 1.03 44.821 n = 27 
within  20.707 -37.558 513.642 T-bar = 30.37 
Unemployment overall 7.373 4.037 0.166 24.8 N = 808 
between  3.398 2.416 15.767 n = 27 
within  2.375 -0.194 22.672 T-bar = 29.926 
Elderly overall 14.541 2.47 9.1 24.1 N = 828 
between  1.804 11.112 17.46 n = 27 
within  1.711 8.001 23.001 T-bar = 30.667 
Trade unions overall 40.403 21.488 7.1 99.1 N = 764 
between  19.649 10.329 85.776 n = 27 
within  8.401 20.648 108.86 T = 28.296 
Trade openness overall 84.707 47.87 15.924 319.554 N = 801 
between  45.172 22.998 230.696 n = 27 
within  17.544 6.087 173.565 T = 29.667 
Financial openness overall 0.792 0.288 0 1 N = 757 
between  0.19 0.3 1 n = 26 
within  0.227 0.039 1.253 T-bar = 29.115 
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Appendix Table 6.3: Effects of government’s (M) and median voter’s (T) positions on social 
expenditure (Y) 
 Welfare state expansion Welfare state expansion 
 M2b (First step) M4b (Second step) 
Cabinet weighted meant-1 0.0235**  
 (0.00730)  
Median voter’s positiont-1  0.0182* 
  (0.00894) 
Yt-1 -0.0704* -0.0708** 
 (0.0275) (0.0272) 
GDP growtht-1 -0.111*** -0.110** 
 (0.0330) (0.0335) 
Debtt-1 -0.00457 -0.00466 
 (0.00311) (0.00312) 
Inflationt-1 0.0426* 0.0382† 
 (0.0214) (0.0216) 
Unemploymentt-1 -0.0827*** -0.0875*** 
 (0.0211) (0.0210) 
Elderlyt-1 0.141** 0.137** 
 (0.0444) (0.0434) 
Trade unionst-1 -0.0243** -0.0228** 
 (0.00820) (0.00756) 
Trade openness t-1 -0.00208 -0.00275 
 (0.00665) (0.00665) 
Financial openness t-1 0.130 0.177 
 (0.293) (0.301) 
Constant 1.088 1.211 
 (1.495) (1.497) 
Year and country d. Yes Yes 
R2 0.290 0.282 
N 642 650 
Notes: OLS estimations with panel corrected standard errors in parentheses. The dependent variable is 
the change in the total public and mandatory private social expenditure as percentage of GDP from 
one year to the next. † p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. 
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Appendix Table 6.4: Effect of median voter’s position (T) on social expenditure (Y) controlling 
for cabinet’s and median legislator’s positions 
 Welfare state expansion Welfare state expansion 
 M6b M8b 
Median voter’s positiont-1  0.0182† 0.0176† 
 (0.00955) (0.00959) 
Cabinet-voter distancet-1 0.0296** 0.0231* 
 (0.00937) (0.0117) 
Median party-voter distancet-1   0.0200 
  (0.0158) 
Yt-1 -0.0693* -0.0677* 
 (0.0276) (0.0276) 
GDP growtht-1  -0.110*** -0.109*** 
 (0.0330) (0.0331) 
Debtt-1 -0.00494 -0.00522 
 (0.00315) (0.00318) 
Inflationt-1 0.0432* 0.0445* 
 (0.0214) (0.0214) 
Unemploymentt-1 -0.0826*** -0.0829*** 
 (0.0211) (0.0211) 
Elderlyt-1 0.145** 0.151*** 
 (0.0443) (0.0450) 
Trade unionst-1 -0.0243** -0.0246** 
 (0.00816) (0.00814) 
Trade openness t-1 -0.00216 -0.00214 
 (0.00667) (0.00668) 
Financial openness t-1 0.119 0.127 
 (0.295) (0.295) 
Constant 1.129 1.001 
 (1.497) (1.494) 
Year and country d. Yes Yes 
R2 0.291 0.292 
N 639 639 
Notes: OLS estimations with panel corrected standard errors in parentheses. The dependent variable is 
the change in the total public and mandatory private social expenditure as percentage of GDP from 
one year to the next. † p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. 
 
  
CONCLUSION 
256 
Appendix Table 6.5: Mediation analysis  
 Welfare state expansion 
 M11b (I step) M12b (II step) 
Dependent variable Cabinet-voter distancet-1 ∆Social expenditure 
Median voter’s positiont-1 0.007 0.0229* 
(0.0389) (0.0089) 
Cabinet-voter distancet-1  0.0291* 
 (0.014) 
Median party-voter distancet-1 0.8062*** -0.0051 
(0.1005) (0.0236) 
Yt-1 0.0477 -0.0391*** 
 (0.0392) (0.0091) 
GDP growtht-1 0.0917* -0.1046*** 
 (0.0435) (0.025) 
Debtt-1 0.0015 -0.0013 
 (0.0043) (0.0012) 
Inflationt-1 0.0453 0.0397* 
 (0.0454) (0.0156) 
Unemploymentt-1 0.0132 -0.0461** 
 (0.0658) (0.013) 
Elderlyt-1 -0.0001 0.0558** 
 (0.0922) (0.018) 
Trade unionst-1 0.0023 -0.0047* 
 (0.0109) (0.0022) 
Trade opennesst-1 0.0057 0.0014 
 (0.0049) (0.0011) 
Financial opennesst-1 -0.0434 0.0296 
 (0.8083) (0.1432) 
Constant -1.9397 -0.2106 
 (1.5761) (0.3024) 
Year dummies Yes Yes 
R2 0.332 0.213 
N 639 639 
Notes: OLS estimations with robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. † p<0.10, * 
p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. 
 
 
Appendix Table 6.6: Simulated direct (ADE) and indirect (ACME) eff. of median voter’s 
position on social exp. 
Welfare state expansion 
Effect Mean 95% conf. interval 
ACME 0.0002 -0.0023 0.0028 
ADE 0.0236* 0.0071 0.0403 
ATE 0.0238* 0.0068 0.0409 
 
i The Kim and Fording’s formula to estimate the median voter’s position is M=L+[(50-
C)/F]*W. M is the median voter position (ideological score); L is the lower end 
(ideological score) of the interval containing the median; C is the cumulative frequency 
(vote share) up to but not including the interval containing the median; F is the frequency 
(vote share) in the interval containing the median; W is the width of the interval containing 
the median. For a more complete description of this procedure, see Kim and Fording 
(1998). 
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ii Whereas Kim and Fording locate different parties on a scale that ranges from 0 (left) to 
100 (right), McDonald, Mendes and Budge employed a left-right scale that ranges from  -
100 (left) to +100 (right). In the following analyzes, I will use this kind of left-right scale. 
iii As in chapter III, the robustness of the results obtained on the welfare dimension has 
been tested by employing a second version of this variable, namely median voter’s position on 
welfare state expansion only. The formula behind this additional variable corresponds to the 
one employed in chapter II to operationalize political parties’ social policy supply on the 
welfare dimension (Cfr. Chapter II, Section 2.2). In detail, it is equal to the CMP 
dimension “welfare”, which sums the CMP variables per 504, referring to welfare state 
expansion, and per503, referring to social justice (Cfr. Appendix tables 6.1 and 6.2). 
iv In detail, the variable total private and mandatory private social expenditure as percentage of GDP 
is available from the year 1990 for Czech Republic, Greece, Iceland and Poland; 1995 for 
Slovakia and Slovenia; 1999 for Estonia and Hungary.  
v A second version of the variable weighted cabinet position on the welfare dimension has been 
calculated, namely the weighted cabinet position on welfare state expansion only. It corresponds 
to the weighted (parliamentary seats) mean of governing parties’ positions on the CMP 
dimension “welfare” (CMP variables per503 and per504; cfr. Appendix Tables 6.1 and 
6.2). 
vi A second version of the variable cabinet - voter distance on the welfare dimension has been 
calculated, namely the cabinet – voter distance on welfare state expansion only. It corresponds to 
the distance between the position of the ruling coalition on the CMP dimension “welfare” 
(CMP variables per503 and per504) and that of the median voter on the same dimension 
(Cfr. Appendix Tables 6.1 and 6.2). 
vii A second version of the variable median party - voter distance on the welfare dimension has been 
calculated, namely the median party - voter distance on welfare state expansion only. It corresponds 
to the distance between the position of the party containing the median legislator on the 
CMP dimension “welfare” (CMP variables per503 and per504) and that of the median 
voter on the same scale (Cfr. Appendix Tables 6.1 and 6.2). 
viii Appendix Table 6.3 tests the robustness of the results discussed so far on the welfare 
dimension by employing the second versions of the variables weighted cabinet position and 
median voter’s position on the welfare dimension (Cfr. Appendix Tables 6.1 and 6.2 and endnotes 
iii and v). As in Chapter III (Cfr. Chapter III, Appendix Table 3.2), indeed, these 
additional variables are based on the CMP dimension “welfare” (CMP variables per503 
and per504). Overall, models M2b and M4b confirm previous results. In particular, M2b 
highlights that, if the governing coalition moves one point toward a more expansionary 
attitude in the year t-1, the change in the share of social expenditure over GDP in the year 
t is expected to be 0.02 percentage points higher than what it would have been without 
this shift. M4b proves that, if the median voter's position moves one point toward a more 
expansionary attitude in the year t-1, the change in the share of social expenditure over 
GDP in the year t is expected to be 0.02 percentage points higher than what it would have 
been without this shift. Note that the coefficients are positive because these variables refer 
to welfare state expansion only. 
ix The pairwise correlation coefficient between the mediator and the treatment variables 
on welfare state expansion only (CMP dimension “welfare”, given by the CMP variables 
per503 and per504) is equal to 0.843 (significant at 5% level or better). 
x The pairwise correlation coefficient between the position of the median parliamentarian 
and that of the median voter on the RILE dimension is equal to 0.846 (significant at 5% 
level or better); while the one on the welfare dimension is equal to 0.917 (significant at 
5% level or better). The pairwise correlation coefficient is equal to 0.918 (significant at 
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5% level or better) even taking into account only positive statements on welfare state 
expansions (CMP dimension “welfare”, equal to the CMP variables per503 and per504). 
The similarity between the position of the median voter and that of the median 
parliamentarian suggests embedding this last political actor in the model specification as 
difference from the median voter's placement. 
xi Appendix Table 6.4 tests the robustness of the results obtained by models M6 and M8 
displayed in Table 6.4. Models M6b and M8b, indeed, embed the second versions of the 
variables cabinet-voter distance and median party-voter distance on the welfare dimension (Cfr. 
Appendix Tables 6.1 and 6.2 and endnotes vi and vii), which are based on the CMP 
variables per503 and per504. Overall, models M6b and M8b confirm previous results, 
estimating positive relations between unitary shifts in the lagged median voter’s positions 
toward more expansionary attitudes and the annual change in the share of social 
expenditure over GDP. Note that the coefficients are positive because these variables 
refer to welfare state expansion only. 
xii In randomized studies, the probability of receiving the treatment does not depend on 
the values of the potential outcomes. Formally, the treatment is jointly independent from 
the potential outcomes, {Yi(1), Yi(0)}⊥⊥Ti. In observational studies, researchers have to 
statistically adjust for the observed differences in the pretreatment covariates Xi between 
the treatment and control groups through regression, matching or other techniques. 
Assuming that the treatment is assigned as if it is randomized among those units that have 
identical values of the observed pretreatment covariates, {Yi(1), Yi(0)} ⊥⊥Ti|Xi=x for 
any value x in the support of Xi. 
xiii Appendix Table 6.5 displays the regressions the mediation analysis is based on for the 
scale “welfare state expansion”, which corresponds on the CMP dimension “welfare” 
(CMP variables per503 and per504). In detail, model M11b, referring to the first step of the 
analysis, employs ordinary least squares (OLS) with robust standard errors clustered by 
country to estimate the effect of median voter’s position in t-1 (T) on cabinet-voter 
distance in t-1 (M). As before (Cfr. Table 6.5, M11), the coefficient of the treatment 
variable fails to reach statistical significance. This result is reasonable because the mediator 
variable is operationalized as cabinet’s deviation from median voter’s position. Model M12b 
estimates the effect of median voter’s positions in t-1 on the annual change in total private 
and mandatory private social expenditure as percentage of GDP including the mediator 
variables among the covariates (i.e., the second step of the analysis). Here too (Cfr. Table 
6.5, M12), median voter’s position has a direct effect on the outcome variable. Indeed, 
model M12b reveals that a unitary shift in median voter’s position toward a more 
expansionary attitude with respect to welfare state provisions increases the annual change 
in social expenditure over GDP of about 0.02 percentage points. 
xiv Appendix Table 6.6 presents the ACME and the ADE of median voter’s position on 
the annual change in social expenditure as percentage over GDP for the dimension 
“welfare state expansion” (i.e., CMP dimension “welfare”, given by the CMP variables 
per503 and per504). Here too (Cfr. Table 6.6), there is significant and positive direct effect 
of median voter’s positions on the annual change in social expenditure, but no indirect 
effects via the distance between the position of the ruling coalition and that of the median 
voter. 
